The concept ‘fairness’ in the regulation of contracts under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 by Stoop, Philip N.
THE CONCEPT ‘FAIRNESS’ IN THE REGULATION OF 
CONTRACTS UNDER THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 68 
OF 2008 
 
by 
 
PHILIP NICOLAAS STOOP 
 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF LAWS 
 
at the 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
SUPERVISOR: PROF CJ VISSER 
JUNE 2012 
ii 
 
SUMMARY 
The thesis analyses the concept ‘fairness’ in consumer contracts regulated by 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, mainly from the perspective of a 
freedom and fairness orientation.  It discusses the evolution of ‘fairness’ as 
background to a more detailed discussion of the classification of fairness into 
substantive and procedural fairness.  The thesis examines dimensions of 
fairness, factors which play a role in the determination of fairness, and fairness-
oriented approaches in an attempt to formulate a framework for fairness in 
consumer contracts.  The main aspects that should be taken into account to 
justify a finding of fairness, or to determine whether a contract is fair, are 
identified.  This analysis addresses, too, the extent to which the fairness 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act are appropriate (with reference to the 
law of South Africa, Europe, and England).  
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1 Problem Statement 
The concept ‘fairness’ has been implemented in full in consumer contracts by 
the Consumer Protection Act.1  Although the concept ‘fairness’ is not foreign to 
South African law, the content of and test for fairness or unfairness in a 
consumer-protection context must be ascertained and developed.  The law of 
contract forms the basis of most aspects of consumer-protection law.  As 
consumer-protection law has developed rapidly during the past few years, it is 
necessary to understand how the concept ‘fairness’ operates, what its contents 
are, and how it will impact on consumer contracts regulated by the CPA. The 
aim of this thesis is to consider the law relating to fairness in consumer 
contracts regulated by the CPA.  One of the main issues is that is not clear what 
we mean when we refer to ‘fairness’; put differently, the concept ‘fairness’ is not 
defined in the CPA.  A further source of uncertainty is how the concept ‘fairness’ 
influences freedom of contract.  In this thesis, I shall discuss the existing 
legislation and the backdrop to this legislation (the common law and legislative 
developments).  My aim is, accordingly, to develop a sound understanding of 
the concept ‘fairness’ in consumer contracts regulated by the CPA.   
2 Chapter Overview 
In chapter 2, I shall explain the philosophical context within which the regulation 
of fairness in the law of contract must be understood.  In the discussion the 
issue of fairness in contract is described in terms of juxtapositions such as 
freedom orientations as against fairness orientations. 
                                                            
1
 68 of 2008 (‘CPA’). 
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Chapter 3 contains an explanation of the dimensions of fairness, which are 
substantive, procedural, abstract, and contextual fairness. Traditionally, the law 
of contract merely provides a framework within which contracts are enforced 
without concern for their context.  Legislation, such as the CPA, is then adopted 
to address this imbalance by, among others, regulating the fairness of contract 
terms. In this chapter, I shall give a brief overview of what must be considered 
when one introduces considerations of ‘fairness’ by means of consumer 
legislation.  I shall identify dimensions of fairness, factors which play a role in 
the determination of fairness, and fairness-oriented approaches, in an attempt 
to formulate a framework for fairness. Such a framework will indicate the 
aspects that should be taken into account to justify a finding of fairness, or to 
determine whether a contract is fair. 
In chapter 4, I shall give a brief overview of the background and main 
developments of the concept ‘fairness’ in the South African law of contract.  In 
the course of this overview, I shall discuss the common law, the exceptio doli 
generalis, the South African Law Commission’s Report on Fairness, the role of 
good faith and public policy, and the background to the CPA. 
Chapter 5 forms the crux of this thesis.  In this chapter I shall analyse the 
concept ‘fairness’ in consumer contracts regulated by the CPA.  In this chapter, 
I shall critically analyse ‘fairness’ with reference to the framework set out in 
chapter 3, and, specifically with reference to substantive and procedural 
fairness.  Substantive fairness is discussed under generalized and individual 
substantive fairness.  In this chapter uncertainties are pointed out, the 
provisions of the CPA are criticized, and suggestions for reform are made.  
Section 2(2) of the CPA provides that ‘when interpreting or applying this Act, a 
person, court or Tribunal or the Commission may consider appropriate foreign 
and international law…’. In chapter 6, I shall discuss the two basic contractual 
fairness regimes of the United Kingdom, which are in many ways similar to the 
Consumer Protection Act.  The first regime is contained in the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977, and the second regime, which is based on the Unfair Contract 
Introduction 
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Terms Directive adopted by the Council of the European Communities,2 is 
contained in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.3  
Article 10(1) of the Directive obliges member states to bring their laws, 
regulations, and administrative provisions into force to comply with the 
Directive, by not later than 31 December 1994.  The provisions of the Directive 
can be divided in three sections: (a) an attempt to formulate a European 
concept ‘unfairness’; (b) interpretation and plain language; and (c) the legal 
consequences of unfairness. The Directive provides a list of terms that can be 
considered as unfair (abusive).  The Directive was, to a large extent, followed 
when the CPA was drafted.  These instruments are accordingly used to 
interpret the concept ‘fairness’ in consumer contracts regulated by the CPA. 
In chapter 7, I shall make recommendations in respect of the concept ‘fairness’ 
in consumer contracts regulated by the CPA.  These recommendations will 
include amendments to the CPA and suggestions for judicial interpretation. 
  
                                                            
2
 EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC). 
3
 Statutory Instrument 1999 no 2083. 
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1 Introduction 
The issue of fairness in contracts is often described in terms of juxtapositions 
such as freedom of contract as against fairness, or individualism as against 
paternalism, collectivism, or welfarism.1  So, to understand what the concept 
‘fairness’ entails, one has to understand its philosophical context. 
Traditionally, individualism underpinned the law of contract.  Individualism 
assumes a world of traders who meet briefly on the market floor, where they 
engage in transactions.  In a political form individualism advances a universe of 
agents with exclusive control over their private domain of autonomy in which the 
role of the state is limited and in which legal relationships are defined by free 
consent on the assumption that consent is a manifestation of individual 
autonomy. The dominant ideas linked to individualism are individual autonomy 
and self-reliance.2  Individualism manifested in the South African law of 
contract, among others, through the rise of the doctrine of freedom of contract, 
which requires that the parties be left alone to choose what contract they want, 
                                                            
1
 AJ Barnard A Critical Legal Argument for Contractual Justice in the South African Law of 
Contract (2005) (unpublished LLD thesis: University of Pretoria) 65-67; A Cockrell ‘Substance 
and Form in the South African Law of Contract’ (1992) 109 SALJ 40 at 41-42; T Wilhelmsson & 
C Willet ‘Unfair Terms and Standard Form Contracts’ in G Howells, I Ramsay, T Wilhelmsson & 
D Kraft Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law (2010) 158; T Wilhelmsson 
‘Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 712 at 712-
713. 
2
 P Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 4-5; A Cockrell 
‘Substance and Form in the South African Law of Contract’ (1992) 109 SALJ 40 at 41-42; S 
Lukes Individualism (2006) 17-18.   
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with whom and on what terms, with very little scope for judicial interference.3  In 
Wells v SA Alumenite Co4 the then Appellate Division held that –  
‘… if there is one thing which, more than other, public policy requires, it is that men 
of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting 
and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held 
sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice.’
5
 
So, provided that a person is not a minor or suffering from a mental illness, and 
his or her consent is not vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, his or her 
contractual undertakings will always be enforced. The courts have always 
enforced contracts as expressed in the rule that agreements must be honoured 
(pacta sunt servanda), which is based on individualism, autonomy, personal 
liberty and freedom of contract.6  The common law, therefore, in general did not 
provide a remedy against the enforcement of an unfair contract or the 
enforcement of a contract in unfair circumstances, because intervention by the 
courts would have been a form of paternalism inconsistent with the parties’ 
freedom of contract.  However, the common law has developed principles to 
curb unfairness in the making of a contract, for example, rules on quasi-mutual 
assent, misrepresentation, undue influence, mistake and illegality.7  In Burger v 
Central South African Railways8 the court set an absolute rule when it held that 
‘our law does not recognise the right of a court to release a contracting party 
from the consequences of an agreement duly entered into by him merely 
                                                            
3
 See A Chrenkoff ‘Freedom of Contract: A New Look at the History and Future of the Idea’ 
(1996) 21 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36 at 36-39 for a discussion on freedom of 
contract and liberalism. 
4
 1927 AD 69.  See also Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571 at 576 where the 
court held that ‘our law does not recognise the right of a court to release a contracting party 
from the consequences of an agreement duly entered into by him merely because that 
agreement appears to be unreasonable’. 
5
 At 72.  The court based its findings on the judgment in Printing Registering Co v Sampson LR 
19 Eq 462 at 465. 
6
 See para 2.1 in ch 4.  See also RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South 
Africa 5
th
 ed (2005) 12; A Cockrell ‘Substance and Form in the South African Law of contract’ 61 
(1992) SALJ 40 at 41 and 61. 
7
 RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5
th
 ed (2005) 13-14. 
8
 1903 TS 571. 
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because that agreement appears to be unreasonable.’9 This absolute rule was, 
however, over time whittled away by the courts which will not enforce an 
unreasonable restraint of trade10 and an unfair term in an unsigned contract 
(ticket contract)11 or contract that has been signed without being read.12  
Recently, however, in many jurisdictions, after the introduction of legislation that 
implements fairness, welfarism has increasingly impacted on the traditional 
basis of contract law.  In this chapter I shall explain the philosophical context 
within which the regulation of fairness in the law of contract must be 
understood.   
2 Unfair Contracts 
Unfair contract terms are usually an issue with standard form contracts.  The 
traditional emphasis of the law of contract is on party autonomy, and the will or 
consent of the parties, or their true consensus, as the factors that impart 
legitimacy to the binding force of contracts.13  In the process, it is accepted that 
a party, who might not even have read the terms or who knows nothing about 
their content, is bound by them.14  Sometimes, where standard-term contracts 
are used, there is a lack of transparency in the process leading to the contract, 
because of the lack of negotiations.15  A lack of transparency leads to situations 
where there is no informed consent or true consensus, where consumers are 
not aware of the existence of certain contractual terms or the risks to 
                                                            
9
 At 576. 
10
 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
11
 RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5
th
 ed (2005) 179-183. 
12
 George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (AD); RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 5
th
 ed (2005) 178-179. 
13
 A van Rensburg ‘Die Grondslag van Kontraktuele Gebondenheid’ (1986) 49 THRHR 448. 
14
 See, for example, Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd v Government of the United Kingdom 
2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA); King’s Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Wakeling 1970 (4) SA 640 (N); Central SAR 
v McLaren 1903 TS 727. 
15
 GTS Eiselen ‘Die Standaardbedingprobleem: Ekonomiese Magsmisbruik, 
Verbruikersvraagstuk of Probleem in Eie Reg’ (1988) 22 De Jure 251 at 254-256. 
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consumers posed by these contractual terms, where they cannot compare 
competing offers or terms, and where they cannot negotiate more favourable 
terms.16 
A further problem is that standard-term contracts can lead to abuse:  the party 
drafting a standard-term contract may insert clauses restricting the other party’s 
rights without the latter realising it,17 as he or she may not have the time, or the 
skill, to understand the document.18  Another problem when standard-term 
contracts are used is that in many instances no negotiation may take place 
before the parties enter into a contract.  A standard-term contract is then merely 
a contract between two parties where the terms are set by one of the parties 
and the other party is placed in a ‘take it or leave it’ position, with no ability to 
negotiate, commonly referred to as a contract of adhesion or contrat d’ 
adhésion.19 
However, it must be conceded that, from a supplier of goods or services’ view, 
standard-term contracts have certain benefits.  A supplier of goods or services 
on a large scale enters into thousands of contracts per year.  It allows more 
consumers to obtain goods or services they might usually not be able to afford.  
Negotiation with every consumer is impractible for such suppliers and standard-
term contracts are therefore used.20  It simplifies and shortens the bargaining 
                                                            
16
 T Wilhelmsson & C Willet ‘Unfair Terms and Standard Form Contracts’ in G Howells, I 
Ramsay, T Wilhelmsson & D Kraft Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law 
(2010) 161-162. 
17
 Consumers often sign contracts without reading them because they assume that they do not 
contain unexpected terms or terms limiting their rights.  See RH Christie & V McFarlane The 
Law of Contract in South Africa 5
th
 ed (2005) 178-179. 
18
 H Beale ‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’ (1978) 5 British Journal of Law and Society 114 at 
115; R Bradgate ‘Unreasonable Standard Terms’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 582. 
19
 P Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 16-17. 
20
 H Beale ‘Unfair Contracts in Britain and Europe’ (1989) 42 Current Legal Problems 192; R 
Bradgate ‘Unreasonable Standard Terms’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 582. 
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process.  It also simplifies the administration of a business, allows for planning, 
and reduces costs.21   
In the next paragraphs, the philosophical context of the focus on unfairness in 
contracting procedures, unfair terms and unfair outcomes of contracts will be 
viewed by analysing the freedom and fairness orientations. 
3 Freedom Orientation 
3.1  Freedom of Contract 
3.1.1 Background to Freedom of Contract 
Although contracts have been part of human experience from time to 
immemorial contracts did not play a significant role in primitive societies.22  That 
is because in primitive societies based on kinship or family, liberal or capitalist 
impulses played an insignificant role since the individual was completely 
subsumed by the group and only seen in terms of his or her relationships with 
various other members of the same group.  The capitalist impulses therefore 
never had a chance to emerge in these societies.23  Freedom of contract did, 
however, made an appearance in ancient Rome.  Roman citizens were deemed 
to be free and autonomous individuals. Freedom of contract, however, declined 
following the fall of the Western Roman empire.24  Freedom of contract only 
                                                            
21
 H Beale ‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’ (1978) 5 British Journal of Law and Society 114 at 
114-115; C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) 16. 
22
 A Chrenkoff ‘Freedom of Contract: A New Look at the History and Future of the Idea’ (1996) 
21 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36 at 40. 
23
 A Chrenkoff ‘Freedom of Contract: A New Look at the History and Future of the Idea’ (1996) 
21 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36 at 40. 
24
 RS Lopez The Commercial Revolution in the Middle Ages, 950-1350 (1976) 48-49. 
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resurfaced in the Middle Ages in Western Europe, when trade revived on a 
large scale.25 
In England, the doctrine of freedom of contract was adopted by the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century promotors of the laissez-faire political economy.26  
Adam Smith was notable among them.  Although he never used the term 
‘laissez-faire’ he proposed the rule that legislation should not be used to 
interfere with freedom of contract.  He was therefore opposed to legislation 
regulating employment contracts and he advocated the removal of all restraints 
of trade.  Smith also believed that when an individual pursues his or her self-
interest, he or she indirectly promotes the good of society and that self-
interested competition in a free market would benefit the society by keeping 
prices low.27 However, freedom of contract was often regarded as exploitative 
and is therefore sometimes linked to an era in which greedy factory owners and 
capitalists exploited the working class.  These factory owners and capitalists 
pursued profit-making with no concern for public interests.  The dogmas of 
laissez-faire were invoked to protect workers’ freedom of contract while in reality 
the result was to give the factory owners complete freedom to exploit and ill-
treat workers.28  In this era, the working class had no real freedom.  After the 
                                                            
25
 EH Mielants The Origins of Capitalism and the ‘Rise of the West’ (2007) 32-42. 
26
 The French phrase laissez-faire literally means ‘leave you’.  It was used in England to broadly 
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Industrial Revolution, a capitalist society emerged, which led to the growth of 
the free market and the rise of freedom of contract.29  During this era fairness 
was excluded from contractual disputes due to the change in general beliefs 
about the determination of value. The value of contractual performance was 
believed to be only subjectively determinable and as a result the law of contract 
became an instrument to enforce contractual bargains without visiting its 
fairness.  So the adjudication of contractual disputes became formalistic and 
positivistic, without any regard to general social context.  It was also believed 
that it would be contrary to the market system and the need for commercial 
certainty to make contracts subject to equitable considerations.30 
3.1.2 The Meaning of Freedom of Contract 
The cornerstones of the individualist philosophy are (a) freedom of contract, and 
(b) sanctity of contract.31  Freedom of contract entails that one is free to decide, 
without interference, whether or not to contract,32 with whom one wants to 
contract (party freedom), and on the terms of the contract (term freedom).33  It is 
based on the notion that no-one can be forced to contract.34 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36 at 37-38; S Gordon ‘The London Economist and the 
High Tide of Laissez Faire’ (1955) 63 Journal of Political Economy 461–488. 
29
 PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 230-237; A Chrenkoff ‘Freedom 
of Contract: A New Look at the History and Future of the Idea’ (1996) 21 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 36 at 47. 
30
 AJ Barnard A Critical Legal Argument for Contractual Justice in the South African Law of 
Contract (2005) (unpublished LLD thesis: University of Pretoria) at 27. 
31
 C-J Pretorius ‘Individualism, Collectivism and the Limits of Good Faith’ (2003) 66 THRHR 638 
at 640. 
32
 The freedom not to contract is sometimes referred to as ‘freedom from contract’.  See C Willet 
Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) 18 and in general see T Rakoff ‘Is “Freedom From 
Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian Freedom?’ (2004) Wisconsin Law Review 477. 
33
 See also AJ Barnard A Critical Legal Argument for Contractual Justice in the South African 
Law of Contract (2005) (unpublished LLD thesis: University of Pretoria) 72-73; R Brownsword 
‘The Limits of Freedom of Contract and the Limits of Contract Theory’ (1995) 22 Journal of Law 
and Society 259 at 262-263; L Hawthorne ‘Closing the Open Norms in the Law of Contract’ 
Philosophical Context 
 
12 
 
A consequence of term freedom is that once the parties have concluded a 
contract, they must abide by it – sanctity of contract.35  This cornerstone finds 
expression in the maxim pacta sunt servanda and is based on individualism, 
autonomy, personal liberty, and freedom of contract.36   
Sanctity of contract emphasises that parties must be held to their contracts and 
that the courts should not adjust the terms of their contracts on the basis of 
unfairness.  Further, courts should not lightly relieve parties of their obligation to 
perform.  The principle of sanctity of contract is therefore against the 
paternalistic intervention in contracts by the courts.37 
This individualist tradition proposes a world of autonomous, freedom-seeking 
beings, and a body of the law of contract that aids them in their search.38  The 
essence of individualism can be described as: 
‘... the making of a sharp distinction between one’s interests and those of others, 
combined with the belief that a preference in conduct for one’s own interests is 
legitimate…. The form of conduct associated with individualism is self-reliance.  
This means an insistence on defining and achieving objectives without the help 
from others…. It means that they will neither share their gains nor one’s own 
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losses.  And it means a firm conviction that I am entitled to enjoy the benefits of my 
efforts without an obligation to share or sacrifice them to the interests of others’.
39 
Individualism further presupposes voluntary transactions, informed transactions, 
and consideration.40  It might also be termed the liberal conception of law, which 
puts a premium on equality of opportunity rather than on equality of outcome.  
That is because liberalism deems the individual to be the best arbiter of his or 
her own interests, and respects the individual choice.41  Individualism comprises 
two aspects – market ideology, and individualistic ideology.42   
In terms of the market ideology, the function of the contract is to facilitate 
competitive exchange.  It establishes the ground rules within which competitive 
commerce is conducted.  Parties are allowed to contract with minimal 
intervention and regulation.  The market promotes certain values – (a) the 
security of transactions must be protected, (b) the ground rules of contract must 
be clear to enable parties to plan their private transactions with the necessary 
circumspection, (c) the law should accommodate commercial practice, as the 
law of contract is concerned with the facilitation of market transactions, and (d) 
many of the rules relating to the formation of contracts are based on 
convenience.43 For example, the cautious approach toward allowing a party to 
escape liability on the basis of subjective mistake reflect the concern for the 
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security of transactions,44 and the rules on contracts made by post reflect rules 
based on convenience and commercial practice.45 
The reasoning in the previous paragraph can be criticised for accepting that all 
legal problems can be solved by the manipulation of a few ground rules of the 
law of contract that are assumed to be beyond controversy.46 
Individualism focuses on aspects such as (a) the voluntary choice of individuals 
to enter markets, (b) the voluntary choice to choose the parties with whom the 
contract is concluded, and (c) the voluntary choice to conclude contracts on the 
parties’ own terms and the choice to honour them.  The individualist ideology 
prefers individual autonomy, self-reliance, free will, and subjective intention.  
Thus, judicial intervention is limited in order that parties have the utmost 
freedom to strike their bargain.  The role of the law of contract is mainly to 
facilitate the voluntary choices of parties and to give effect to them.47 
3.1.3 Freedom of Contract in South Africa 
From a South African perspective, freedom of contract, finding expression in the 
maxim pacta sunt servanda, can be traced back to Roman law.48  The South 
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African law of contract has, however, also been influenced by nineteenth-
century English law and its will theory of contract.49  Freedom of contract is also 
regarded as a constitutional value, and as one of the cornerstones of the South 
African law of contract.50  The elevation of freedom of contract to a 
constitutional right is, however, incorrect, because a right to freedom of contract 
is nowhere to be found in the Constitution.51  Freedom of contract was omitted 
from the constitution.  The underlying constitutional value of freedom does not 
equate with complete individual liberty and does not found an independent right 
to unlimited contractual liberty.52  Freedom of contract in this context is 
significantly restricted by its interaction with the constitutional values of equality 
and dignity.53  Furthermore, a right to freedom of contract will be recognised 
only to the extent that such a right, and the conditions for and consequences of 
its exercise, are compatible with the Bill of Rights.54  Although the values of 
equality, freedom, and dignity may require doctrinal rules that give effect to the 
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individual’s voluntary decision to conclude a contract, it must be noted that such 
rules in themselves may infringe the right to dignity.55  The position could be 
summarised as follows: freedom and autonomy are not guaranteed ‘where one 
party effectively claims freedom of contract for it alone, whereas there is only 
freedom of contract for the other party in a very formalistic, hollow and 
practically meaningless sense’.56 
Freedom of contract is regarded as the basis of contractual obligations in the 
South African law of contract.  In Burger v Central South African Railways,57 the 
then Supreme Court found that the South African law of contract does not allow 
a court to release a party to a contract from his or her obligations on 
considerations of fairness.58  This rule was, however, challenged in Jajbhay v 
Cassim,59 where the Appeal Division found that public policy requires ‘simple 
justice between man and man’.  In Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De 
Ornelas and Others,60 the Appellate Division indicated its preference for 
individualism by doing away with the exceptio doli generalis in terms of which a 
contract could be declared unenforceable by a court on the basis of 
considerations of unfairness.  In Brisley v Drotsky,61 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal criticised attempts to breathe new life into the exceptio doli.  However, it 
was indicated in the minority judgment in Brisley that our law finds itself in a 
developmental phase where contractual justice is emerging increasingly as a 
juristic and moral norm.62  In Afrox Healthcare v Strydom,63 the Supreme Court 
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of Appeal held that good faith, reasonableness, and fairness are abstract 
considerations that are not free-floating bases for the non-enforcement of 
contacts: the court has no discretion to act on the basis of abstract ideas, but 
can act only on the basis of crystallised and established rules of law when it 
decides on the enforceability of a contractual term.  Before the enactment of the 
Consumer Protection Act,64 then, the courts followed an individualistic 
approach, as they did not find contracts to be unenforceable for unfairness, and 
they did not challenge freedom of contract on equitable grounds.65  So the 
courts in these cases also assumed that any judicial supervision of contracts 
was contrary to the principle of freedom of contract.66 
Until recent times freedom of contract was so stringently enforced that 
consumers were left to take care of themselves.  However, in modern times 
consumer protection increasingly appears as recognised legislative principle.67  
In short, the purpose of consumer protection and fairness regulation is to 
safeguard the actual consent of the consumer, in other words, to safeguard the 
substantive freedom of contract of the consumer.  The rules which have this aim 
focus mainly on the procedure for concluding the contract and less on the 
content of the contract.  So, these rules are based on procedural justices, in 
which negotiation and information are central.68 
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3.1.4 Freedom of Contract and the Process Leading to the Conclusion of a 
Contract 
3.1.4.1 Procedural Factors Involved in the Process Leading to the Conclusion 
of a Contract 
Although what happens in the course of the process leading to the contract is 
closely linked to the substantive contract itself, it is important to distinguish 
between the process or procedure leading to the making of a contract and the 
terms of a contract itself.  That is because the process leading to the contract 
affects the expectations parties have about the substance of the contract and 
the extent to which the parties are able to protect their interests in relation to the 
substance of the agreement.  It includes the way in which terms are presented 
or in other words, how ‘transparent’ the terms are.  Another important aspect is 
the options available to the consumer, for example, was the consumer under 
pressure or influence which affected his or her ability to choose freely to 
contract or not to contract.  If core terms, which include terms about the 
description, the price and delivery date, are not transparent, the consumer 
cannot compare the terms to those of competitors.  Even if a consumer has a 
choice or different options, traders often refuse to bargain with the consumer 
over terms.  If bargaining indeed takes place, the trader is usually in a strong 
enough bargaining position to enable him or her to avoid having to make 
significant changes to the terms.69  So, consumers are faced with issues of a 
lack of transparency, a lack of alternatives or choice, and bargaining issues. 
3.1.4.2 Freedom-oriented Approach and Procedural Factors 
Freedom of contract is concerned with maximising self-reliant freedom to 
pursue self-interest in the making of contracts.  So, at a procedural stage, it 
removes any constraints preventing the bringing about of a contract by 
maximising self-reliant freedom to enter into a binding agreement and 
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minimising attention paid to restrictions on consumer information and consumer 
options.70 
In terms of the freedom-oriented approach a consumer is free to decide what to 
do, therefore only minimal transparency is required.  Minimal transparency 
entails that the consumer has only a basic awareness that terms exist.  The 
consumer can then take the risk of entering into the contract even if he did not 
investigate the meaning and implication of terms.  So, consumer freedom in 
general takes no cognisance of the contracting process, the relationship 
between the parties, or the weaknesses of the parties.  Furthermore, in terms of 
the freedom-oriented approach the imposition of transparency requirements 
limits the freedom of a trader to pursue his or her self-interest. 71 
The only instances in which procedural factors are taken into account and 
intervention is allowed, are when the choice of a party has been restricted by 
duress or undue influence or in the case of illegality.72  So, in general, a 
freedom oriented-approach is uncomfortable with intervention and accepts only 
minimum procedural standards.   
3.1.5 Freedom of Contract and the Substance of a Contract 
Freedom of contract accepts only minimal procedural standards.   The same 
applies to the substance of contract.  Therefore, the resulting contract terms 
should be enforced, irrespective of their substantive features and the extent to 
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which they are fair.  That is because the freedom of contract approach aims at 
maximising freedom to agree and then enforce what has been agreed to.  This 
principle is expressed in the principle pacta sunt servanda, which requires 
contracts to be enforced.  Whereas it is undesirable to impose too many 
constraints at a procedural stage, it is even more undesirable to set terms aside 
on substantive grounds.73  That is because the parties in the process leading to 
the contract had the opportunity to exercise their freedom.  Furthermore, the 
freedom of contract approach does not take the consequences of substantive 
terms or the ability of the parties to bear the consequences into account.  So, 
the freedom of contract approach is in effect abstract, formalistic and non-
contextual.74 
3.1.6 Shortcomings of Freedom of Contract and the Rationale for the Regulation of 
Fairness in Contracts 
The main shortcoming of the freedom of contract approach or the classical 
contract law is that it is abstract, formalistic and non-contextual.  Since it is a 
self-reliant, non-contextual approach it pays limited heed to contextual factors 
that might affect the consumer.75  It attempts to create certainty, so parties are 
viewed as abstract persons, who are all equals to which rules should be 
applied.  It is also unconcerned with a consumer’s ability to protect him- or 
herself and his or her interests.  That is because the traditional law of contract 
emphasises autonomy and the will or consent of the parties or true consensus 
as the legitimating factors behind the binding force of contracts.76  In terms of 
traditional law of contract it is assumed, when parties enter into a contract, that 
they had real consensus and that they, as abstract consumers, are able and 
free to protect their own interests.  It is also assumed that the abstract 
consumer has the required knowledge or necessary information to his or her 
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avail.77  The issue with that is that it is difficult to view choice as autonomous or 
voluntary if one party is without basic knowledge or information, especially when 
standard-term contracts are used.78  Furthermore, to hold parties bound to 
standard-term contracts which they have entered into but have not read or if 
they did, have not renegotiated the terms, does not rest comfortably within the 
basis of the freedom of contract approach which is based on individual 
autonomy and real consensus.79  So, regulation is applied to curb these 
shortcomings of freedom of contract.  This is done by limitations intended to 
protect one or more contract party and by limitations intended to protect third 
parties or general society.80 
It is believed in terms of the freedom of contract approach that it would be 
contrary to the market system and the need for commercial and contractual 
certainty to make contracts subject to equitable considerations.81  It is 
furthermore believed that to open contracts for challenge on the basis of 
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fairness would be disastrous as it would lead to a flood of litigation. However, 
the point is that individuals should not be denied justice simply because it 
produces hassles or fears.  Furthermore, the victims of contractual inequity 
usually can’t afford litigation.82  It must also be noted that fairness-oriented 
legislation usually only applies to consumer contracts or contracts that have not 
been individually negotiated and not to commercial contracts, so fears of 
commercial uncertainty tend to be exaggerated.83 
Freedom of contract in the current social context is only a theoretical freedom.84  
Contract parties, with the increased use of standard-term contracts, no longer 
bargain, so there is in fact no or very little freedom to determine the contents of 
a contract or freedom to decide with whom to contract or not.85  The classical 
law of contract, with its emphasis on freedom of contract, was traditionally 
designed for parties negotiating at arm’s length and parties of equal standing 
reaching real or true consensus.86  However, it does not take proper account of 
social reality and the issues related to it such as discrepancies in resources, 
knowledge, and wealth.  Although it states that no one can be forced to 
contract, it ignores the fact that economic necessity provides compulsion to 
contract.87  So, freedom of contract is applied outside of its theoretical context.88  
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In contrast with a freedom-oriented approach, a fairness-oriented approach 
takes proper account of social reality and the issues related to it. 
4 Fairness Orientation 
4.1 Background to the Fairness Orientation 
In the twentieth and twenty first century, in many jurisdictions, the tide started 
shifting against capitalism and classical liberalism and therefore against 
freedom of contract.  So, instead of viewing society as composed of individuals, 
society was viewed as composing economic classes in which inequality of 
bargaining power became the main concern.  The thrust of legal reform was, 
therefore, the redistribution of bargaining power between parties reflected in 
support for principles and development of rules on collective bargaining, 
unenforceable contract terms, protection of weaker parties, minimum wages, 
compulsory arbitration, collusion, franchising, mergers, price-fixing, and 
affirmative action.89  The shifting tide also led to a paternalistic attitude towards 
the general society, which is based on the view that people do not possess 
sufficient information or the cognitive ability to determine what is truly in their 
interest.90  This paternalistic outlook strikes at the rationale for the existence of 
the doctrine of freedom of contract, since it challenges the notion of the 
individual responsible for his or her own destiny.91 
In the twentieth century unprecedented legislative and judicial regulation and 
control of contracts in many jurisdictions followed.  The liberal and individualistic 
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impulses were superseded by philosophies of collectivism and paternalism, and 
capitalism was more and more challenged by programs of egalitarianism, 
welfarism and planning.  However, the failure of the greatest anti-individualist 
experiments of all, communism, bodes well for the future of freedom of 
contract.92  However, the current era is, again, not an era of absolute freedom of 
contract, but can be marked by a paternalistic attitude towards the weaker party 
to a contract in which public policy concerns can override freedom of contract in 
appropriate cases and by the increase in regulatory legislation.93 
4.2 General Fairness Concerns 
A fairness-oriented approach is not concerned with freedom of contract, but with 
context and is therefore also described as a person-oriented approach to 
contracts.94  This approach is therefore not abstract.  In terms of this approach 
parties are viewed as consumers, who are the weaker party, and traders, 
focusing on their characteristics and the way in which the interests of parties are 
affected by substantive terms.  This approach also focuses on factors that might 
affect the abilities of parties to protect their interests in the process leading to 
the contract.95  The agenda is to fairly balance the interests of parties, by 
protecting the weaker party.96  So, the fairness-oriented approach can be linked 
to social justice or welfarism (or collectivism), which can be observed in the 
development of rules protecting weaker parties like consumers in the 
contractual relationship.  These rules are, for example, rules setting standards 
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for procedural fairness or rules that go beyond that by disallowing terms on 
substantive grounds.  This approach can also be described as welfarism in 
contract law or the intrusion of the welfare state into the market-oriented 
structure of traditional contract law or as incorporating protective (welfarist) 
measures into the libertarian approach to contract, which is aimed at 
maximising wealth.97   
To summarise, the fairness-approach is contextual, person-oriented and less 
concerned with self-reliance.  It does not restrict all types of freedom but 
addresses the idea that self-reliant, non-contextual freedom may not be 
effective or useful freedom in practice for consumers.  So, the view is, for 
example, that there is only effective freedom for the consumer where terms are 
sufficiently transparent to enable the consumer to make an informed choice.  It 
is therefore a version of freedom inspired by the sensitivity to context and 
concern with fairness.98 
4.2.1 The Fairness-oriented Approach and Procedural Factors 
From a fairness-oriented approach, the contractual process and market 
conditions are viewed as making it difficult for consumers to protect their 
interests, based on problems of lack of transparency, choice and weak 
bargaining position.99  The lack of transparency may also affect what the 
consumer expects to get from the contract and the ability of the consumer to 
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protect his or her interests in relation to the substantive terms of the contract.  
So, if terms are not transparent,100 a lack of informed consent exists, which is 
problematic, irrespective of the substantive features of the contract terms.  A 
lack of transparency limits choice, awareness of terms or risks, it leads to a lack 
of informed consent, and prevents consumers from comparing terms or 
negotiating for improvements, which in effect undermines competition.101 
A fairness-oriented approach recognises that it is unrealistic to expect 
consumers to overcome the problems of lack of transparency by self-reliant 
means because pre-existing procedural aspects or factors (procedural 
unfairness) are more powerful than substantive terms.  That is because these 
pre-existing procedural aspects or factors may distract consumers from the 
substantive contractual terms, conditioning consumers to believe that the 
substantive terms are not important.  Advertising, limited consumer experience, 
expertise or technical knowledge needed to understand terms and legal 
language can be regarded as pre-existing procedural aspects or factors turning 
a consumer’s attention away from substantive terms.102   
Procedural fairness deals with preventative control of unfairness and not only 
with judicial control of fairness.  That is because procedural fairness is not 
applied ex post facto but focuses on aspects such as transparency, before the 
conclusion of a contract.  Usually, procedural fairness measures oblige 
suppliers to disclose specific information, to comply with language requirements 
and specific formats in contracts in order to address the lack of transparency in 
advance.  So, procedural fairness has a proactive nature, because it applies to 
the procedure leading to the contract which includes aspects such as language, 
format, and the contract document itself. 
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4.2.2 The Fairness-oriented Approach and Substantive Factors 
In contrast with the freedom-oriented approach, the fairness-oriented approach 
takes account of the way that terms affect the interests of parties.  So, 
substantive terms are viewed as having the potential to be damaging to the 
interest of consumers.103  This view is based on the idea that consumers enter 
into contracts to sustain and to enhance the private sphere of life, rather than to 
make profit.104  The interests of consumers that may be affected by the 
substantive terms are physical safety, proprietary, economic and social 
interests, for example, allowing suppliers to evade responsibility or imposing 
undue burdens on consumers.  While suppliers usually have the means to deal 
with losses or to distribute losses, consumers don’t have.105  
Furthermore, the fairness-oriented approach does not only address 
transparency issues but also issues related to the lack of consumer choice and 
the weaker bargaining position of the consumer.  Even if a consumer is aware 
of what a term provides and does not wish to agree to it, the supplier or other 
suppliers may not offer any alternatives, which makes it a contract of adhesion 
placing the consumer in a ‘take it or leave it’ position.  In terms of the freedom-
oriented approach, the consumer then has to refuse to enter into the contract or 
seek better terms.  However, the fairness-oriented approach recognises that 
consumers can rarely realistically refuse to enter into a contract because the 
goods or services are needed.  It also recognises that it is unrealistic to expect 
the consumer to bargain for better terms because the supplier will normally 
refuse to change standard terms since it is inefficient for him or her to engage in 
bargaining over standard terms.  If the trader is prepared to bargain, the 
consumer is, however unlikely to be in a strong enough bargaining position to 
persuade the supplier to remove or amend a term.106  Thus, a fairness-oriented 
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approach attempts to balance the interests of the parties and to protect the 
interests of consumers by being cognisant of the ways in which terms may be 
damaging to a consumer’s interests (and by addressing the problems of 
procedural fairness that may arise).107   
4.3  Collectivism 
As indicated, the fairness-oriented approach can be linked to social justice, 
welfarism or collectivism or altruism, which can be observed in the development 
of rules protecting weaker parties like consumers in the contractual 
relationship.108  Collectivism or altruism is the counter-ideology to individualism.  
Altruists believe that humans are social creatures with responsibilities and 
benefits which crystallise out of one’s existence in a community.  So, humans 
are not only concerned with the realisation of self-interest, but also with the 
interests of others and how their actions impact on the well-being of others.109  
Barnard is of the opinion that the good faith principle would have been able to 
form the theoretical basis for the judicial activism that is required to further the 
ideals of collectivism or altruism and to move away from an individualistic 
stance to one which takes account of the structural inequalities within society.110  
The most important aspect of collectivism or altruism is that it acknowledges 
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that blind enforcement of contracts is an ineffective method of achieving social 
ends and courts with an altruistic approach therefore consider procedures 
followed when the contract was concluded and the terms of a contract.111  So, 
altruists see the gap between the ideal world and the real world of limitation and 
inequality unlike individualists who postulate an ideal world of freedom and 
equality.112  Altruism or collectivism is associated with the rise of consumer 
protection.113  It therefore manifests in the law of contract in the form of rules or 
standards on unenforceability of contracts and on considerations of public 
interests, fairness or reasonableness.   
5 Conclusion 
Although the court, before the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act,114 
had the opportunity to challenge issues related to freedom of contract on 
equitable grounds, the court did not.  So, for many years, fairness-oriented 
approaches or collectivism were suppressed by the over-emphasis of traditional 
contract ideologies.  In recent years, the freedom-oriented approach was, 
however, increasingly criticized as being abstract, formalistic and non-
contextual.  It was also realised that the classical law of contract with its 
freedom-oriented approach was designed for parties negotiating at arm’s 
length.  The need to implement a fairness-oriented approach for the types of 
contracts through the implementation of legislation was therefore recognised.  A 
fairness-oriented approach takes proper account of social reality and the issues 
related to it and places obligations on parties not to exploit each other and in 
effect to contract in good faith.  In South Africa, this led to the implementation of 
the CPA, that regulates fairness in consumer contracts. 
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The CPA was enacted because the system of consumer laws in South Africa 
was outdated, fragmented and predicated on principles contrary to the 
democratic system.  Before the enactment of the CPA, South Africa did not 
have a comprehensive consumer protection statute clearly spelling out the 
rights and obligations of all market participants. There was therefore a need for 
a comprehensive consumer policy to guide the welfare of South Africa’s 
economic citizens.  The CPA regulates consumer-supplier interaction with the 
aim of promoting a fair, efficient and transparent market place for consumers 
and businesses.  For consumers to participate effectively in the market 
economy, they are afforded basic rights in a comprehensive consumer law that 
sets out guiding principles for market conduct.  These guiding principles relate 
to trade, competition, balanced terms and a working market.  The principles on 
balanced terms were incorporated into the CPA by inserting general provisions 
regarding unfair contracts.  These fairness provisions, which are primarily built 
on English and European Council precedent, do not only deal with substantive 
terms, but also with procedural responsibilities of parties, such as the use and 
promotion of plain language in consumer contracts.115   
The CPA uses various techniques to achieve fairness in contracts.  In the 
preamble to the CPA it is stated that it is necessary to develop and employ 
innovative means to protect the interests of all consumers and to ensure 
redress for consumers who are subjected to abuse or exploitation in the 
marketplace.  It is also stated that the CPA was enacted to promote and protect 
the economic interests of consumers and to improve access to, and the quality 
of, information that is necessary so that consumers are able to make informed 
choices according to their individual needs.  The purpose of the CPA is, among 
others, to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers 
in South Africa, by: (a) establishing a legal framework for the achievement and 
maintenance of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable 
and responsible for the benefit of consumers generally;116 (b) promoting fair 
                                                            
115
 See DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 at 6, 9-13 and 31 
published in GN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 Sept 2004. 
116
 Section 3(1)(a). 
Philosophical Context 
 
31 
 
business practices;117 (c) protecting consumers from unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade practices and deceptive, 
misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct;118 and (d) improving consumer 
awareness and information and encouraging responsible and informed 
consumer choice and behaviour.119 
So the CPA applies a traditional contract law approach blended with welfarism 
which can be evidenced from its application of: (a) corrective justice (the CPA 
focuses on the need to correct situations that have emerged as a consequence 
of behaviour that is considered unacceptable); (b) a mixed system of market-
rational and market rectifying regulation (the CPA mainly implements measures 
aimed at improving the function of the market mechanism but it also attempts to 
remedy the drawbacks of the market mechanism); (c) an internal perspective 
(the CPA regulates the individual legal relationship between the parties of a 
contract and it does not, in general, add an external perspective by looking 
beyond the individual relationship which is the case with collective contract law); 
(d) a need-orientation (the CPA focuses on the weaker party, not on a mere 
abstract person, and the need of the party as the ground for granting 
protection); and (e) protection of parties (the CPA focuses on the interest of the 
contracting parties and not on values not related to them).120  
In the Chapter 3, an overview will be given of what must be kept in mind when 
thinking of fairness.  So, dimensions of fairness or factors playing a role in the 
question of fairness will be identified.  In Chapter 5, specifics of fairness in 
terms of the CPA will be discussed against the backdrop of the factors identified 
in Chapter 3. 
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 ‘If a contract is stigmatised as “unfair”, it may be unfair in one of two ways. It may 
be unfair by reason of the unfair manner in which it was brought into existence.... It 
may also, in some contexts, be described … as “unfair” by reason of the fact that 
the terms of the contract are more favourable to one party than to the other.’
1
 
1 Introduction 
Traditionally, the law of contract merely provides a framework within which 
contracts are enforced,2 without concern for their context.3 Legislation is then 
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 Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1017-1018 (per Lord Brightman). 
2
 When it is alleged that a contract in restraint of trade is unreasonable, reasonableness (the 
context), is, however, assessed at the time of enforcement.  See, for example, Magna Alloys 
and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A); National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Borrowman and another 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) at 1107.  Before the decision in Bank of Lisbon 
and South Africa v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) it had also been accepted that the exceptio 
doli generalis provided a remedy against the enforcement of an unfair contract in unfair 
circumstances but the then Appellate Division reviewed the authorities on the exceptio doli 
generalis and concluded that it is not part of South African law (at 607B). The exceptio doli  
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adopted to address this imbalance by, among others, regulating the fairness of 
contract terms.4 
The starting point for consumer protection is the imbalance, from a legal and an 
economic perspective, between suppliers and consumers in the making of a 
contract, in the contract terms and in the enforcement of a contract. This 
imbalance may arise, because the traditional (or classical) law of contract 
applies regardless of the identity of the parties, their relationship to one another, 
the subject matter of the contract, and the social context of the contract. 
In this chapter, I shall give a brief overview of what must be considered when 
one introduces considerations of ‘fairness’ by means of consumer legislation. I 
shall do so without any reference to any specific jurisdiction,5 and irrespective of 
whether, and to what extent, fairness is supported by the current law of 
contract.  I shall identify dimensions of fairness, factors which play a role in the 
determination of fairness, and fairness-oriented approaches, in an attempt to 
formulate a framework for fairness. Such a framework should indicate the 
aspects that should be taken into account in order to justify a finding of fairness, 
or to determine whether or not a contract is fair. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
generalis could therefore no longer be used to give relief against the enforcement of an unfair 
contract.  See para 2.2 in Ch 4. 
3
 The taking into consideration of context at the formation of a contract or pre-contractually, is 
therefore not foreign to the South African law of contract.  See for example the rules on 
misrepresentation and fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake and illegality, which aim at 
curbing unfairness at the formation of a contract.  In these instances context (at the formation of 
a contract) plays a role.  The question is, however, whether the common-law rules and 
principles cover the ground sufficiently or whether there are gaps that need to be filled to curb 
unfairness.  See para 2.1 in Ch 4.  See also RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in 
South Africa 5
th
 ed (2005) 14. 
4
 For a discussion of the goal of consumer protection, see JGJ Rinkes ‘European Consumer 
Law: Making Sense’ in C Twigg-Flesner, D Parry, G Howeels & A Nordhausen (eds) The 
Yearbook of Consumer Law 2008 (2008) 3 at 15. 
5
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Willet, a well-known author on the British law of contract, has identified the 
dimensions of fairness, or fairness-oriented approaches. I shall base much of 
this discussion on his research.  He distinguishes between a fairness approach 
aimed at substantive fairness, on the one hand, and a fairness approach aimed 
at procedural fairness, on the other.  As the aim of these two approaches, and 
the moment at which fairness is relevant, differ, it makes sense to distinguish 
between them, even though they are interdependent.   
In this chapter, I shall extend the discussion on the fairness-oriented approach.6  
As I have shown in Chapter 2, the focus of the fairness-oriented approach is on 
balancing the interests of the parties, and, especially, to protect the interests of 
consumers.7  So, the fairness-oriented approach considers the way in which 
terms affect the interests of the contracting parties, and problems relating to 
procedural fairness that may arise.8  However, properly to understand the 
concept ‘fairness’ and its regulation, one needs to concretise the concept– a 
lack of certainty is often raised as a concern in relation to the assessment of 
fairness.9 The lack of precedent to guide the development of the concept 
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the criticism in AJ Barnard A Critical Legal Argument for Contractual Justice in the South African 
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Pieterse ‘Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox 
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‘It is said that the recognition of the exceptio doli… would be an infraction of freedom of 
contract and the principle that pacta servanda sunt – that it would lead to legal 
uncertainty.  Freedom of contract, the principles of pacta servanda sunt and certainty 
are however not absolute values.  They did not prevent the modification in England of 
the common law by equity, which inter alia gives relief against ‘unconscionable 
bargains’.  Moreover, the twin concepts of freedom of contract and pacta servanda sunt 
have, during this century, increasingly come under assault as a result of inter alia 
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contributes to uncertainty. In the final analysis, the concept ‘fairness’ is of little 
value if its content cannot be determined because of overgeneralisation or 
vagueness.   
2 Substantive Fairness 
Substantive fairness concerns the outcome of the contracting process, whereas 
procedural fairness concerns the contracting process.  If a contract is 
substantively unfair, then there is at least something objectionable about its 
terms taken by themselves, or its terms are unfair as between the contracting 
parties.10 
Conceptions of substantive fairness may be either generalised or individualised.  
Where fairness is determined with reference to factors external to the 
contracting parties, such as the market price of goods or services or the 
availability of alternatives from competitors the conception is generalised.  But 
where fairness is determined with reference to factors related to consumer 
welfare, such as the effect of contract terms on the consumer, the conception is 
generalised.  It is very difficult to work with an individualised conception in 
practice, as the required information about a consumer’s state of mind, and the 
effect of a contract term on a consumer, cannot always be determined reliably 
and may differ from time to time.11 
There are, furthermore, different measures that can be applied to determine 
whether contract terms are substantively fair.  Terms may come under 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
rampant inflation, monopolistic practices giving rise to unequal bargaining power and 
the large-scale use of standard form contracts.’ 
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 See also SA Smith ‘In Defence of Substantive Fairness’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 
138 at 140-144 (an introduction to the meaning of substantive fairness, and a discussion of the 
distinction between substantive and procedural fairness) and at 144-155 (a discussion of the 
relevance of price to a decision as to whether a contract is unfair). 
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 See SA Smith ‘In Defence of Substantive Fairness’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 138 at 
141, where the different conceptions of substantive fairness are analysed. 
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suspicion when they deviate from default rules, or from a consumer’s 
reasonable expectations.12  A further approach considers the type of consumer 
interests involved, and whether a contract term affects the consumer interests.  
A fairness assessment must, for example, take into account whether a term has 
the effect of denying liability for injury or death (physical integrity),13 damage to 
property (property interests), or economic loss (economic interests), or whether 
it excludes legal remedies or access to justice,14 or allows a party to a contract 
to vary or terminate a contract at will.15 
So the focus of a fairness assessment is on the effect of a contractual term on 
the interests of a consumer.  A term may, for example, be regarded as unfair on 
the basis that it unduly impacts on the interest of the consumer while it is not 
necessary to protect the supplier’s interests.16  Since the supplier’s interest is 
also taken into account, this approach requires a comprehensive analysis of the 
interests of the consumer and the supplier.17 
Furthermore, overall substantive fairness must be considered.  This means that 
the contract terms are scrutinised in the context of other terms of the contract 
and of related contracts.  For example, one term may be to a consumer’s 
detriment, while another term may favour him.  Put differently, a consumer may 
pay a ‘price’ for a term that is favourable to him.  The key question, therefore, is 
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 See para 2.2. 
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 See, for example, Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) 
where the court had to decide whether the effective exclusion of liability for damages for 
negligently causing the death of another is contrary to high value accorded at common law and 
in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996, to sanctity of life. 
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 See, for example, Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) in which the right off access to 
courts was considered when the court had to decide whether a term was contrary to public 
policy and therefore unenforceable. 
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 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 49-50. 
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 See, for example, Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). The court (at 9) found that 
although public policy favours utmost freedom of contract, ‘simple justice between man and 
man’ should be done.  The court further indicated that a contract maybe declared contrary to 
public policy if it is plainly improper and unconscionable, or unduly harsh or oppressive. 
17
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 50. 
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whether the detrimental term represents a ‘fair price’, or whether an imbalanced 
(or detrimental) term is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interest of 
the party who would be advantaged by the term.18  To answer this question, the 
risks that the supplier is seeking to protect himself against by using the term, 
and the degree of detriment or risk caused to the consumer by the term, should 
be considered.  A good rule of thumb is that if there is a term detrimental to the 
consumer, there should be another term that protects the consumer or allows 
the consumer to protect himself against the term under consideration. If, for 
example, the term allows the supplier to increase the contract price in his or her 
discretion, there should be a term allowing a consumer to cancel in the event of 
a price increase.19 
One way to measure this is by asking whether, without the term under 
consideration, the price should have been higher to cover the supplier’s risks 
and make it economically viable for him to contract.  If so, the price charged can 
be viewed as representing a ‘fair price’ for the term, and there can be said to be 
overall substantive fairness.  A different way of measuring is by asking whether 
the price and the overall balance of rights and obligations are fair by typical 
market price in contracts where such terms are used.  The problem is, however, 
that market price is not necessarily the best price from the consumer’s 
perspective.  From a supplier’s perspective, it can be asked whether it is 
economically efficient to provide the goods or service without the specific term.  
If it is not, it may be argued that the price is fair.20 
                                                            
18
 For a discussion on whether a term is reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate 
interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term, see J Paterson ‘The Australian 
Unfair Contract Terms Law:  The Rise of Substantive Unfairness as a Ground for Review of 
Standard Form Consumer Contracts’ (2003) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 934 at 944-
945. 
19
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 51-52. 
20
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 52-55. In para 
2.2.1.3 in Ch 5, considering the price of goods or services as part of a fairness assessment is 
criticised.  
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To conclude, in terms of this approach, which focuses on substantive issues, it 
is assessed whether there is a fair balance between rights and obligations.  But 
this approach is usually not conclusive.  Usually a review of procedural fairness 
should also be undertaken.  The reason is that despite the existence of a fair 
balance of substantive rights and obligations, a consumer has a legitimate 
interest in being able to make his or her own assessment, which means that 
transparency is required.21 
2.1. Disallowing Terms with Certain Substantive Features 
Disallowing terms with certain substantive features is the most radical form of 
fairness and the least acceptable from a freedom orientation.  The reason is 
that terms are disallowed irrespective of overall substantive or procedural 
fairness.22 This approach implies the pre-emptive control of fairness, as certain 
terms are rendered ineffective, irrespective of how and when they are used.  In 
some jurisdictions, a regulatory body controls the use of terms with certain 
substantive features.23 
There are several lines of thought underpinning this approach.24 
In the first instance, consumers should be given absolute protection where 
certain so-called irreducible rights (substantive interests) are involved.25  These 
                                                            
21
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 55.  See also T 
Naudé ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation:  The Implications of Why we Need it for its 
Formulation and Application’ 2006 Stell LR 361 at 371-377, where the possibility of control on 
the basis of only substantive fairness is considered. 
22
 See also para 2.3 in Ch 6. 
23
 See para 3.3.1 in Ch 6 in respect of some of the functions of the English Office of Fair 
Trading performed in the prevention of unfairness in contracts. 
24
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 65-66. 
25
 For example, a term purporting to exclude liability for causing death probably would be void 
for being contrary to public policy.  See Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and another 2004 
(5) SA 511 (SCA). 
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irreducible rights are treated as legally guaranteed and cannot be traded for 
more beneficial terms, as they are rights that should be protected irrespective of 
procedural fairness or overall substantive fairness.26  Another line of thought is 
that the nature of the unfairness in substance is so serious that we cannot risk 
that procedural fairness did not, or could not, work in practice because the 
consumer was not in a position to take advantage of procedural fairness to 
protect his or her interest against terms compromising his or her substantive 
interests.  So the degree to which a term compromises a consumer’s 
substantive interests is such that it is presumed that consumers may not take 
the opportunities that may have been available them to protect their interests 
pre-contractually.  These opportunities refer to whether the terms are 
transparent, whether choices are available to the consumer, and whether the 
consumer is in a strong bargaining position.  This approach accordingly implies 
that there are doubts as to how effective procedural fairness on its own can be 
to help consumers to protect their interests during the contractual bargaining 
stage.  However, the main reason for disallowing terms is that they are 
substantively detrimental.  This means that the focus is on the substantive 
features of the terms.27 
Secondly, non-negotiated (standard) terms cannot be regarded as the proper 
expression of the self-determination of both parties, with the result that 
intervention is justified.  Although this line of thought may be speculative, the 
removal of unfair terms may increase consumer confidence and trust, and so 
increase economic activity.28 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
25
 For example, a term purporting to exclude liability for causing death probably would be void 
for being contrary to public policy.  See Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and another 2004 
(5) SA 511 (SCA). 
26
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 66-67.  See also 
T Naudé ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation:  the Implications of why we Need it for its 
Formulation and Application’ 2006 Stell LR 361 at 372. 
27
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 67-70. 
28
 T Naudé ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation:  The Implications of why we Need it for its 
Formulation and Application’ 2006 Stell LR 361 at 365 and 370-371. 
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Thirdly, setting substantive standards that apply irrespective of procedural 
fairness helps to extract more benefit from procedural fairness – the substantive 
features of contracts are standardised in the process and, as a result of the 
focus on their substantive features.  This promotes transparency in that it helps 
consumers to know to what they are agreeing.29 
Fourthly, there is a need to promote clear and effective consumer protection.  
Certain terms compromise the interests of consumers to such an extent that 
they may be banned outright.  So this orientation also aims at the practical and 
effective protection of the majority of consumers, who would not usually want to 
agree to the specific term.30 
2.2 Default Rules and Reasonable Expectations 
As fairness legislation is usually aimed at specific types of terms that have been 
used to consumers’ detriment, or that may lead to exploitation, it is important to 
have a concrete idea as to the types of substantive terms that are targeted.  
This issue can be approached by using default rules, implied terms,31 and legal 
remedies as benchmarks of fairness, and by comparing express terms that are 
detrimental to consumers to default rules or legal remedies.32 
Default rules, implied terms, and legal remedies often aim at balancing the 
interests of the parties.  Implied terms are, for example, sometimes based on 
what a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, reasonable, or 
equitable – they contain an element of justice that strives to level the playing 
field between parties that do not have equal bargaining power.  Implied terms 
                                                            
29
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 70. 
30
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 70-71. 
31
 A contract of lease that falls within the ambits of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 is, for 
example, in terms of s 5, deemed to include certain terms.  These terms are implied to balance 
the rights and duties of tenants and landlords. 
32
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 47. 
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are also referred to as naturalia, legal incidents, or residual provisions that 
derive from common law, precedent, custom, or legislation.33 
When there are no default rules, implied terms, or legal remedies dealing with a 
particular situation, an alternative fairness benchmark is the consumer’s 
reasonable expectations.  For example, where a term requires a consumer to 
perform in a way different from what he reasonably expected, the term may be 
regarded as unfair.34 The reasonable expectation of an ordinary consumer can 
be described as the ‘objectively justified belief in the likelihood in some future 
event or entitlement’.35 However, the interests of the parties still should be 
balanced, and the expectations of the consumer should objectively be 
reasonable.36 
To conclude: substantive fairness relates to the fairness of terms, the fairness of 
the outcome, and fairness as between the parties.37 A term will become subject 
to scrutiny where it creates an imbalance between parties, or it deviates from a 
default rule, runs contrary to an implied term, denies a legal remedy, or deviates 
from a consumer’s reasonable expectations. 
                                                            
33
 SJ Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts 2
 
ed (2007) 162-163; JP Vorster 
‘The Bases for the Implication of Contractual Terms’ 1988 TSAR 161 at 166-167. 
34
 See T Naudé & G Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses – a Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare v 
Strydom’ (2005) 122 SALJ 441 at 454: the authors submit that a party may reasonably expect 
the terms of a written document to be consistent with the aim of the envisaged contract.  They 
found that a clause which purports to vary the consequences of the contract in a manner 
contrary to the essence of the contract by undermining the reciprocity between the essential 
obligations envisaged by the parties was ‘surprising’.  In Mercurius Motors v Lopez (2008 (3) SA 
572 (SCA) para [33]), the Supreme Court of Appeal found that if a term undermines the very 
essence of a contract, it should clearly and pertinently be brought to the attention of a consumer 
who signs a standard form.  For a discussion of reasonable expectations regarding quality, see 
also C Willet ‘Fairness in Sale of Goods Act Quality Obligations and Remedies’, in C Willet 
Aspects of Fairness in Contract (1996) 123 at 125-130. 
35
 See also P Nebbia Unfair Contract Terms in European Law (2007) 158. 
36
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 48-49. 
37
 For an introduction to the meaning of substantive fairness, see also SA Smith “In Defence of 
Substantive Fairness” (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 138 at 140. 
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3 Procedural Fairness 
Measures aimed at procedural fairness address conduct during the bargaining 
process, and generally aim at ensuring transparency.38 Transparency has two 
elements: (a) transparency in relation to the terms of a contract, and (b) 
transparency in the sense of not being positively misled, pre-contractually or 
during the performance of a contract, as to aspects of the goods, service, price, 
and terms.  Transparency in relation to the terms of a contract relates to 
whether the contract terms are accessible, in clear language, well-structured, 
and cross-referenced, with prominence being given to terms that are 
detrimental to the consumer or because they grant important rights.39  In a 
nutshell, one could say that a contract is procedurally fair, where it has been 
concluded voluntary, or put differently, without being misled as to aspects of the 
goods, service, price and terms. 
Substantive fairness relates to procedural fairness through the requirement of 
transparency.  A good level of transparency has to do with, among others, 
aspects such as information disclosure, awareness of terms, size of print, clarity 
of language, and interpretation and format, as these procedural factors relate to 
circumstances surrounding the manner in which agreement is reached.40 
Transparency can be a negative control which allows at most the elimination of 
unclear and incomprehensible contract terms, or it may provide for positive 
                                                            
38
 See, generally, R Lawson Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms 8 ed (2005) 219; T 
Naudé “Unfair Contract Terms Legislation:  the Implications of why we Need it for its 
Formulation and Application” 2006 Stell LR 361 at 377. 
39
 C Willet ‘General Clauses on Fairness and the Promotion of Values Important in Services of 
General Interest’, in C Twigg-Flesner, D Parry, G Howells & A Nordhausen (eds) The Yearbook 
of Consumer Law 2008 (2008) 67 at 75.  See also J Paterson ‘The Australian Unfair Contract 
Terms Law:  the Rise of Substantive Unfairness as a Ground for Review of Standard Form 
Consumer Contracts’ (2003) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 934 at 949, where the author 
analyses elements of transparency: a term is in transparent where it is (a) expressed in 
reasonably plain language, (b) legible, (c) presented clearly, and (d) readily available to any 
party affected by the term. 
40
 See also P Nebbia Unfair Contract Terms in European Law (2007) 135-136. 
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duties, such as to explain and summarise the implication of certain substantive 
contractual terms.41 While a fairness orientation requires a high level of 
transparency, a freedom orientation would require a mere awareness of the 
contractual terms.  A high level of transparency means that the consumer is 
placed in a position at least to have a chance of being able to exercise a 
reasonable degree of informed consent.  Transparency also enhances choice 
and fairness substantively.42 
From a substantive fairness perspective, procedural fairness requires that terms 
that are damaging to consumers’ substantive interests should be transparent.  
Accordingly, the greater the substantive unfairness, the higher are the demands 
of transparency.  However, where a term is in some way substantively 
detrimental but it is balanced by another favourable term, both the detrimental 
and favourable terms should be transparent, so that controlling bodies, such as 
the Office of Fair Trading or an ombudsman can apply preventative control.  
These bodies should be allowed to assert that terms that are not transparent 
are unfair, and a court would, ex post facto, be allowed to consider the lack of 
transparency.43 
Consumers should be aware not only of terms that are to their detriment but 
also of terms that are to their advantage.  This is clearly in the consumers’ 
interests. From this follows that these terms should also be transparent, so that 
consumers avail themselves of the advantages that these terms offer.  It is 
argued that in order to pro-actively or pre-contractually achieve transparency, it 
should be compulsory to include certain terms that reflect certain rights of 
consumers, or that provide mechanisms that will help consumers to protect 
themselves post-contractually.  Transparency in this regard means that a 
consumer should be aware of a term, and should understand it. Awareness 
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 See also P Nebbia Unfair Contract Terms in European Law (2007) 137. 
42
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 55-56. 
43
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 56-57. 
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increases, of course, situations in which consumers challenge terms, or 
exercise their rights under a term.44 
As we have seen, the major problem with standard-terms contracts is usually 
the lack of transparency.45  This problem can be addressed by focusing on 
procedural fairness preventatively, by setting transparency requirements.  
However, there are limits to the efficacy of procedural measures and 
transparency.  Several factors would likely limit consumers’ ability to overcome 
a lack of transparency, irrespective of a supplier’s compliance with transparency 
requirements.  These factors include: (a) consumers’ disinclination to read 
detailed contractual terms; (b) consumers’ pre-existing expectations suggesting 
a successful contractual relationship, which would obviate certain contractual 
terms coming into play; (c) consumers not reading contractual terms properly, 
as they have other complex decisions to make (such as whether to contract in 
the first place); (d) consumers not understanding the formal terms, irrespective 
of them being transparent; (e) consumers’ idea that they do not need to 
understand the contractual terms, as suppliers are unlikely to change them; (f) 
consumers not understanding how a term will affect them in practice; and (g) 
competitors expressing equivalent terms differently, which makes it difficult for 
consumers to compare.46 
                                                            
44
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 58-59. 
45
 See para 3.3.1 in Ch 6.  See also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed 
(2006) 229-230. 
46
 For reasons why consumers accept standard terms without reading them, and related issues, 
see also T Naudé ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation:  The Implications of why we Need it for its 
Formulation and Application’ 2006 Stell LR 361 at 366-369. See also M Donnely & F White ‘The 
Effect of Information Based Consumer Protection:  Lessons from a Study of the Irish Online 
Market’, in C Twigg-Flesner, D Parry, G Howells & A Nordhausen (eds) The Yearbook of 
Consumer Law 2008 (2008) 271 at 283-284 (the limits of transparency, and an essential 
presumption underlying fairness in the form of disclosure – consumers will act rationally on the 
basis of information received). See further J Paterson ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms 
Law:  The Rise of Substantive Unfairness as a Ground for Review of Standard Form Consumer 
Contracts’ (2003) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 934 at 951-956. 
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However, although transparency may often not be sufficient to ensure fairness, 
it at least provides some basis for consumers to give informed consent.  
Transparency also enables consumers to ascertain their rights and duties in the 
event of a dispute.  It may also affect the affordability of goods and services: if 
consumers have a clear idea of the price and quality, they may be able to 
assess an offer and to compare it with offers of competitors.  This may also lead 
to wider consumer choice and increased competition.47 
To overcome the problems related to procedural measures and transparency, a 
strong emphasis should be placed on standardisation of the way in which terms 
are presented.  However, this will still not address all these issues; for example, 
it may not make it more likely that a consumer will actually read the terms.  
Standardisation in presentation, however, makes it slightly easier for a 
consumer to understand the contractual terms proffered, as information is 
presented in a standard way.  It may also help a consumer to compare the 
terms offered by competitors.  
Further, as we have seen, although transparency may be a basic right, it is 
uncertain whether a consumer will actually exercise this right pre-contractually.  
This problem can be addressed by disclosure rules and mandatory terms, which 
require the disclosure of certain information or rights.48 From a supplier’s 
perspective, the compulsory disclosure of information involves relatively minimal 
                                                            
47
 C Willet ‘General Clauses on Fairness and the Promotion of Values Important in Services of 
General Interest’, in C Twigg-Flesner, D Parry, G Howells & A Nordhausen (eds) The Yearbook 
of Consumer Law 2008 (2008) 67 at 75-76. 
48
 It may happen that a mandatory term is unfair substantively.  To address this, mandatory 
terms, provided for in legislation other than fairness legislation, should be excluded from 
fairness legislation if they are fair.  A regulatory body or the court should therefore be 
empowered to analyse the fairness of such provisions. See also C Willet ‘General Clauses on 
Fairness and the Promotion of Values Important in Services of General Interest’, in C Twigg-
Flesner, D Parry, G Howells & A Nordhausen (eds) The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2008 
(2008) 67 at 72-73. 
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interference with party autonomy – all that is required is that information be 
disclosed. The transaction may then proceed.49  
Another possible solution aimed at addressing the issues related to 
transparency is the standardisation of the substantive features of terms, or 
independent content control.  If terms are standardised substantively, 
transparency may lead to better levels of informed consent, which is supported 
by the classical contract theory.50 
In terms of a procedural approach to fairness, the poor bargaining position of a 
consumer and the lack of choice militate against a finding of fairness.  The 
reason is that even if the term is transparent (for example, where the consumer 
is aware of the risks), the lack of choice and/or the weak bargaining position of 
the consumer may mean that he or she cannot do anything to protect his or her 
interests.  However, in consumer contracts there will usually be an inequality of 
bargaining power, as an individual consumer will usually not be important 
enough to the supplier to give him any leverage.  From this perspective, then, it 
is unrealistic to use a lack of choice and inequality of bargaining power as sole 
measures of fairness.  These two aspects should be considered only where 
substantive terms are significantly detrimental.  Substantive terms are 
significantly detrimental if they prevent consumers from protecting their interests 
against terms that are detrimental.  If it is established that a term is significantly 
detrimental, it must be enquired whether the supplier or a competitor offers a 
choice in the form of alternatives.  If there then is a choice between alternatives, 
this would argue in favour of a finding of fairness.  If a consumer should have 
been in a bargaining position in which he or her could have protected his or her 
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 For a discussion on the information provision model and its critics, see also M Donnely & F 
White “The Effect of Information Based Consumer Protection:  Lessons from a Study of the Irish 
Online Market” in C Twigg-Flesner, D Parry, G Howells & A Nordhausen (eds) The Yearbook of 
Consumer Law 2008 (2008) 271 at 282-283. 
50
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 59-62. For a 
further discussion of the role of measures aimed at procedural fairness, see also T Naudé 
‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation:  The Implications of why we Need it for its Formulation and 
Application’ 2006 Stell LR 361 at 377-378.  
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interests against a detrimental substantive term, it may also argue in favour of a 
finding of fairness.51 
It is clear from the above that there is a link between procedural and substantive 
fairness.  That is so because the approach to issues of choice and bargaining 
power are dictated by the degree of substantive unfairness.  If, for example, the 
question is whether the consumer had an opportunity at the procedural stage to 
protect his or her substantive interests, it is relevant to consider the extent to 
which these interests are affected.52 
To conclude: transparency is fundamental to fairness.  However, transparency 
(limited to an understanding of the risks and informed consent) is not 
necessarily enough.  Consumer choice and the parties relative bargaining 
positions are not fundamental to procedural fairness but may also be relevant.  
In practice, it is difficult to address consumer choice and bargaining power, as 
suppliers will have to determine which terms are significantly detrimental to 
consumers’ interests, and whether competitors offer consumers alternatives.  It 
would place an intolerable burden on suppliers if choice was a prerequisite of 
fairness, and especially for a fairness as a prerequisite of enforceability.  Terms 
are standardised for the reasons that it is usually not efficient for traders to 
bargain over all contractual terms.53   
4 Abstract and Contextual Fairness (Generalised and Individualised 
Fairness) 
The main shortcoming of the freedom orientation is that it is abstract, 
formalistic, and non-contextual, whereas the fairness orientation focuses on 
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 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 62-63. 
52
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 63-64. 
53
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 64-65. 
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context and the person of the parties.54  However, within the fairness 
orientation, some approaches are contextual and others are abstract.   
In terms of an abstract approach (‘pure fairness’), the same standards apply to 
consumers and suppliers irrespective of their particular characteristics, 
strengths, or weaknesses, and irrespective of the circumstances of a case.  The 
advantage of an abstract approach to fairness is that it retains greater certainty 
and predictability in assessing fairness, and is accordingly generally applied in 
the form of preventative control mechanisms.55  The scope of protection of an 
abstract approach is usually very high, as there is no scope for reducing the 
levels of protection.  Usually, in terms of an abstract approach, the focus is on 
the extent to which a term deviates from the default position, the way in which a 
term would affect the interests of an average consumer, whether there is 
another term that is beneficial to consumers generally, and whether a term is 
sufficiently transparent to be understood by the typical consumer.56 
The same factors are considered in terms of a contextual approach, but the 
particular weaknesses, strengths, and general circumstances that might arise 
after the contract has been drafted, are also considered.  So this approach 
involves less predictability and a lower level of protection.  However, although 
pure contextual fairness is rarely applied, it amounts to a purer form of 
individual justice, as it allows, for example, a more protective approach to 
vulnerable consumers.57 A risk inherent in the contextual approach is that it 
easily leads to shifting the focus of the fairness test from the time of the 
conclusion of the contract to the time when enforcement of the contract is 
sought.58 In practice, the abstract and contextual approaches to fairness are 
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 See para 3.1.6 in Ch 2. 
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 See also P Nebbia Unfair Contract Terms in European Law (2007) 159. 
56
 C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 71-72. 
57
 See also P Nebbia Unfair Contract Terms in European Law (2007) 158. 
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 See also P Nebbia Unfair Contract Terms in European Law (2007) 158. 
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usually mixed, as the rules are expressed broadly enough to take account of 
contextual factors.59 
5 Conclusion 
In practice, consumers often, for various reasons, do not read the terms of a 
contract.  For consumers to be aware of their rights, it should, therefore, be 
compulsory to include certain terms to reflect certain consumer rights, or to 
provide mechanisms that will help consumers to protect themselves post-
contractually. However, the inability of consumers to benefit from extra 
information, or even from transparency, render procedural measures 
insufficient.  Procedural fairness on its own, then, is not sufficient to ensure that 
contractual terms are fair.  To ensure fairness, control of the contents of a 
contract is needed, and some detrimental terms should be disallowed from the 
outset.  It is accordingly clear that there is a link and interdependency between 
procedural and substantive fairness, and that both are needed to ensure 
fairness of contractual terms. 
The two main elements or dimensions of fairness are substantive and 
procedural fairness. To achieve substantive and procedural fairness, certain 
specific factors need to be considered and certain measures need to be 
applied.  These factors are set out in the figure below (figure 1). 
To achieve substantive fairness, an outright prohibition and a list indicating 
terms, or types of term, which may be regarded as unfair, should be set out in 
legislation.  Furthermore, the impact of contract terms on the consumer’s 
interests should be considered, as well as default rules or the consumer’s 
reasonable expectations. Substantive fairness can be measured against the 
‘price’ of a contract, by a balancing of interests, default rules, and reasonable 
expectations, or pro-actively by disallowing terms with certain substantive 
features. 
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To achieve procedural fairness, transparency should be required.  To increase 
transparency, disclosure rules should be enacted, or mandatory terms should 
be imposed by legislation.  Legislation may also require standardisation to 
increase consumer awareness and, by the same token, transparency.  To 
evaluate procedural fairness, the bargaining position of the parties, and the 
choices or alternatives available to the consumer, should be considered. 
So fairness entails substantive and procedural fairness.  
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Approach Dimensions Factors/Measures
 
Figure 1: Measures to achieve fairness or to determine fairness 
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1 Introduction 
In South Africa, until recently, there was no comprehensive legislation dealing 
with consumer protection, generally, and fairness in contracts, specifically.  
However, governments around the world, in particular in developing countries, 
have been encouraged by the United Nations (UN) to adopt general consumer 
protection laws, since the adoption of the Resolution on Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection1 in 1985.2 
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 Resolution 39/248 of 16 April 1985, available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r248.htm (accessed on 1 Dec 2011). 
2
 Department of Trade and Industry Consumer Law Benchmark Study (2004) 10, available at 
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Some of the main questions which had to be answered before new legislation to 
this effect could be adopted in South Africa, were: (a) whether there was a need 
for new legislation with provisions that will apply to specific contracts; (b) 
whether legislation should deal with standard-term contracts and abusive 
practices; (c) whether there should be a uniform test of ‘fairness’, and, if so, 
whether the test should be objective or subjective; and (d) whether exemptions 
should be allowed.3 
There was a general belief that the judicial supervision of contracts by the 
courts was contrary to the fundamental principles of freedom of contract.  In 
contrast, those who were willing to accept that society has an interest in the 
contractual relations between parties, had less problems with accepting the 
need for legislation giving courts the mandate to, in appropriate circumstances, 
scrutinise the fairness of contracts.4 The Department of Trade and Industry, in 
its benchmark study, recommended that abusive contract terms should be 
prohibited, regardless of whether or not they were stated in standard-term 
contracts, and that the test for unfairness should be objective.5  Although most 
jurisdictions provide a comprehensive list of conduct that can be considered 
prima facie unfair, the Department of Trade and Industry was of the opinion that 
such a list should merely be a guideline that is provided in addition to the 
general objective test.6 
In this chapter, I shall give a very brief overview of the background and main 
developments of the concept ‘fairness’ in the South African law of contract.   
                                                            
3
 Department of Trade and Industry Consumer Law Benchmark Study (2004) 28 and 36. 
4
 See, generally, CFC van der Walt ‘Kontrakte en Beheer oor Kontrakvryheid in ’n Nuwe Suid-
Afrika’ (1991) ’54 THRHR 367; CFC van der Walt ‘Aangepaste Voorstelle vir ’n Stelsel van 
Voorkomende Beheer oor Kontrakteervryheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg’ (1993) 56 THRHR 65. 
5
 Department of Trade and Industry Consumer Law Benchmark Study (2004) 35. 
6
 Department of Trade and Industry Consumer Law Benchmark Study (2004) 36. 
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2 History and Development of Law Regarding Fairness in Contracts 
2.1. The Common Law 
At common law, sanctity of contract takes pride of place in our predominantly 
capitalist society:  parties enter into a contract in the hope that it is enforceable, 
and that the government and the courts will not interfere, regardless of the 
hardships that the contract may cause.7 
In Wells v South African Alumenite Company,8 Innes CJ stated: 
‘No doubt the condition is hard and onerous.  But if people sign such conditions 
they must, in the absence of fraud, be held to them.  Public policy so demands.  “If 
there is one thing which more than another public policy requires is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by courts of justice”.’
9
 
So, in principle, the courts enforce contracts, as expressed in the rule that 
agreements must be honoured (pacta sunt servanda), which is based on 
individualism, autonomy, personal liberty, and freedom of contract.10  By 
contrast, paternalism (or welfarism) is the principle or system of controlling 
contracts, and the parties to a contract, in a parental way; this runs counter to 
the principle of freedom of contract.11  Put differently, intervention by the courts 
where an agreement appears to be unreasonable would be a form of 
paternalism inconsistent with the parties’ freedom of contract.12  However, for 
                                                            
7
 Department of Trade and Industry Consumer Law Benchmark Study (2004) 28. 
8
 1927 AD 69 at 72. 
9
 Quoting Jessel MR in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 
at 465. 
10
 See the discussion on the philosophical context of the focus on unfairness in contracting 
procedures, unfair terms and unfair outcomes of contracts in Ch 2.  See also RH Christie & V 
McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2005) 12; A Cockrell ‘Substance and Form 
in the South African Law of Contract’ (1992) 61 SALJ 40 at 41 and 61. 
11
 See Ch 2. 
12
 RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2005) 14. 
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quite a while, courts have whittled away the common law at this general 
principle by developing specific (paternalistic) rules for, among others, restraints 
of trade,13 terms that had been signed without reading,14 ticket contracts,15 and 
consensus improperly obtained  (such as misrepresentation,16 duress,17 and 
undue influence18).19 
One can trace the progression of the development and acceptance of the 
concept ‘fairness’ in the law of contract from Roman law to the present.  During 
                                                            
13
 Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) at par [10]; Magna 
Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) at 891-893; National Chemsearch 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Borrowman and another 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) at 1107.  See also AJ Kerr 
‘Restraint of trade after Magna Alloys’ in CJ Visser (ed) Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn 
(1989) 186; JM Otto ‘Inkorting van “Restraint of Trade” – bedinge in Kontrakte: Magna Alloys se 
Nageslag’ (1997) 60 THRHR 282; C-J Pretorius ‘Covenants in Restraint of Trade: an Evaluation 
of the Positive Law’ (1997) 60 THRHR 6; CJ Visser ‘The Principle pacta servanda sunt in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch Law, with Specific Reference to Contracts in Restraint of Trade’ 
(1984) 101 SALJ 641. 
14
 Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Forbes Waterproofing v The Government of the United 
Kingdom 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA); Home Fires Transvaal CC v Van Wyk 2002 (2) SA 375. 
15
 Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Forbes Waterproofing v The Government of the United 
Kingdom 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA); Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 
982 (A); King’s Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Wakeling 1970 (4) SA 640 (N); Central South African 
Railways v McLaren 1903 TS 727. See further AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 5 
ed (1998) 321-324. 
16
 Bayer South Africa Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 559 (A); Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch 1977 
(3) SA 562 (A); Ranger v Wykerd and another 1977 (2) SA 976 (A); Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 
1973 (3) SA 1019 (A); De Jager v Grunder 1964 (1) SA 446 (A); Trotman and another v Edwick 
1951 (1) SA 443 (A); Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69. 
17
 Broodryk v Smuts 1942 TPD 47.  See further G Glover ‘The Test for Duress in the South 
African Law of Contract’ (2006) 123 SALJ 98. 
18
 Preller v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A); Patel v Grobbelaar 1974 (1) SA 532 (A); Hofer v Kevitt 
1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA). See further J Barnard & C Nagel ‘Jordan v Farber (1352/09) [2009] 
ZANCHC 81 (15/12/2009)’ (2010) 13 PELJ 449 at 461-462. 
19
 RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2005) 14, 178-179, 183 
and 361; A Cockrell ‘Substance and Form in the South African Law of Contract” (1992) 61 SALJ 
40 at 61; L Hawthorne ‘The Principle of Equality in the Law of Contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 151 
at 168-169. 
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the Middle Ages, the Roman law changed from a system of a limited number of 
formal contracts, to a system where consensus formed the basis of all 
contracts.   
In pre-classical and classical Roman law all obligations were individualised 
mainly by those actiones which were available for their enforcement.  The 
recognised actiones which were included with their pattern formulae in the 
edicts of praetors and aedilis, was limited to a number of types of obligations:  
parties could not create obligations other than those for which an actio has been 
provided.  Gaius distinguished between two sources of obligations: (a) contract, 
and (b) delict. 20 Later, Justinianus further divided obligations into (a) contract, 
(b) quasi-contract, (c) delict, and (d) quasi-delict.21 Gaius divided contractual 
obligations again in those created (a) re, (b) verbis, (c) litteris, and (d) 
consensu.22   
Mainly loans were regarded as contractual obligations created re (real 
contracts).23 These obligations were loan for consumption (mutuum),24 loan for 
use (commodatum),25 deposit (depositum),26 and pledge (pigmus).27 Apart from 
contractual consent, the handing over of a thing which the recipient was obliged 
to restore was required for the creation of a contractual obligation.28   
With literal contracts, the writing down of words was the only source of the 
obligation. The formal entry into the account book which was a fictitious 
payment of money lent, was, for example, regarded as the source of an 
                                                            
20
 Gaius Institutiones 3.88 
21
 Justinianus Institutiones 3.13.2. 
22
 Gaius Institutiones 3.89. 
23
 Gaius Institutiones 3.90 et seq. 
24
 Gaius Institutiones 3.90. Paulus Digesta 12.1.2pr. 
25
 Ulpianus Digesta 13.6.1pr./1. 
26
 Gaius Institutiones 4.47. 
27
 Ulpianus Digesta 13.7.13.1. 
28
 Gaius Digesta 44.7.1.2-6 
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obligation created litteris.29 A literal contract was therefore created with the debit 
entry which a creditor made in his or her account book as if he or she paid over 
the booked sum of money as a loan to the debtor. 
With a contractual obligation created verbis or a verbal contract especially 
stipulatio, the only source of the obligation was the ritual form or formal word 
spoken, which was binding, even if no obligation was intended.30 The stipulatio 
was a unilaterally binding contract.  If the stipulatio did not disclose the legal 
foundation (causa) for the object it was concluded, the obligation was created 
even if the causa was absent.  To meet the action on the stipulatio the debtor 
could plead the absence of the causa by means of the exceptio doli.31 
Although consensus underlined contracts, it was in itself not sufficient to make 
contracts enforceable.  Something more was required, namely an underlying 
causa (causa contractus).  
Only in consensual contracts the informally declared consensus, in itself, 
without the giving of a thing or a formal act, created the obligation. The 
consensual contracts rendered actionable initially were (a) contracts of sale 
(emptio venditio), (b) hire (locatio conductio), (c) partnership (societas), and (d) 
mandate (mandatum).32  Contracts which were not actionable were called 
pacta.33  Some of them were, however, made actionable by the praetor and 
others only by post-classical imperial legislation. Initially pacta gave rise to a 
praetorian defence to any action. Later they were admitted to vary obligations 
                                                            
29
 Gaius Institutiones 3.128 et seq. 
30
 Gaius Institutiones 3.92-96. 
31
 Gaius Institutiones 4.116 and 119. 
32
 Gaius Institutiones 3.135 et seq. 
33
 Ulpianus Digesta 2.14.1.2. 
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by means of ancillary contracts.  These contracts were systematised later by 
East Roman academia as unnamed or innominate contracts.34  
The formal approach was therefore no longer followed when consensus 
became the basis of contractual liability in Roman law.  The Roman-Dutch 
writer, De Groot is regarded as the father of the modern law of contract.  He 
contended that in terms of natural law all pacta were binding.35  He based his 
contention on texts to the effect that fides formed the basis of justice.36 He 
attached great importance to the principle that promises should be kept, which 
he declared to be one of the basic principles of natural law.37  In his Inleidinge 
he stressed the fact that men are free to bind themselves by means of their 
toezegging or by promising something to someone,38 which is interpreted as his 
acceptance of the principle pacta servanda sunt as the basic tenet of the 
Roman-Dutch law of contract law.39 This freedom was, however, limited if a 
contract’s contents were, for example, illegal or immoral.40  In an exception to 
the rule that promises should be kept, he stated that parties should not be 
bound to an agreement where holding them so bound would work intolerable 
hardship on one of them.41  Put differently, he argued that leeway should be left 
to deal with circumstances which would have left the parties to provide for an 
exception which could be made to their obligations under the agreement.42  
Although he only used three examples to illustrate the above, he did open the 
door for a party to escape liability by providing that the covenant would work 
                                                            
34
 Generally, see R Dannenberg Roman Private Law 2 ed (1968) (a translation of M Kaser 
Römisches Privatrecht (1960)) 194-208. 
35
 H de Groot De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libre Tres (1625) 2.11.1.1 and 3. 
36
 Cicero De Officiis 1.7.2.3. 
37
 H de Groot De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libre Tres (1625) prolegomena 15. 
38
 H de Groot Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtgeleerdheid (1631) 3.1.10. 
39
 See also E Kahn (ed), C Lewis & CJ Visser Contract & Mercantile Law 2ed vol 1 (1988) 11-
15; C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African Law (1)’ (2004) 67 THRHR 
179 at 182. 
40
 H de Groot Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtgeleerdheid (1631) 4.1.42 and 43. 
41
 H de Groot De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libre Tres (1625) 2.16.27.1. 
42
 H de Groot De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libre Tres (1625) 2.16.26.1. 
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intolerable hardship on him if enforced.43  So generally fairness did not play a 
major role, since contracts had to be honoured in all circumstances. 
When Jan van Riebeeck, who was commissioned by the Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie to establish a refreshment station at the Cape, landed at 
the Cape in 1652, Roman-Dutch law became the law of the land.44  The Cape 
was regarded as a res nullius. It therefore became Dutch territory through 
occupatio. In terms of the Roman-Dutch law, mere consensus gave rise to 
contractual liability (will theory).45  The principles of freedom of contract and 
pacta sunt servanda therefore became the cornerstones of the South African 
law of contract.46  In 1795 and 1806 Britain conquered the Cape and ended the 
reign of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie.  The law in force under the 
Dutch was however still enforced.  In 1827 and 1832 Britain published the first 
and second Charters of Justice.  In terms of these charters courts in the Colony 
of Good Hope had to exercise their jurisdiction according to the laws which 
have been in force at that time, and according to the laws which were to be 
made after that time.  After 1828 Dutch judges and magistrates were replaced 
by jurists trained in England and the English procedural law was applied in 
courts.  After that, the South African law was further influenced by English 
mercantile law.  The independent Republics of Natalia, Oranje-Vrijstaat, and the 
Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic were established between 1838 and 1856.  These 
republics and the Kaffaria- and Griekwaland areas were at different times 
annexed by England.  They were also managed in terms of the laws in force 
                                                            
43
 Generally, see R Feenstra & M Ahsmann Contract: Aspecten van de Begrippen Contract en 
Contractsvrijheid in Historisch Perspectief (1980) 17-25; CJ Visser ‘The Principle pacta 
servanda sunt in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law, with Specific Reference to Contracts in 
Restraint of Trade’ (1984) 101 South African Law Journal 641 at 649-654. 
44
 The charter that has been awarded by the State-General to the Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie has given the 17 directors the power to dispose over matters which normally fall 
within the sphere of the State. 
45
 C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African Law (1)’ (2004) 67 THRHR 
179 at 185. 
46
 C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African Law (1)’ (2004) 67 THRHR 
179 at 185. 
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within the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.47  Under the influence of English 
law, the objective approach to consent was accepted.48  In terms of this 
approach, if there is no actual agreement or consensus between parties no 
contract exists.49 In 1979, in Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman,50 
the court considered, obiter,51 the basis of contractual liability. It concluded that 
consensus between the parties is the basis of contractual liability and the 
enforcement of contracts.52 
2.2 The exceptio doli 
The exceptio doli generalis was a Roman law remedy developed during the 
heyday of the formulary procedure of classical Roman law.53  It was aimed at 
addressing a situation in which a contract was concluded in a wholly proper 
manner but turned out to have an unfair result at a later stage.  This remedy 
made it possible for a defendant brought before a court in terms of a contract to 
acknowledge the contract, but to raise circumstances which would render the 
enforcement of the contract by the plaintiff tantamount to fraud.54  
                                                            
47
 Generally, see HR Hahlo & E Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background 
(1960) 575ff. 
48
 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597; Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 
(3) SA 978 (A) at 955; see also C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African 
Law (1)’ (2004) 67 THRHR 179 at 188. 
49
 S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 
(2007) 21-22; also see C-J Pretorius ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African Law (1)’ 
(2004) 67 THRHR 179 at 188. 
50
1979 (3) SA 978 (A). 
51
 The discussion was obiter in view of the eventual finding of the court that the appellant had 
contracted with the person pretending to be the respondent and that the respondent himself had 
not been involved in any contractual negotiations with the appellant.  For a discussion on the 
force of obiter dicta see AJ Kerr ‘The Persuasive Force of Obiter Dicta’ (1975) 92 SALJ 136. 
52
 At 933F. 
53
 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) at 605. 
54
 In Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W) it was accepted that the exceptio doli 
generalis formed part of the South African law. 
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In Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another,55 the court 
considered the exceptio doli generalis56 as a remedy against the enforcement of 
a contract in unfair circumstances.  The majority held, after examining old 
authorities,57 that the exceptio doli generalis was not part of South African law.58 
The court did not indicate any other remedy in our law that could achieve the 
same result as the exceptio doli generalis. Actually, the court held that the 
South African courts did not have equitable jurisdiction,59 and that there was no 
support in the Roman-Dutch law for an equitable defence to an action for the 
enforcement of a contract. The court was of the opinion, however, that Roman-
Dutch law was itself inherently equitable.60 
This decision was criticised, among others, for its absence of a discussion of 
general policy considerations, of the responsibility of a court to ensure justice 
between parties, and for its positivist historical and formalistic approach.61  This 
                                                            
55
 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
56
 The exceptio doli had a dual function: (a) Where the debtor alleged that the plaintiff was guilty 
of fraud before he or she instituted a claim the exceptio doli specialis was raised; (b) where the 
debtor alleged that the plaintiff claimed something that he or she was legally entitled to, but that 
he or she was in terms of reasonableness and good faith not entitled to, the exceptio doli 
generalis was raised.  See DJ Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 279. 
57
 The court, at 605, considered old sources and came to the conclusion that the exceptio doli 
never formed part of the Roman-Dutch law.  The court, however, held that Roman-Dutch law is 
itself inherently an equitable system.  See Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (1829) 1.1.6; 
Huber Hedendaegse Rechtsgeleerthheyt (1686) 1.1.17, 18, and 21; Van der Keessel Thesis 
Selectae  (1800) 24; De Groot Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtgeleerdheid (1631) 1.2.22. 
58
 At 607B. Cf Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 (1) SA 514 (A); Paddock Motors 
(Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16 (A).  See also SWJ van der Merwe, GF Lubbe & LF van 
Huyssteen ‘The exceptio doli generalis: requiescat in pace – vivat aequitas’ (1989) 106 SALJ 
235 at 236. 
59
 Unlike their United Kingdom counterparts, for example, under s 49 of the Supreme Court Act 
1981. 
60
 At 605-606. 
61
 See RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2005) 12; C Lewis 
‘The Demise of the exceptio doli: Is There Another Route to Contractual Equity?’ (1991) 107 
SALJ 26 at 29-30; J Lewis ‘Fairness in South African Contract Law’ (2003) 104 SALJ 330 at 
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decision left the South African law of contract, generally, without any means to 
serve the demands of justice, fairness, and reasonableness.62  However, at that 
time, bona fides or good faith had been recognised as a relevant factor in the 
context of contract as far as equity was concerned.63 
2.3 The South African Law Commission’s Report on Fairness 
The South African Law Commission set up a project to investigate the question 
of fairness in contracts.  In its report,64 the Law Commission proposed 
comprehensive legislation65 to deal with unfair contracts and unfair contractual 
terms, the unfair enforcement and execution of contracts, and the unfair 
formation of contracts.66 The aim of the Bill was to provide courts with the power 
to determine whether contractual terms are unreasonable, unconscionable, or 
oppressive, and, if so, to make the appropriate orders.  The Bill supplied the 
court with 25 guidelines that could be taken into account to determine 
unreasonableness, unconscionableness, or oppressiveness in contracts or 
contractual terms.  The last guideline was ‘any other factor which in the opinion 
of the court should be taken into account’.67  These guidelines were criticised for 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
332-333; SWJ van der Merwe, GF Lubbe & LF van Huyssteen ‘The exceptio doli generalis: 
requiescat in pace – vivat aequitas’ (1989) 106 SALJ 235 at 238-240. 
62
 See, however, L Veldsman & B Kuschke ‘The exceptio doli generalis – back again’ (2012) 
12.4 Without Prejudice 28. 
63
 See SWJ van der Merwe, GF Lubbe & LF van Huyssteen ‘The exceptio doli generalis: 
requiescat in pace – vivat aequitas’ (1989) 106 SALJ 235 at 241-242 with reference to Tuckers 
Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 (1) SA 645 (A) and Meskin NO v 
Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd and another 1968 (4) SA 793 (W). See also para 2.4. 
64
 South African Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification 
of Contracts Report, Project 47, April 1998. 
65
 Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms 
Bill. 
66
 See also JJF Hefer ‘Billikheid in die Kontraktereg Volgens die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Regskommissie’ 2000 TSAR 142; J Jamneck ‘Die Konsepwetsontwerp op die Beheer van 
Kontraksbedinge, 1994’ 1997 TSAR 637; CFC van der Walt “Beheer oor Onbillike 
Kontraksbedinge – quo vadis Vanaf 15 Mei 1999” 2000 TSAR 33 at 50-51.. 
67
 Clause 2(z). 
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opening almost every contract to attack, for their potential to upset the balance 
which the courts were in the process of achieving by employing the concept 
‘public policy’, and for creating legal uncertainty.68 Some authors were of the 
opinion that the acceptance of the proposed legislation would have meant the 
complete adoption of a paternalistic approach, whereas the common law 
provided the courts with all the principles that they needed.69 The proposed 
legislation was never promulgated. 
2.4 Good Faith 
After Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another,70 
academics and the courts analysed bona fides as a means to serve the 
demands of justice, fairness, and reasonableness.71 In Eerste Nasionale Bank 
van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman,72 the minority judge came to the same 
conclusion as the majority judges, by applying the concept ‘good faith’ (or the 
bona fide principle)73 as an independent basis for setting aside a contract.74 
                                                            
68
 RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2005) 13; GB Glover 
‘Good Faith and Procedural Unfairness in Contract – Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike 
Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A)’ (1998) 61 THRHR 328 at 334; NJ Grové 
‘Kontraktuele Gebondenheid, die Vereistes van Goeie Trou, Redelikheid en Billikheid – Eerste 
Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Beperk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A)’ (1998) 61 THRHR 
687 at 697; JJF Hefer ‘Billikheid in die Kontraktereg Volgens die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Regskommissie’ 2000 TSAR 142 at 149. 
69
 RH Christie & V McFarlane The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2005) 14-15. 
70
 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
71
 SWJ van der Merwe, GF Lubbe & LF van Huyssteen ‘The exceptio doli generalis: requiescat 
in pace – vivat aequitas’ (1989) SALJ 235 at 242. 
72
 1997 (4) SA 302 (A) at 318-322. 
73
 See Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A) at 304 
where Olivier AJ equated the bona fide principle and good faith.  See also Bank of Lisbon and 
South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) at 612. 
74
 The minority view Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 (4) SA 
302 (A) was also referred to in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive 1999 (4) SA 928 
(SCA) and Mort v Henry Shields Chiat 2001 (1) SA 464 (C), and followed in Janse van 
Rensburg v Grieve Trust 2000 (1) SA 315 (C).  See also GB Glover ‘Good Faith and Procedural 
Unfairness in Contract – Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 
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However, in Brisley v Drotsky,75 the majority held that good faith could not be 
accepted as an independent basis for not enforcing or setting aside a contract, 
or as an instrument to counter unfairness in contracts.76  The court did draw 
attention, though, to public policy as a recognised basis for not enforcing a 
contract.77 It further held that public policy was rooted in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, and the values that it enshrines.78  In Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,79 the court held that although abstract ideas or 
considerations such as good faith, fairness and reasonableness were the basis 
and reason for the existence of legal rules, and also led to the creation and 
amendment of those rules, they were not in themselves legal rules.80 Also, 
when it comes to the enforcement of contractual terms, the court has no 
discretion and does not operate on the basis of abstract ideas but rather on the 
basis of established legal rules.81  However, the courts in these cases, actually 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
302 (A)’ (1998) 61 THRHR 328; NJ Grové ‘Kontraktuele Gebondenheid, die Vereistes van 
Goeie Trou, Redelikheid en Billikheid – Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Beperk v 
Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A)’ (1998) 61 THRHR 687; CFC van der Walt ‘Beheer oor Onbillike 
Kontraksbedinge – quo vadis Vanaf 15 Mei 1999’2000 TSAR 33 at 39-40. 
75
 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [22]. 
76
 See also South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA).  Further on 
the role of bona fides, see D Bhana & M Pieterse ‘Towards a Reconciliation of the Contract Law 
and Constitutional Values:  Brisley and Afrox Revisited’ (2005) 122 SALJ 865 at 889-893; FDJ 
Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The 
Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71 at 73-74; L Hawthorne 
‘The Principle of Equality in the Law of Contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 157 at 171-172; L 
Hawthorne ‘Closing the Open Norms in the Law of Contract’ (2004) 67 THRHR 294 at 296-297 
and 300-301; GF Lubbe ‘Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously:  The Bill of Rights and Its 
Implications For the Development of Contract Law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395 at 396-398; C-J 
Pretorius ‘Individualism, Collectivism and the Limits of Good Faith’ (2003) 66 THRHR 638 at 
643-645. 
77
 Paragraph [31]. 
78
 Paragraph [91].  These values include human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism. 
79
 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
80
 Paragraphs [32]. 
81
 Paragraph [32].  Compare GF Lubbe ‘Bona fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die 
Suid Afrikaanse Reg’ 1990 Stell LR 7 at 20. Lubbe defines bona fides and concludes: 
History of Fairness in SA Law of Contract 
 
 
65 
 
also uncritically based their findings on incomplete or open-ended concepts 
such as ‘freedom of contract’, ‘pacta sunt servanda’, and ‘freedom of trade’.82 
2.5 Public Policy 
In Wells v South African Alumenite Company,83 Innes CJ held that public policy 
requires that parties to a contract must be held to it in the absence of fraud. In 
Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis84 the appeal court held that 
agreements should be enforced unless they are unreasonable and thus 
contrary to public policy.85 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
‘Die presiese strekking van die agsaamheidsaspek van die bona fides hang af van die 
relatiewe gewig wat aan outonomie teenoor altruïsme toegeken word, en mag van 
stelsel tot stelsel, en van tyd tot tyd en van kontrakstipe tot kontrakstipe varieer.  Die 
implikasie is egter dat die onredelike bevordering van eie belang ten koste van die 
ander party tot die kontraktuele verhouding strydig mag wees met die bona fides.  
Vanweë die noodsaaklikheid om botsende individuele belange te versoen, kan nie 
betwyfel word dat die handhawing van hierdie norm in openbare belang is nie”.  He also 
indicated that bona fides plays a role in the conclusion of contract and the result of a 
contract between parties or in procedural and substantive fairness’ (at 23). 
See also GB Glover ‘Good Faith and Procedural Unfairness in Contract – Eerste Nasionale 
Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A)’; (1998) 61 THRHR 328 at 334, 
who mentions that it is difficult to attach a precise meaning to amorphous concepts such as 
bona fides. 
82
 See also GF Lubbe ‘Bona fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die Suid Afrikaanse 
Reg’ 1990 Stell LR 7 at 15. 
83
 1927 AD 69 at 72. 
84
 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) at 892-894. 
85
 The case dealt with contracts in restraint of trade. See also Reddy v Siemens 
Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) at paras [10] and [15]; CTP Ltd and 
others v Argus Holdings Ltd and another 1995 (4) SA 774 (A) at 784; J Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Richter and others 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) at 243; National Chemsearch (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Borrowman and another 1979 (3) SA 1092 (T) at 1107.  See further a historical survey in CJ 
Visser ‘The Principle pacta servanda sunt in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law, with Specific 
Reference to Contracts in Restraint of Trade’ (1984) 101 South African Law Journal 641. 
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In Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes,86 in a case where the contract subjected one party 
almost entirely to the economic power of the other, the court held that no court 
should shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to public policy 
when the circumstances so demand, but that this power should be applied 
sparingly and only in the clearest cases – a judge’s individual sense of propriety 
and fairness should not influence the judge’s power to declare a contract to be 
contrary to public policy.87 Although public policy favours unbridled freedom of 
contract, ‘simple justice between man and man’88 should also be effected.89 
In the constitutional era, the Constitutional Court, in Barkhuizen v Napier,90 held 
that public policy should be determined with reference to the Constitution, and 
that a contractual term that violated the Constitution was by definition contrary 
to public policy and thus unenforceable.91 This case illustrates how the court in 
the constitutional era applies fairness in terms of the common law.92  The court 
held that where a court has to decide whether the terms of a contract are 
contrary to public policy, ‘reasonableness’ and ‘fairness’ must be considered.93 
The court held that there are two questions to ask when it has to determine 
fairness: 
                                                            
86
 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
87
 At 9.  For a discussion of the role of public policy, see also FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good 
Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The Influence of the Common 
Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71 at 74-83; L Hawthorne ‘The Principle of Equality 
in the Law of Contract’ (1995) 58 THRHR 157 at 173-174; L Hawthorne ‘Closing the Open 
Norms in the Law of Contract’ (2004) 67 THRHR 294 at 296-297; J Lewis ‘Fairness in South 
African Contract Law’ (2003) 104 SALJ 330 at 333-338. 
88
 Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 at 544. 
89
 At 9.   
90
 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
91
 Paragraph [29]. 
92
 See also, generally, FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South 
African Law of Contract: The Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 
SALJ 71 at 84-90; DW Jordaan ‘The Constitution’s Impact on the Law of Contract in 
Perspective’ (2004) 37 De Jure 58; G Lubbe ‘Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously:  The Bill of 
Rights and Its Implications For the Development of Contract Law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395. 
93
 Paragraph [36]. 
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‘The first is whether the clause itself is unreasonable. Secondly, if the clause is 
reasonable, whether it should be enforced in the light of the circumstances which 
prevented compliance with the … clause.’
94 
The court further held that the question of ‘reasonableness’ involves the 
weighing up of two considerations: 
‘On the one hand, public policy, as informed by the Constitution, requires, in general, 
that parties should comply with contractual obligations that have been freely and 
voluntarily undertaken. This consideration is expressed in the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda, which, as the Supreme Court of Appeal has repeatedly noted, gives effect to 
the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. Self-autonomy, or the ability to 
regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of freedom 
and a vital part of dignity. The extent to which the contract was freely and voluntarily 
concluded is clearly a vital factor as it will determine the weight that should be afforded 
to the values of freedom and dignity.’ 
The other consideration is the specific fundamental right involved in a case. So, 
reasonableness and fairness were considerations that the court considered in 
order to determine whether time-limitation clauses were contrary to public 
policy.95  The court also held that although it is necessary to recognise the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, courts could still decline to enforce clauses if 
implementation would result in unfairness or would be unreasonable for being 
contrary to public policy.96 
In Breedenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and 
Another,97 the court held that Barkhuizen v Napier was authority for the 
proposition that a party could not impose a term on another party, where the 
term would, if applied, operate unfairly, and that a term could not be enforced in 
a manner that was unfair.98 
                                                            
94
 Paragraph [56]. 
95
 Paragraph [48]. 
96
 Paragraph [70].  See also M Kruger ‘The Role of Public Policy in the Law of Contract, 
Revisited’ (2011) 128 SALJ 712. 
97
 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ). 
98
 Paragraph [48]. 
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From the above one can conclude that although freedom of contract is favoured 
by public policy, public policy at the same time sets the limits to freedom of 
contract.  However, the courts have declared only a few contracts to be contrary 
to public policy after Sasfin v Beukes.99   
3 Background to the Consumer Protection Act 
The Department of Trade and Industry, in its Draft Green Paper on the 
Consumer Policy Framework,100 referred to the South African Law 
Commission’s report on unfair contracts, and likewise recognised the need to 
legislate against contractual unfairness.101  Although the Law Commission 
recommended that unfair contracts legislation be adopted, the Department of 
Trade and Industry proposed that rather than enacting special legislation, 
general provisions regarding unfair contracts should be inserted in a more 
general consumer protection law.102 The aim of the Department was to enact 
law to provide not only for the rights and responsibilities of the parties, but also 
to promote the use of plain language in consumer contracts, and to give 
                                                            
99
 For example, Jordan and another v Farber (1352/09) [2009] ZANCHC 81 (15 Dec 2009) 
(unreported case) (immense bargaining position of a client and breach of the standards of 
professional ethics); Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa and Another 2006 (4) SA 581 
(SCA) (clause insulated the appellant from the effects of an administration order); Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Essop 1997 (4) SA 569 (D) (clause deprived respondent of his status 
as a solvent person, and inevitably subjected him to all the onerous obligations and extensive 
restrictions which bind an insolvent). 
100
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005), available at 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/conslawdraftgreenpaper/1tablesandcontent.pdf 
(accessed on 1 Dec 2011).  
101
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 30. 
102
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 31.  See also T 
Woker ‘Why the Need for Consumer Protection Legislation? A Look at Some of the Reasons 
behind the Promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31 
Obiter 217. 
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examples of unfair contractual terms through guidelines that built on 
international precedent.  A further aim was to create an overarching consumer 
law to regulate the interaction of consumers and businesses in the market 
place, with regard to issues such as marketing and selling practices, contracts, 
product safety, and product labelling.103 
In developing an overarching consumer protection law, the imbalances between 
consumers and businesses as a result of consumers’ poor or low literacy levels, 
limited skills, and residency in rural areas were taken into account, as was 
consumers’ exposure to unfair advertising, predatory selling mechanisms, lack 
of access to information, and unfair deals and contractual terms.104 The lack of 
proper information disclosure was also raised as a concern, as such disclosure 
(a) allows consumers to make informed choices and so achieves consumer 
driven outcomes; (b) enhances consumer protection, as it enables basic 
information to be presented in a uniform format, which prevents consumers 
from being misled; and (c) makes markets more efficient, as it can drive down 
prices by allowing consumers to shop around for the lowest price.105 
The inequality of bargaining power between consumers and businesses was 
also directly addressed in the Green Paper.  Many consumers, who generally 
have limited resources, enter into contracts without reading them.  Although 
consumers are bound to contracts which they have signed even if they did not 
familiarise themselves with the provisions,106 the compilers of the Green Paper 
noted that consumers’ actions can be attributed to the fact that contracts are 
                                                            
103
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 9-10. 
104
 
104
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 27-30. 
105
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 27-28. 
106
 In Burger v Central SAR 1903 TS 571 at 578 the court held that a person who signs a 
contractual document signifies his or her assent to the contents of the document (also known as 
the caveat subscriptor rule). 
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often written in language that is difficult to comprehend, and that consumers 
have little resources and few options to negotiate the terms.107 
In 1998, the Law Commission108 had already recognised the need to legislate 
against contractual unfairness in all contractual phases.  It concluded that 
unless measures against unfair contract terms were introduced, South Africa 
would become the exception to the rule, and its law of contract would be 
deficient by comparison with countries that recognise and require compliance 
with the principle of good faith in contract.109 
However, the Department of Trade and Industry, in its Green Paper, proposed 
that rather than enacting separate legislation, a general provision regarding 
unfair contracts should be inserted in consumer protection law.  It said that the 
legislation should provide not only for the rights and responsibilities of parties, 
but promote the use of plain language in consumer contracts, specifically in 
view of South Africa’s low levels of literacy.  It also stated that through 
guidelines, built on international precedent, the legislation could provide 
examples of unfair contractual terms.110 
The Consumer Protection Act was signed into law on 29 April 2009.111 The Act 
and its measures that deal with fairness entered into force on 31 March 2011.112 
In Part G of Chapter 2, the Act now contains measures dealing with unfair, 
unreasonable, or unjust contractual terms.  One of the aims of the Act is to 
                                                            
107
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 30. 
108
 See para 2.3. 
109
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 31; South African 
Law Commission “Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts” 
Report, Project 47, April 1998, xiii. 
110
 DTI Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 09/04 – Driving 
Competitiveness, Consumer Confidence and Business Excellence (2005) 31. 
111
 GG 32186 of 29 April 2009. 
112
 The general effective date was published in Gen N 917 GG 33581 of 23 September 2010. 
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protect consumers against unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust, or 
improper practices.113  The regulations under the Act contain a list of terms that 
are presumed to be unfair; the regulations likewise entered into force on 1 April 
2011.114 
5 Conclusion 
Although the courts have had several opportunities to create or enforce fairness 
mechanisms or requirements in the law of contract, they never did, despite the 
fact that the need for the regulation of unfair contractual terms was noted 
several times. The concept ‘good faith’ was never sufficiently developed to 
serve as an independent fairness mechanism, and the courts were never willing 
to develop it to this end, despite a considerable body of academic opinion 
suggesting this.115 It became quite clear, therefore, that South African consumer 
law and the law of contract were in dire need of fairness legislation.     
                                                            
113
 It is uncertain why the legislature used all these concepts to describe and regulate fairness in 
contracts. The concepts “fairness” would have served this purpose equally well. 
114
 GN R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 2011. 
115
 Lubbe is the only academic who properly defined the concept ‘good faith’:  see GF Lubbe 
‘Bona fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die Suid Afrikaanse Reg’ 1990 Stell LR 7 at 
20. See further GTS Eiselen ‘Die Standaardbedingprobleem: Ekonomiese Magsmisbruik, 
Verbruikersvraagstuk of Probleem in Eie Reg’ (1988) 22 De Jure 251; GB Glover ‘Good Faith 
and Procedural Unfairness in Contract – Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v 
Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A)’ (1998) 61 THRHR 328; NJ Grové ‘Kontraktuele Gebondenheid, 
die Vereistes van Goeie Trou, Redelikheid en Billikheid – Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike 
Afrika Beperk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A)’ (1998) 61 THRHR 687; C Lewis ‘The Demise of 
the exceptio doli: Is There another Route to Contractual Equity’ (1991) 107 SALJ 26; SWJ van 
der Merwe, GF Lubbe & LF van Huyssteen ‘The exceptio doli generalis: requiescat in pace – 
vivat aequitas’ (1989) 106 SALJ 235; CFC van der Walt ‘Aangepaste Voorstelle vir ’n Stelsel 
van Voorkomende Beheer oor Kontrakteervryheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg’ (1993) 56 
THRHR 65; CFC van der Walt ‘Kontrakte en Beheer oor Kontrakvryheid in ’n Nuwe Suid-Afrika’ 
(1991) 54 THRHR 367; C van Loggerenberg ‘Onbillike Uitsluitingsbedinge in Kontrakte:  ’n 
Pleidooi vir Regshervorming’ 1988 TSAR 407;  
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As I have indicated, the courts paid little or no attention to the significance of 
fairness in the process of negotiating and concluding contracts.  At common 
law, the courts have formally recognised only three instances in which contracts 
may be rescinded for procedural unfairness - misrepresentation, duress, and 
undue influence.116  I have also shown that freedom of contract, with its 
emphasis on negotiation and real party autonomy, is actually only a theoretical 
freedom, as a result of the increased use of standard-term contracts, and the 
concomitant lack of negotiation.117 It has accordingly emerged that the common 
law does not offer a sufficient mechanism for the judicial control of fairness in 
contract. As I have shown, the courts are not willing to read the common law 
extensively so as to give them the power to control fairness in contract and to 
strike down unfair contractual terms.  Legislative control in the form of fairness 
legislation was accordingly the only option.118 In Chapter 5, I shall analyse 
‘fairness’ as used in the Consumer Protection Act, with reference to the types of 
fairness (substantial and procedural).    
                                                            
116
 On the lack of a remedy aimed at addressing the lack of procedural fairness and the 
suitability of bona fides in this regard, see also GB Glover ‘Good Faith and Procedural 
Unfairness in Contract – Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 
302 (A)’ (1998) 61 THRHR 328 at 333-334. 
117
 See para 3.1.6 in Ch 2.  See also T Naudé ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation:  The 
Implications of why we Need it for its Formulation and Application’ 2006 Stell LR 361 at 366: 
she states that freedom or autonomy is not guaranteed where one party effectively claims 
freedom of contract only for itself, whereas there is freedom of contract for the other party only 
in a very formalistic, hollow, and practically meaningless sense. 
118
 For a discussion of the reasons for legislative control, see also GTS Eiselen Die Beheer oor 
Standaardbedinge: ’n Regsvergelykende Ondersoek (1988) (unpublished LLD thesis: 
Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys) 203-204, 467-476; T Naudé ‘Unfair 
Contract Terms Legislation:  The Implications of why we Need it for its Formulation and 
Application’ 2006 Stell LR 361 at 365-378. 
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1. Introduction to the Consumer Protection Act 
1.1 Fundamental Consumer Rights 
Before the concept ‘fairness’ under the CPA1 is analysed, it is important to give 
a brief overview of the rights introduced by the Act.  The CPA applies to every 
transaction occurring within South Africa for the supply of goods or services, 
unless the transaction is exempt from the application of the Act.2  The CPA 
introduced eight consumer rights: (a) equality in the consumer market;3 (b) the 
right to privacy;4 (c) the right to choose;5 (d) the right to disclosure and 
                                                            
1
 Act 68 of 2008 (‘CPA’). 
2
 Section 5. 
3
 Section 8-10. 
4
 Section 11-12. 
5
 Section 13-21. 
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information;6 (e) the right to fair and responsible marketing;7 (f) the right to fair 
and honest dealing;8 (g) the right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and 
conditions;9 (h) and the right to fair value, good quality, and safety.10 
Chapter 2 Part G of the CPA contains measures dealing with unfair, unjust, and 
unreasonable contract terms.  The right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and 
conditions is the first general fairness measure introduced in South African 
contract law by means of which one party can rely on protection if a bargain is 
unreasonable, unfair, or onerous to him or her. 
A fundamental error is to assume that the meaning of the concept ‘fairness’ can 
be determined, or may be restricted, by reference to only the right to fair, just, 
and reasonable terms and conditions.  Rather, fairness extends much further.  
Although most of the fairness mechanisms of the CPA are contained under the 
umbrella of the right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and conditions, the CPA 
contains several other provisions dealing with and related to fairness.  These 
provisions make it difficult for suppliers to understand the concept ‘fairness’ in 
such a way that they are able to know whether a contract will be fair, or whether 
they have complied proactively with fairness requirements. 
1.2 Field of Application 
Before I discuss the concept ‘fairness’ in consumer contracts regulated in terms 
of the CPA, it is necessary first to consider the Act’s field of application.11 
                                                            
6
 Section 22-28. 
7
 Section 29-39. 
8
 Section 40-47. 
9
 Section 48-52. 
10
 Section 53-61. 
11
 For a detailed critical discussion on the CPA’s field of application, see W Jacobs, P Stoop & R 
van Niekerk ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights Under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A 
Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PELJ 302 at 309-316; RD Sharrock ‘Judicial Control 
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As I have indicated,12 the CPA applies to every transaction occurring within 
South Africa for the supply of goods or services, or the promotion of goods and 
services, and the goods or services themselves, unless the transaction is 
exempt from the application of the Act.13  Although the CPA has a wide field of 
application, it may not be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from 
exercising any rights afforded by the common law.14 
1.2.1 Regulated Transactions 
The CPA applies to certain ‘transactions’.  A ‘transaction’ is defined as an 
agreement between two or more persons, in the ordinary course of business, 
for the supply of goods and services for consideration.15  Once-off transactions 
(transactions not concluded in the ordinary course of business) and other non-
business transactions are therefore not transactions that will be regulated by the 
Act.  Although ‘consideration’ is mentioned in the definition of ‘transaction’, 
certain arrangements must be regarded as transactions irrespective of whether 
a charge or economic contribution is required.16  Those arrangements that must 
be regarded as transactions include the supply of goods or services in the 
ordinary course of business to members of a club, trade union association, 
society or an incorporated or corporate voluntary association of people for a 
common purpose.  A solicitation of offers to enter into a franchise agreement 
also constitutes a transaction.  An offer by a potential franchisor to enter into a 
franchise agreement with a potential franchisee, a franchise agreement or an 
agreement supplementary to it, and the supply of goods and services to a 
franchisee in terms of the franchise agreement, are also regarded as 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of Unfair Contract Terms: The Implications of the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 22 SA Merc 
LJ 295 at 299-304.  See also R Sharrock ‘Judicial control of unfair contract terms: The 
implications of the Consumer Protection Act’ in M Kidd and S Hoctor Stella Iuris – Celebrating 
100 years of teaching law in Pietermaritzburg (2010) 115–148 
12
 Para 1.1. 
13
 Section 5(1). 
14
 Section 2(10). 
15
 Section 1 sv ‘transaction’. 
16
 Section 5(6). 
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transactions between a supplier and consumer in terms of the CPA.  The CPA 
applies to these potential franchises or franchise agreements, irrespective of the 
exclusionary provision that states that the Act does not apply to transactions 
where the consumer is a juristic person17 whose asset value or annual income 
is more than R2 million.18  Furthermore, the Act applies to transactions, 
irrespective of whether the supplier resides outside or has its principal place of 
business outside South Africa, or irrespective of the supplier’s nature or 
irrespective of the fact that a license is required to supply the products or 
services or part of the products or services to the public.19  The effect is 
therefore that the Act also applies to foreign suppliers of goods and services in 
terms of every transaction occurring within South Africa, even if the supplier has 
no principal office or residence within South Africa.  
1.2.2 Goods, Services, Supply and Promotion 
‘Goods’ is defined in section 1 of the Act.  ‘Goods’ include, but are not limited to, 
anything marketed for human consumption, any tangible object, literature, 
music, photograph, motion picture, game, information, data, software, code or 
other intangible product written on any medium, licences to use such intangible 
objects, legal interest in land or other immovable property, gas, water and 
electricity. 
‘Service’ is defined in section 1 of the Act.  ‘Service’ includes, but is not limited 
to, work performed by a person for the direct or indirect benefit of another, the 
provision of education, information, advice or consultation, banking or similar 
financial services, transportation of goods or individuals, provision of 
accommodation, entertainment or access to entertainment, access to electronic 
communication infrastructure, access or a right of access to an event, premises, 
activity or facility or access to or use of property in terms of a rental.  Services 
also include the right of occupancy of, or power or privilege over, land or 
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 Section 1 sv ‘juristic person’. 
18
 Section 5(7). 
19
 Section 5(8).  The R2 million threshold was published in GN 294 in GG 34181 of 1 April 2011. 
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immovable property, and the rights of a franchisee in terms of a franchise 
agreement to the extent provided for in the Act. 
‘Supply’ is defined in section 1 of the Act.  In relation to goods it includes selling, 
renting, exchanging and hiring in the ordinary course of business for 
consideration.  In relation to services, it means to sell services, to perform or to 
cause services to be performed or provided, and to grant access to premises, 
events, activities or facilities in the ordinary course of business for 
consideration. 
In many provisions, the Act refers to a supplier.  A ‘supplier’ is any person, 
including a juristic person, who markets goods or services.  ‘Market’ means to 
supply or to promote. 
‘Promote’, as defined in section 1 of the Act, means to advertise, display or offer 
to supply services or goods in the ordinary course of business for consideration.  
It also means to make any representation in the ordinary course of business 
that could be inferred as expressing willingness to supply services or goods for 
consideration, or engagement in any other conduct in the ordinary course of 
business that could reasonably be construed to be an inducement or attempted 
inducement to a person to engage in a transaction. 
A ‘consumer’ is any person, including a juristic person, to whom goods or 
services are marketed or supplied in the ordinary course of a supplier’s 
business, unless the transaction is exempted from the application of the Act.  
However, transactions in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person 
whose asset value or annual turnover, at the time of the transaction, is more 
than or equals the threshold value determined by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, are excluded from the application of the Act.20 
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 See para 1.2.3. 
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1.2.3 Excluded Transactions 
As was indicated,21 the Act applies to every transaction occurring within South 
Africa for the supply of goods or services or the promotion of goods and 
services and the goods or services themselves, unless the transaction is 
exempted from the application of the Act.  The following are exempted from the 
application of the Act:22 
(a) transactions for the supply or promotion of goods or services to the State;23 
(b) transactions in terms of which, at the time of the transaction, the consumer 
is a juristic person24 whose asset value or annual turnover is more than or 
equals the threshold value of R2 million determined by the Minister of Trade 
and Industry;25 (c) transactions exempted by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
after a regulatory authority has applied for an industry-wide exemption;26 (d) 
                                                            
21
 Paragraph 1.1. 
22
 Section 5(2). 
23
 The Act does not contain a definition of ‘State’.  It is not clear whether companies and other 
entities, of which the State is a shareholder or member, are included in the definition of ‘State’. 
However, an ‘organ of state’ is defined in s 1 of the Consumer Protection Act as an organ of 
state, as defined in s 239 of the Constitution.  
24
 See the definition of ‘juristic person’ in s 1 of the Act.  See also see W Jacobs, P Stoop & R 
van Niekerk ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A 
Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PELJ 302 at 309. 
25
 GN 294 in GG 34181 of 1 Apr 2011. 
26
 In terms of section 5(3), only a regulatory authority may apply to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry for an industry-wide exemption from one or more provisions of the Act on the basis that 
the provisions overlap or duplicate a regulatory scheme regulated by any authority under 
national legislation, treaty, international law, convention or protocol.  Therefore, an individual 
supplier or a representative body may not apply for an exemption from the Act.  However, in 
terms of section 5(4), the Minister of Trade and Industry may, by notice in the Government 
Gazette, grant an exemption to an industry, after receiving advice from the Consumer 
Commission.  Such an exemption may only be granted to the extent that the regulatory scheme 
ensures the achievement of the purposes of the Act and its provisions.  The exemption may be 
subjected to limits or conditions that are necessary to ensure the achievement of the purposes 
of the Act.  See also W Jacobs, P Stoop & R van Niekerk ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PELJ 302 
at 310. 
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transactions constituting credit agreements under the National Credit Act (but 
the goods and services subject to such agreement are not excluded for the 
application of the CPA);27 (e) transactions pertaining to services to be supplied 
under an employment contract; (f) transactions giving effect to a collective 
bargaining agreement in terms of the Labour Relations Act28 or section 23 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; and (g) advice or 
intermediary services, banking services, related financial services or 
undertaking, underwriting or assumption of risks to the extent that the service is 
regulated by the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act29 and the 
Long-term Insurance Act30 and the Short-term Insurance Act31.32 
                                                            
27
 Although this exemption seems to be clear, it is not.  The National Credit Act makes provision 
for so-called ‘incidental credit agreements’.  Incidental credit agreements are credit agreements 
in terms of s 1, 5(2) and 8(4)(b) of the National Credit Act.  However, an incidental credit 
agreement is regarded as a credit agreement only twenty ‘business days’ (see s 2(5) of the 
National Credit Act) after the supplier of goods or services had first charged interest or fees for 
late payment of an account.  Therefore, during the above-mentioned first twenty business days, 
an incidental credit agreement does not constitute a credit agreement in terms of the National 
Credit Act.  The question is then whether the Consumer Protection Act can apply to an 
‘incidental credit agreement’ that is not yet a credit agreement in terms of the National Credit 
Act.  Furthermore, the Consumer Protection Act only excludes credit agreements in terms of the 
National Credit Act from its ambit.  Marketing of credit products in terms of the National Credit 
Act is not expressly excluded from the application of the Consumer Protection Act.  Therefore, 
the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act should apply to credit advertisements 
and marketing of credit.  This leads to a duplication of regulations.  The National Credit 
Regulator could, on behalf of the credit industry, apply for an exemption from the marketing 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act in terms of section 5(3).  However, should there be 
any inconsistency between any provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and other legislation, 
the provisions of both Acts apply concurrently to the extent that it is possible.  Should it not be 
possible to apply the provisions of the Acts concurrently, the provisions that extend the greater 
protection to consumers must prevail (s 2(9) of the Consumer Protection Act).  See also W 
Jacobs, P Stoop & R van Niekerk ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PELJ 302 at 310. 
28
 66 of 1955. 
29
 37 of 2002. 
30
 52 of 1998. 
31
 53 of 1998. 
32
 See this exemption in the definition of ‘service’ in s 1. 
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1.2.4 Purposes of the Act 
The purposes of the CPA are to promote and advance the social and economic 
welfare of consumers through various means, and to ensure the realisation of 
the purposes of the Act and the enjoyment of consumer rights conferred by the 
Act.33  The Consumer Commission is responsible for the realisation of the 
purposes of the Act and the enjoyment of consumer rights conferred by the 
Act.34  
These purposes of the Act are achieved by, among others: (a) establishing a 
legal framework for the achievement and maintenance of a consumer market 
that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and responsible for the benefit of 
consumers;35 (b) reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in 
accessing any supply of goods and services by low-income consumers or 
communities, minors, seniors and other similarly vulnerable consumers, and 
most important, of consumers whose ability to read and comprehend 
advertisements, contracts, marks, notices, warnings, labels or instructions is 
limited by reason of low literacy, visual impairment or limited fluency in the 
language of the representation;36 (c) promoting fair business practices;37 (d) 
protecting consumers from unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or 
improper trade practices and deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent 
                                                            
33
 Section 3(1) and (2).  The National Consumer Commission was established in terms of s 85 
of the Consumer Protection Act.  It is an organ of state, which has jurisdiction throughout the 
Republic.  The Commission has several enforcement functions and is responsible for promoting 
dispute resolution between consumers and suppliers and receiving complaints concerning 
prohibited conduct or offences.  It is also responsible for, amongst other things, monitoring the 
consumer market, investigation, issuing and enforcing compliance notices (see ss 99-106).  The 
Commission has powers in support of investigation such as the power to issue summons and to 
enter and search premises under warrant.  The Commission must also conduct research, liaise 
with other regulatory authorities, promote consumer protection and make recommendations to 
the Minister of Trade and Industry (see ss 92-98). 
34
 Section 3(2). 
35
 Section 3(1)(a). 
36
 Section 3(1)(b). 
37
 Section 3(1)(c). 
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conduct;38 (e) and improving consumer awareness and information and 
encouraging responsible and informed consumer choice and behaviour.39 
The Act further provides an extensive framework for consumer protection and 
aims to develop, enhance and protect the rights of consumers and to eliminate 
unethical suppliers and improper business practices.40 
In the current era, unprecedented legislative and judicial regulation and control 
of contracts in many jurisdictions have been introduced.41  Liberal and 
individualistic impulses were therefore superseded by philosophies of 
collectivism and paternalism, and capitalism is more and more challenged by 
programmes of egalitarianism, welfarism and planning.  The purposes of the Act 
can also clearly be recognised by a paternalistic attitude towards the weaker 
party to a contract and is in line with international developments in terms of 
which public policy concerns can override freedom of contract in appropriated 
cases and by the increase in regulatory legislation.42 
1.2.5 Interpretation of the Act 
When one has to interpret the CPA, the traditional approaches cannot be 
followed.  In section 2(1), the Act expressly provides that it (the Act) must be 
interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the purposes of the Act as set out in 
section 3.43  This method of interpretation may lead to a result different to that 
expected when the traditional rules of interpretation are applied to ascertain the 
intention of the legislature, which is the main aim of interpretation.  Usually, 
legislation is interpreted according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of 
words, but contextual interpretation, namely to interpret the meaning that the 
                                                            
38
 Section 3(1)(d). 
39
 Section 3(1)(e).  
40
 See the Preamble to the Consumer Protection Act. 
41
 See, for example, the discussion of developments in the European and English law in Ch 6. 
42
 See also para 4.1 and in Ch 2. 
43
 See para 1.2.4 on the purposes of the Act. 
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words have ascertained in their broader legal context in the rest of the world, is 
not unknown to our law.44 
Furthermore, when interpreting the Act, applicable foreign law, international law, 
conventions, declarations or protocols may be considered.45  
The Act further provides that any decision of a consumer court, ombud, or 
arbitrator in terms of this Act that has not been set aside by a higher court may 
also be considered when interpreting the Act.46  Precedents may thus be 
created and followed if a consumer court, ombud, or arbitrator interprets the 
Act. 
Sections 2(8) and 2(9) prescribe rules in cases of conflict between the Act and 
other legislation.  Should there be an inconsistency between any provisions of 
Chapter 5 of this Act47 and the Public Finance Management Act48 or the Public 
Service Act,49 the latter Acts will apply.  In other instances in which there is an 
inconsistency between any provisions of other legislation and the Act, the 
provisions of both pieces of legislation will apply concurrently to the extent that it 
is possible.  If it is not possible to apply the provisions of both the pieces of the 
                                                            
44
 In terms of the literal interpretation principle, which is firmly entrenched in our law, legislation 
is interpreted according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of words.  See CJ Botha 
Wetsuitleg: ’n Inleiding vir Studente (1991) at 14-15 and JR De Ville Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000) at 94 et seq on literal interpretation, and CJ Botha Wetsuitleg: ’n Inleiding 
vir Studente (1991) at 11-15 and JR De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) 
at 238-241 on contextual interpretation.  See also W Jacobs, P Stoop & R van Niekerk 
‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A Critical 
Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PELJ 302 at 305. 
45
 Section 2(2)(a)-(b).  See also Ch 6 for a discussion on the current two fairness-oriented 
regimes in the United Kingdom, under the Unfair Contract Terms Act (which requires good faith) 
and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 (which requires reasonableness). 
46
 Section 2(2)(c). 
47
 Chapter 5 of the Act deals with national consumer protection institutions. 
48
 1 of 1999. 
49
 103 of 1994. 
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legislation concurrently, the provision that extends the greater protection to 
consumers must prevail. 
As I shall show below, the basic problem with the concept ‘fairness’, as used  in 
the CPA, is that there is no specific definition of the term ‘fairness’ in the Act.  
So it is difficult to predict with any certainty whether a court will consider a 
contract to be fair, and provide relief in any particular case.  Suppliers50 
therefore also struggle to determine in a pro-active manner whether their 
contracts are fair.  Concrete guidance on the content of the concept ‘fairness’ is 
accordingly needed.  For example, one factor that may yield greater 
predictability is proactive or preventative fairness requirements, which can be 
applied to attain fairness in contract.  Lists of prohibited conduct and unfair 
contract terms may also help.  To increase the effectiveness of the CPA, the 
concept ‘fairness’ must be defined properly and contextualized, so as to allow 
suppliers to predict in advance whether their contracts are fair. 
What exactly is the content of the concept ‘fairness’, has never been easy to 
determine.51  In lay terms, ‘fairness’ is often considered to be acting in a fair or 
reasonable manner.  But what is the legal content of the concept ‘fairness’?  
‘Reasonableness’ and ‘fairness’ are in legal terms often regarded as synonyms. 
In this chapter, the concept ‘fairness’ will be narrowed down, described and 
analysed with reference to the two types of fairness –  substantive and 
procedural fairness.  Substantive fairness will be divided into generalised and 
individual substantive fairness, of which the former is easier to predict and to 
measure than the latter.  After the analyses, standards in terms of which 
substantive fairness and procedural fairness may be measured will be 
deducted.  Uncertainties will also be pointed out and current fairness provisions 
of the CPA will be analysed and criticised. 
                                                            
50
 A supplier is a person who markets any goods or services. Section 1 sv ‘supplier’. 
51
 See, for example, J Jamneck ‘Die Konsepwetsontwerp op die Beheer van Kontraksbedinge, 
1994’ 1997 TSAR 637 at 637-638, who asked what exactly is meant by ‘fairness’. 
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This chapter therefore looks at the problem of fairness in contracts, whether 
such contracts are substantively or procedurally unfair, and furthermore 
considers both generalised and individual substantive fairness in terms of the 
CPA. 
A good definition or description of ‘fairness’ will provide suppliers with the 
opportunity of attaining fairness through self-imposed control, which may also 
eliminate the need to wait for the courts to take action reactively.52   
2 Fairness in Terms of the Act 
2.1 General 
The meaning of the concept ‘fairness’ cannot be determined or restricted with 
reference only to the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions.  
The Act also contains several other provisions related to fairness.  In this 
Chapter, the concept ‘fairness’ will be analysed critically with reference to the 
framework set out in Chapter 4. 
All the fairness measures contained in the Act resort under either substantive or 
procedural fairness, and they will therefore be analysed accordingly.  At the 
end,53 the different unfairness standards for each type of fairness will be 
highlighted and uncertainties will be pointed out.  The aim of this paragraph is, 
among others, to analyse the concept ‘fairness’ and to put it into a framework, 
so as to allow suppliers to predict whether their contracts are fair or not and to 
encourage pro-active action amongst suppliers against unfairness in contracts. 
Chapter 2 Part G of the Act contains a right to fair, just and reasonable terms 
and conditions.  The concepts ‘fair’, ‘just’ and ‘reasonable’ are however not 
defined.  Since these terms seem to overlap significantly, it is not sure why the 
legislature used all these concepts to describe and regulate fairness in 
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 See also Ch 3. 
53
 See paras 2.2.1.4, 2.2.2.6 and 2.3.4. 
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contracts.  It has been submitted that the concepts ‘unfairness’ and ‘fairness’ 
would have served this purpose equally well.54  Therefore, the concept ‘fairness’ 
will be used instead of ‘fair, just and reasonable’ or ‘unfair, unjust or 
unreasonable’.  Under the right to fair terms and conditions, it describes when 
terms and conditions will be unfair,55 when a notice is required for certain terms 
and conditions,56 and when consumer contracts must be in writing.57  It also 
sets out which transactions, agreements, terms or conditions are prohibited,58 
and what the powers of court are to ensure fair conduct, terms and conditions.59 
Over and above the fairness provisions contained under the right to fair 
contracts, the Act also contains other provisions related to fairness.  To ensure 
sufficient disclosure of information, the Act requires that certain minimum 
information must be disclosed to consumers.  This ensures transparency and 
puts consumers in a better position to protect their own interests.  Under the 
right to disclosure and information,60 the Act deals with the right to information in 
plain and understandable language,61 disclosure of the price of goods or 
services,62 product labelling and trade descriptions,63 disclosure of 
reconditioned or grey market goods,64 sales records,65 disclosure by 
intermediaries66 and identification of deliverers and installers.67  Furthermore, 
                                                            
54
 RD Sharrock ‘Judicial Control of Unfair Contract Terms: The Implications of the Consumer 
Protection Act’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 295 at 307. 
55
 Section 48. 
56
 Section 49. 
57
 Section 50. 
58
 Section 51. See also para 2.2.1.1.1 for a discussion on this ‘black list’. 
59
 Section 52. 
60
 Chapter 2, Part D of the Act. 
61
 Section 22. 
62
 Section 23. 
63
 Section 24. 
64
 Section 25. 
65
 Section 26.  
66
 Section 27. 
67
 Section 28. 
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the Act provides consumers with the right to fair and responsible marketing,68 
under which a general standard is set for marketing69 and certain types of 
marketing are regulated,70 and the right fair and honest dealing,71 under which 
unconscionable conduct72 and false, misleading or deceptive representations 
are regulated.73  Under the right to fair value, good quality and safety,74 
consumers should receive warnings concerning the fact and nature of certain 
risks.75  ‘Fairness’ can therefore not be determined or restricted with reference 
only to the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions.  In the 
analysis which follows, I will refer to all the fairness measures in the Act. 
At this point it is important to note that South Africa does not have an 
administrative body that controls fairness in contracts proactively.  Only a ‘court’ 
has the power to issue orders in respect of unfair contract terms.76  In terms of 
the definition of ‘court’ in section 1, a consumer court is not a court, but  a body 
with that name or a consumer tribunal that has been established in terms of 
applicable consumer legislation.  The orders contemplated in section 52 can 
therefore only be made by a court of law and not by a consumer tribunal or any 
other administrative body.77  However, in terms of section 100(1), the Consumer 
                                                            
68
 Chapter 2, Part E of the Act. 
69
 Section 29. 
70
 Section 30-38. 
71
 Chapter 2, Part F of the Act. 
72
 Section 40. 
73
 Section 41. 
74
 Chapter 2, Part H of the Act. 
75
 Section 58. 
76
 See section 52 for the powers of court in this regard.  
77
 In section 52(2), where factors which a court must take into account when it has to decide 
whether a contract or term is unfair are described, the section refers to contracts that were 
concluded, which makes it clear that the Act does not directly aim at proactively controlling 
fairness of consumer contracts in general but only of individual contracts which have been 
concluded.  So the Act rather aims at reactive judicial control of unfairness.  However, suppliers 
always have to comply with certain provisions irrespective of whether such provisions form part 
of the aspects which have to considered when the court has to decide whether a contract is 
unfair.  A supplier, for example, always has to comply with the plain language requirements set 
out in section 22.  Whether a contract was drafted in plain language is one of the factors which 
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Commission may issue a compliance notice to any person who engages in 
prohibited conduct.  Should the person then fail to comply with the compliance 
notice, the Consumer Commission may refer the matter to the National 
Prosecuting Authority for prosecution in terms of section 110(2), or apply to the 
Consumer Tribunal78 for the imposition of an administrative fine.79  In order to 
enforce any right in terms of the Act or to resolve disputes with suppliers, a 
consumer or any other party mentioned in section 4(1) may refer the matter 
directly to the Consumer Tribunal if the Act permits it,80 or refer the matter to the 
relevant ombud, apply to a court, refer the matter to an alternative dispute 
resolution agent in terms of section 70, file a complaint with the Commission in 
terms of section 71, or approach a court with jurisdiction, should all other 
remedies available in terms of legislation have been exhausted.81  Therefore, 
sections 52 and 69 are in a way contradictory.  In terms of section 69, a court 
should only be approached in order to enforce consumer rights should all other 
remedies be exhausted, while in terms of section 52, the right to fair, just and 
reasonable terms and conditions, and the right to honest and fair dealings can 
only be enforced by a court.  It is problematic that only courts have jurisdiction 
in disputes regarding so-called ‘unfair’ contracts, and this will increase the 
number of court disputes and litigation.  It is generally expensive for individual 
consumers to enforce their rights in court, and suppliers are well aware of this 
fact.  Furthermore, should only courts have jurisdiction in unfair contract 
disputes, there will be no official body or tribunal with the authority to hear 
complaints and apply proactive preventative measures in order to ensure that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
has to be considered in terms of section 52(2).  So, the Act still has measures aimed at 
proactive fairness (usually procedural factors or measures). 
78
 The Consumer Tribunal was established in terms of s 26 of the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005.  It conducts hearings into complaints relating to the National Credit Act and the Consumer 
Protection Act and it may impose a penalty in respect of prohibited or required conduct (see ss 
27 and 136-152).  It has jurisdiction throughout South Africa, is a juristic person, and is a 
tribunal of record.  An order of the Tribunal may be served, executed and enforced as if it were 
an order of the High Court and it is binding on the National Credit Regulator, the Consumer 
Commission, consumer courts and a Magistrate’s Court (see s 152). 
79
 Section 100(6). 
80
 Section 69(a). 
81
 Section 69(b)-(d). 
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unfair terms, contracts and unconscionable conduct are prevented in 
accordance with the principle that prevention is better than cure.82  Another 
issue is that the Act does not make provision for the court to raise the issue of 
unfairness mero motu. 
In general, fairness is measured by a general fairness criterion set out in the 
Act.83  The second way of assessing fairness of contractual terms includes lists 
disallowing terms with certain substantive features, a list of indicative terms 
which may be regarded as unfair and other procedural measures. 
The general fairness criterion for consumer contracts regulated in terms of the 
Act is set out in section 48.  It provides that, first, a supplier must not supply, 
offer to supply or enter into an agreement to supply goods or services at a price 
or on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust.84  Second, a supplier is not 
allowed to market any goods or services, or negotiate, or enter into or 
administer a transaction or agreement for the supply of goods or services in a 
manner that is unfair, unjust or unreasonable.85  Third, a supplier must not 
require a consumer or a person to whom goods or services are supplied at the 
consumer’s direction to waive any rights, assume any obligation or waive any 
liability of the supplier on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or 
impose any such terms as a condition of entering into a transaction.86  So, to 
summarise, the general standard is that an offer to supply, the supply, 
marketing, entering into a contract, negotiation, administration, waiver of rights, 
assumption of risk or waiver of supplier’s liability, terms or a price that is unfair 
is not allowed.  In order to decide whether a contract term was indeed unfair, 
several substantive and procedural factors play a role and must be taken into 
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 See also W Jacobs, P Stoop & R van Niekerk ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PELJ 302 at 
361-362. 
83
 See section 48. 
84
 Section 48(1)(a). 
85
 Section 48(1)(b). 
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 Section 48(1)(c). 
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account by a court.  Some of these factors are applied proactively and as 
preventative measures.87   
The factors which render a contract unfair, unreasonable or unjust are listed in 
section 48(2).88  This includes that a term or contract is unfair (a) should it be 
excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than a consumer; (b) 
should the terms of the agreement or transaction be so adverse to the 
consumer that they are inequitable; (c) should a consumer have relied, to 
his/her detriment, on a false, misleading or deceptive representation or a 
statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of a supplier; or (d) should the 
transaction or agreement have been subject to a term or condition or a notice 
for which a notice in terms of section 49(1) is required, and the term, condition 
or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable, or the fact, nature 
and effect of the term, condition or notice was not drawn to the consumer’s 
attention as required by section 49(1). 
Section 52(2) also lists specific factors which a court must consider in any 
proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier 
and consumer where it is alleged that the supplier conducted unconscionably,89 
                                                            
87
 Generally, any reference to the fairness or unfairness of a term or contract in this chapter also 
means the fairness or unfairness of an offer to supply, the supply, marketing, entering into a 
contract, negotiation, administration, waiver of rights, assumption of risk or waiver of a supplier’s 
liability, terms or a price. 
88
 The guidelines of factors listed in section 48(2) only apply to ‘a transaction or agreement, a 
term or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a notice to which a term or condition is 
purportedly subject’.  So, it does not apply to price.  It must also be noted that section 48(2) 
states that it (s 48(2)) does not limit the generality of section 48(1).  Unfairness therefore goes 
further than the situations mentioned in the guidelines or factors listed in section 48(2).  See 
also RD Sharrock ‘Judicial Control of Unfair Contract Terms: The Implications of the Consumer 
Protection Act’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 295 at 308. 
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used false, misleading or deceptive representations90 or that a contract or 
contract term is unfair.91  The latter is discussed below.   
The word ‘must’ indicates that the court always has to consider all these factors 
in each case.  These factors include: (a) the fair value of the goods and 
services; (b) the nature of the parties to the agreement or transaction; (c) the 
parties’ relationship to each other; (d) the parties’ relative capacity, education, 
experience, sophistication, and bargaining position; (e) the circumstances of the 
agreement or transaction that existed or which were reasonably foreseeable at 
the time of the transaction, agreement or conduct, irrespective of whether the 
Act was in force at that time; (f) the conduct of the supplier and of the 
consumer; (g) whether the parties negotiated, and if they did, the extent of the 
negotiation; (h) whether a consumer was required to do anything that was not 
reasonably necessary for the legitimate interest of the supplier; (i) whether, and 
the extent to which, the plain and understandable language requirements were 
complied with; (j) whether a consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known 
of the existence of a provision of the agreement that is alleged to have been 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust when having regard to customs of trade and 
previous dealings between the parties; (k) the amount for and the 
circumstances under which a consumer could have acquired the same or 
equivalent goods or service from another supplier; and (l) where goods were 
supplied, whether the goods were manufactured or adapted to a consumer's 
special order. 
2.2 Substantive Fairness Measures in the Act 
Substantive fairness is concerned with the outcome of the contracting process.  
If a contract is substantively unfair, there is then, at minimum, something 
objectionable about its terms, or its terms are unfair as between the contracting 
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parties.  The reference to ‘terms’ therefore distinguishes substantive fairness 
from procedural fairness.92 
Conceptions of substantive fairness may either be general or individual.  If 
fairness is determined with reference to factors external to the contracting 
parties, it is generalised, for example, the market price of goods or services or 
the availability of alternatives from competitors.  If fairness is determined with 
reference to factors related to consumers’ welfare, it is individualised, for 
example, the effect of terms on the consumer.93 
2.2.1 General Substantive Fairness 
General substantive measures in the Act include the disallowing of terms with 
certain substantive features and default rules.  Such measures also include 
other factors listed in section 52(2), such as whether the consumer could have 
acquired identical goods or services from a different supplier or whether goods 
were manufactured, adapted or processed to the special order of a consumer.  
Section 52(2) lists the specific factors the court must consider when a person 
alleges that a supplier contravened sections 40,94 4195 or 48 or in other words, 
when unfairness is alleged.96  Some of these factors are generalised factors, 
while others are individualised factors. It is therefore difficult to consider and 
apply both generalised and individualised factors without separating these 
factors.  However, in order to simplify the application of these factors they are 
separated. 
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2.2.1.1 Disallowing Terms with Certain Substantive Features 
Disallowing terms with certain substantive features is the most radical form of 
fairness and the least acceptable from a freedom-oriented perspective.  That is 
because terms are disallowed irrespective of overall substantive or procedural 
fairness.97  This approach thus implies the pre-emptive control of fairness, 
because certain terms are rendered ineffective irrespective of how and when 
they are used.98  The main reason for disallowing terms with substantive 
features is the idea that consumers should be given absolute protection where 
certain substantive interests or irreducible rights are involved.  Sometimes the 
substantive features or the nature of the substance or a term is so serious or 
detrimental that the risk that procedural fairness did or could work in practice 
cannot be taken.  Disallowing terms is therefore an independent and general 
substantive fairness measure; the only factor to be considered is whether the 
substantive features of a specific term are disallowed or presumed to be unfair 
or whether the term contains a prohibited element.  Terms are usually 
disallowed in terms of a black list.  Terms presumed to be unfair are usually 
listed in a grey list.  Black and grey lists are used widely and are supported 
internationally.99 
Generally, fairness is measured by a general fairness criterion.100  As already 
indicate,101 the best guideline to a general fairness criterion is to assess fairness 
of contractual terms by using a list disallowing terms with certain substantive 
features or by comparing the terms to a list of indicative list terms which may be 
regarded as unfair.  Such an indicative list is an invaluable tool for courts, 
authorities and suppliers. 
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 See also para 2.3 in Ch 6. 
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2.2.1.1.1 Black List 
A black list contains a list of prohibited terms.  These terms are void under all 
circumstances irrespective of any other factors or the circumstances.102  Since a 
black list does not take cognisance of the circumstances or overall substantive 
or procedural fairness, it is the most radical form of fairness or the most radical 
fairness mechanism.  The benefit, as we have seen, is that black lists (and grey 
lists) enhance the effectiveness of the control of unfair contract terms and lead 
to greater predictability.  At the same time, black lists are also applied 
proactively, since suppliers apply these lists spontaneously and as a measure 
of self-imposed control.  Proactive control is not fully dependent on judicial 
control, so the costs and risks of litigation are also reduced by black lists.  In 
practice, black lists therefore function better than a general criterion of fairness 
which may take a long time to work out in practice or which is difficult to 
predict.103 
Since South Africa has practically no experience of the general control of 
fairness in contracts, it is a good idea to be very careful when drawing up an 
extensive black list.104  Where there is doubt as to whether a clause that may 
seem substantively unfair may sometimes be justified, it is better to put the term 
in a grey list and then, based on experience, to move it to the black list if 
required.105 
In order for black lists (and grey lists) to be manageable they should focus on 
terms which are not desirable across different types of contracts.  Terms unique 
to specific types of contracts should be dealt with in sector-specific legislation.  
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 T Naudé ‘The Use of Black and Grey Lists in Unfair Contract Terms Legislation in 
Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 124 SALJ 128 at 130. 
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 See the commentary below. 
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The legislation should therefore state that a black or grey list is additional or not 
intended to replace any other statutory or common-law measures of control.  
Furthermore, a black list does not only contain certain terms or guidelines, but 
sometimes certain trade practices may also be blacklisted.  A black list should 
also be updated regularly, because it is impossible to list all unfair clauses at 
once.  Since black lists are used by suppliers as a measure of self-control, they 
should be written in plain and understandable language.106 
The Act contains a black list in section 51.107  It does not contain an extensive 
list of prohibited terms, but a list of factors or guidelines.  This reads as follows: 
‘(1) A supplier must not make a transaction or agreement subject to any term or 
condition if – 
 (a) its general purpose or effect is to – 
 (i) defeat the purposes and policy of this Act; 
 (ii) mislead or deceive the consumer; or 
 (iii) subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct; 
 (b) it directly or indirectly purports to – 
 (i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of this Act; 
(ii) avoid a supplier's obligation or duty in terms of this Act; 
(iii) set aside or override the effect of any provision of this Act; or 
 (iv) authorise the supplier to – 
(aa) do anything that is unlawful in terms of this Act; or 
(bb) fail to do anything that is required in terms of this Act; 
 (c) it purports to – 
(i) limit or exempt a supplier of goods or services from liability for any 
loss directly or indirectly attributable to the gross negligence of the 
supplier or any person acting for or controlled by the supplier; 
(ii) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer for a 
loss contemplated in subparagraph (i); or 
(iii) impose an obligation on a consumer to pay for damage to, or 
otherwise assume the risk of handling, any goods displayed by the 
supplier, except to the extent contemplated in section 18(1); 
 (d) it results from an offer prohibited in terms of section 31; 
(e) it requires the consumer to enter into a supplementary agreement, or 
sign a document, prohibited by subsection (2)(a); 
(f) it purports to cede to any person, charge, set off against a debt, or 
alienate in any manner, a right of the consumer to any claim against the 
Guardian's Fund; 
(g) it falsely expresses an acknowledgement by the consumer that – 
(i) before the agreement was made, no representations or warranties 
were made in connection with the agreement by the supplier or a 
person on behalf of the supplier; or 
(ii) the consumer has received goods or services, or a document that 
is required by this Act to be delivered to the consumer; 
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(h) it requires the consumer to forfeit any money to the supplier – 
(i) if the consumer exercises any right in terms of this Act; or 
(ii) to which the supplier is not entitled in terms of this Act or any other 
law; 
 (i) it expresses, on behalf of the consumer – 
(i) an authorisation for any person acting on behalf of the supplier to 
enter any premises for the purposes of taking possession of goods 
to which the agreement relates; 
(ii) an undertaking to sign in advance any documentation relating to 
enforcement of the agreement, irrespective of whether such 
documentation is complete or incomplete at the time it is signed; or 
(iii) a consent to a predetermined value of costs relating to enforcement 
of the agreement, except to the extent that is consistent with this 
Act; or 
 (j) it expresses an agreement by the consumer to – 
(i) deposit with the supplier, or with any other person at the direction of 
the supplier, an identity document, credit or debit card, bank 
account or automatic teller machine access card, or any similar 
identifying document or device; or 
(ii) provide a personal identification code or number to be used to 
access an account. 
 
‘(2) A supplier may not – 
(a) directly or indirectly require or induce a consumer to enter into a 
supplementary agreement, or sign any document, that contains a 
provision contemplated in subsection (1); 
 (b) request or demand a consumer to – 
(i) give the supplier temporary or permanent possession of an 
instrument referred to in subsection (1)(j)(i) other than for the 
purpose of identification, or to make a copy of such instrument; 
or 
(ii) reveal any personal identification code or number contemplated 
in subsection (1)(j)(ii); or 
(c) direct, or knowingly permit, any other person to do anything referred to 
in this section on behalf of or for the benefit of the supplier.’ 
Transactions, contracts, terms or conditions in contravention of this section are 
void to the extent that they contravene section 51.108  If they are void in terms of 
a section of this Act, this must be regarded as having been of no force or effect 
at any time, unless a court declared that the relevant provision of the Act does 
not apply.109 
The main issue with the black list contained in section 51 is that it is not very 
‘black’, in other words, it is vague and long.  That is mainly because the list is 
linked to the purpose and policy of the Act, which makes it difficult to determine 
whether a term is prohibited or not.110  The Act, for example, states the a 
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supplier must not make a transaction or contract subject to any terms or 
condition if its general purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes and policy of 
the Act, mislead or deceive the consumer or subject the consumer to fraudulent 
conduct.  First, the purpose and policy of the Act are drafted in wide and 
general terms.111  It is therefore very difficult to determine whether a term or its 
purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes and policy of the Act.  Second, 
whether the purpose or effect of a term is to mislead or deceive, is a subjective 
question.  No formula is prescribed in order to determine whether the purpose 
or effect of a term is to mislead or deceive a consumer.112  Third, ‘fraudulent 
                                                            
111
 See para 1.2.4. 
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 Section 41 deals with false, misleading or deceptive representations in respect of marketing 
and may therefore be of assistance when one has to determine whether the consumer was 
misled or deceived.  This section states that suppliers are not allowed to use false, misleading 
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affiliation, connection, sponsorship or approval that he, she or it does not have; (b) that any 
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have; (b) the purpose of the land; or (c) the facilities and features of the land.  This list is not 
exhaustive.  When one has to determine whether the consumer was misled or deceived, it will 
not be of guidance to look at common-law misrepresentation, because it is doubted that the 
legislature intended to outlaw all terms agreed upon as a result of misrepresentation and 
whether ‘mislead and deceive’ is the same as misrepresentation.  The common-law rules on 
misrepresentation are clear, and it is doubted that the legislature intended to further regulate 
misrepresentation by adding terms, which result from misrepresentation to the black list.  
However, the Act did not blacklist terms excluding or limiting liability for misrepresentations.  
Misrepresentation requires an act (a representation made by one contract party to the other 
party), wrongfulness (the conduct must be wrongful), fault (blameworthiness for the wrongful 
conduct), causation (the misrepresentation must have caused the party to contract where 
he/she would not have contracted or on different terms) and an undesirable result (contract or 
damage) (see S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reyneck & GF Lubbe Contract 
General Principles 3 ed (2007) at 108-117 for an analysis of misrepresentation.  See also Wells 
v SA Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69, Trotman and Another v Edwick 1951 (1) SA 443 (A), De Jager 
v Grunder 1964 (1) SA 446 (A), Ranger v Wykerd and Another 1977 (2) SA 976 (A), Bayer 
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conduct’ is not defined in the Act.113  This part of the black list is therefore vague 
and drafted in terms that are too wide.114  As we have seen, it is very important 
to use plain and understandable language in black and grey lists in order to use 
them effectively and for them to have the intended effect.  It has been 
suggested that section 51(1)(a) and (b) could have simply provided that ‘any 
term or notice which directly or indirectly waives or restricts the consumer’s 
rights under this Act or in any other way contravenes this Act shall be void’.115  
That is because it seems as if these subsections aim to prohibit the exclusion or 
limitation of the consumer’s rights and the supplier’s duties under the Act. 
A term or an agreement may also not directly or indirectly purport to waive or 
deprive consumers of their rights in terms of the Act, avoid a supplier’s duty in 
terms of the Act, or authorise a supplier to do something that is unlawful in 
terms of this Act or fail to do something that is required in terms of the Act.116  
Several types of terms excluding or restricting liability normally imposed by 
legislation are often encountered in black lists, so this part of the black list is in 
accordance with international standards and precedent.117  These terms, which 
are usually prohibited, include terms excluding or limiting the legal liability of the 
supplier for negligently causing personal injury or death, excluding or limiting 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 449 (A), Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 (3) SA 1019 
(A) on misrepresentation.  See also par 2.3.1.1. 
113
 In section 42, however, the Act prohibits fraudulent schemes and offers.  Essentially, section 
42 prohibits any person from directly or indirectly promoting, knowingly joining or participating in 
a fraudulent currency scheme (see s 42(3)), a fraudulent financial transaction (see s 42(4)), 
fraudulent transfer of property or legal rights (see s 42(5), (6) and (7) or any other scheme 
declared fraudulent by the Minister of Trade and Industry in terms of section 42(8). 
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 Section 51(1)(a) and (b) have also been described as unnecessarily verbose.  See T Naudé 
‘The Consumer’s ‘Right to Fair, Reasonable and Just Terms’ under the New Consumer 
Protection Act in Comparative Perspective’ (2009) 126 SALJ 505 at 519. 
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 T Naudé ‘The Consumer’s ‘Right to Fair, Reasonable and Just Terms’ under the New 
Consumer Protection Act in Comparative Perspective’ (2009) 126 SALJ 505 at 519. 
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 Section 51(1)(b). 
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 See T Naudé ‘The Use of Black and Grey Lists in Unfair Contract Terms Legislation in 
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liability for intentional harm or gross negligence and excluding or limiting liability 
for misrepresentations.118  In this regard, section 51(1)(c) prohibits a supplier 
from using exemption or indemnity agreements or terms that limit or exempt a 
supplier from liability for any loss directly or indirectly attributable to the gross 
negligence119 of the supplier or someone on his, her or its behalf.  It also 
prohibits the use of agreements or terms that constitute an assumption of risk or 
liability by the consumer for these damages.  Lastly, an agreement or term may 
not impose an obligation on a consumer to pay for damage to goods displayed 
by a supplier.  A notice in terms of which a consumer will be liable for the 
damage to goods displayed will therefore not be permitted in terms of this 
section.120 
Furthermore, section 51 has several other prohibitions, such as agreements or 
terms resulting from an offer prohibited in section 31,121 requiring consumers to 
enter into supplementary contracts,122 purporting to cede or set off a consumer's 
right to claim against the Guardian Fund,123 and falsely expressing an 
acknowledgement by a consumer that no representations or warranties were 
made before an agreement was made, or that a consumer has received goods, 
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 See T Naudé ‘The Use of Black and Grey Lists in Unfair Contract Terms Legislation in 
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services or a required document.124  The latter prohibition implies that a contract 
may contain an acknowledgement by a consumer that no representations or 
warranties had been made before an agreement was made, or that a consumer 
has received goods, services or a required document, but the 
acknowledgement may not be false.  Parties may thus still use a term indicating 
that no party will be able to rely on alleged representations not recorded in the 
written agreement.125 
Other prohibitions include transactions or contracts subject to any term or 
condition requiring a consumer to forfeit money to a supplier should the 
consumer exercise his or her rights in terms of this Act or to which the supplier 
is not entitled.126  Terms requiring forfeiture prohibited by the Act or other laws 
are thus prohibited.127 
Furthermore, prohibitions include transactions or contracts subject to any term 
or condition expressing an authorisation for the supplier or someone on his, her 
or its behalf to enter any premises for the purpose of taking possession of 
goods, undertaking to sign in advance documents relating to enforcement, or a 
consent to a predetermined value of costs relating to enforcement,128 and 
expressing an agreement by the consumer to deposit a bank card or identity 
document or provide a pin code or number to be used to access an account.129  
A supplier is also not allowed to require a consumer to enter into a 
supplementary agreement or sign any document in terms of which the 
consumer enters into an agreement that contains a prohibited term in terms of 
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section 51(1),130 or gives temporary or permanent possession of his/her bank 
card or identification document or reveals his/her pin or other access number to 
an account to a supplier.131  The latter is an example of a blacklisted trade 
practice. 
A fourth issue is that the black list does not make provision for it to be updated 
regularly.  It should at least make provision for the Consumer Commission to 
regularly review the black list and to make recommendations to the Department 
of Trade and Industry based on case law.  Regular updating may result in the 
effectiveness of the Act and the black list being increased.  However, the Act 
states that the Consumer Commission must report from time to time to the 
Minister of Trade and Industry recommendations for achieving the progressive 
transformation and reform of consumer law.132  For the black list to stay relevant 
and in keeping with business, the Act should place a duty on the Consumer 
Commission or the Department of Trade and Industry to regularly update or 
review the black list. 
It must be noted that the provisions of the black list must not be interpreted so 
as to preclude consumers from exercising any rights afforded in terms of 
common law.133 
2.2.1.1.2 Grey List 
A grey list contains a list of terms which may be unfair.  The final decision of a 
court on whether the term is unfair depends on the circumstances of a particular 
case.134  A grey list is therefore not absolute, but is a very good indication of 
what fairness or unfairness is.  Grey lists therefore effectively limit the open-
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endedness of the concept ‘fairness’ in legislation and as a result increase 
certainty. 
One of the benefits of grey listing problematic clauses is that it places the 
burden of convincing a court that a term is fair on the supplier.135  Without 
evidence by the supplier that the use of a greylisted term is not prohibited, a 
court will therefore not be able to find that a term is fair.  It also, as is the case 
with black lists, has the benefit of proactive control. 
Another benefit is that a grey list enhances the effectiveness of the control of 
unfair contract terms, which leads to greater predictability.  A grey list is also 
applied proactively, since suppliers apply these lists as a measure of self-
imposed control.  Proactive control is not fully dependent on judicial control, so 
the costs and risks of litigation are also reduced by grey lists.  In practice, grey 
lists therefore function better than a general criterion of fairness, which may 
take a long time to work out in practice or which is difficult to predict.136 
In order to make it easy for suppliers to know what is required and which risks 
they should bear or insure against, a grey list should give clear guidance and be 
specific.  Re-writing of standard term contracts should then only be a once-off 
expense as the grey list gives guidance to drafters as to the types of clauses 
that should be treated with caution.137 
The grey list in the Act is based on English law.  Schedule 2 of the English 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations also contains a similar 
indicative and non-exhaustive list or grey list of terms which may be regarded 
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as unfair.138  In turn, this list is based on the grey list published in the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive adopted by the Council of the European Communities 
in 1993.139 
Section 120(1)(d) empowers the Minister of Trade and Industry to make 
regulations relating to unfair contract terms.  The CPA, 2008 Regulations were 
published accordingly.140  The grey list to the Act was published in regulation 
44(3) to the Act.  Ideally, the grey list should have been included in the text of 
the Act, in the same part as the black list.  It would then have had greater 
legitimacy and would have been more prominent and accessible to 
consumers.141  The grey list only applies to terms in consumer agreements 
where the supplier is operating on a profit basis and acting wholly or mainly for 
purposes related to its business or profession and the consumer is an individual 
acting for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to his/her business or 
profession.142 
Contract terms are presumed to be unfair if they contain one or more of the 
purposes or effects listed in regulation 44(3).  A supplier may thus still include a 
greylisted term in a consumer agreement provided that he/she can show that, in 
light of the circumstances, the term is in fact fair.143  The list in regulation 44(3) 
is non-exhaustive, so other terms may also be unfair for the purpose of section 
48.144  The list is also only indicative since the terms listed may be fair in view of 
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the particular circumstances of a case.145  A court may therefore not limit its 
control simply to the listed clauses, purposes or effects.  The list also does not 
derogate from provisions in the Act or any other law in terms of or in respect of 
which a term is prohibited.146  
Again, an issue is that the grey list does not make provision for it to be updated 
regularly.  It should at least make provision for the Consumer Commission to 
review it regularly and to make recommendations to the Department of Trade 
and Industry based on case law.  Regular updating may result in the 
effectiveness of the Act and the grey list being increased.  However, the Act 
states that the Consumer Commission must report from time to time to the 
Minister of Trade and Industry recommendations for achieving the progressive 
transformation and reform of consumer law.147 
A grey list helps administrative bodies, such as the Consumer Commission or 
the Office of Fair Trading, to take preventative action against using unfair terms, 
since a grey list indicates which terms are presumed to be unfair.  It can 
therefore decrease the need for expensive litigation.  Suppliers often just stop 
using greylisted terms or avoid greylisted terms as far as possible.  Although a 
grey list reduces the likelihood of fairness disputes, the fact that South Africa 
does not have an administrative body that controls fairness in contracts does 
not serve the aim of prevention.  In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair 
Trading considers any complaints about the unfairness of a contract term and, if 
it believes that a term is unfair, it has powers to ask a court for an injunction to 
prevent the term being used or recommended for use. However, only the courts 
can finally decide whether a term is unfair or not.148  South Africa has a negative 
system for eliminating unfair terms.  In terms of this traditional approach, terms 
are eliminated by court based on actions for interdicts.  When a term is 
presumed to be unfair, a court may order that it is unfair and that it must be 
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removed from a contract.  The supplier will normally replace this term by 
another term, which may also be unfair.  The negative system is therefore not 
always effective in increasing fairness in contract terms.  In order to eliminate 
unfair terms effectively, there should be a national system and an administrative 
body for monitoring unfair terms, in other words a positive system for eliminating 
unfair terms.  The administrative body may, for example, once it receives a 
complaint about a term presumed as unfair, initiate discussions and 
negotiations in order to persuade the supplier not to use the term in question.  
Administrative bodies or bodies with a legitimate interest in protecting 
consumers149 may also take part in collective negotiations with the drafting of 
standard form contracts.150  A threat by an administrative body of a grey list 
being used against a supplier in interdict proceedings is also likely to spur the 
supplier into negotiations with the administrative body or consumer bodies.151 
An administrative body, such as the Office of Fair Trading, thus plays an 
important role in the prevention of unfair contract terms. 
The aim of this chapter is not to analyse every part of the grey list.  However, in 
order to make it easier to digest, the major categories of terms often 
encountered in grey lists are listed. 152  They are:153 (a) exclusion and limitation 
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clauses ((i) exclusion of liability for death or personal injury;154 (ii) exclusion or 
limitation of general liability or liability for contractual obligations;155 (iii) 
modifying normal rules on distribution of risk;156 (iv) exclusion or limitation of 
vicarious liability;157 (v) time limits on claims or excluding a right to rely on 
prescription;158 (vi) excluding the right of set-off;159 and (vii) guarantees of 
operating as exclusion clauses; (b) binding the consumer while allowing the 
supplier to provide not to perform or binding the consumer while the supplier 
failed to perform;160 (c) retention of payment on consumer cancellation;161 (d) 
financial penalties and excessive damages;162 (e) cancellation clauses ((i) 
unequal cancellation rights;163 and (ii) supplier’s right to cancel without 
refund;164 (f) supplier’s right to cancel without notice;165 (g) binding consumers 
to hidden terms;166 (h) supplier’s right to vary terms generally;167 (i) right to 
change what is supplied;168 (j) price variation clauses;169 (k) supplier’s right of 
final decision;170 (l) entire agreement and formality clauses;171 (m) binding 
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consumers where the supplier defaults;172 (n) supplier’s right to assign without 
consent; (o) restricting the consumer’s remedies or the right to take legal 
action;173 and (p) other terms.174 
2.2.1.2 Default Rules 
Substantive fairness can be approached by using default rules, implied terms 
and remedies as benchmarks of fairness and by comparing terms that are 
detrimental to consumers to default rules or remedies.175  This measure 
therefore overlaps with the factors and guidelines of black and grey lists. 
Default rules and remedies, like other measures aimed at substantive fairness, 
aim at balancing the interest of parties.  Implied terms are, for example, 
sometimes based on what a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, 
reasonable or equitable and they therefore contain an element of justice that 
strives to level the playing field between parties that do not have equal 
bargaining power.  Implied terms are also referred to as naturalia, legal 
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incidents or residual provisions, which are derived from common law, 
precedent, custom or legislation.176 
The Act does not contain any default rule specifically aimed at increasing 
fairness in contracts.  However, one specific implied term that the Act provides 
for is the implied warranty of quality.177  The implied term provides that there is 
an implied warranty in every agreement pertaining to the supply of goods to a 
consumer, and that the producer, or importer, the distributor and the retailer 
warrant that the goods comply with the standard set out in the consumer’s right 
to safe, good-quality goods in terms of section 55.178  The legislature can 
therefore, for example, use implied terms in order to increase substantial 
fairness in contracts of sale. 
2.2.1.3 Other Generalised Substantive Factors 
As we have seen, conceptions of substantive fairness may be either 
generalised or individualised.  If fairness is determined with reference to factors 
external to the contracting parties, it is generalised. 
The general fairness criterion for consumer contracts regulated in terms of the 
Act is set out in section 48.  In order to decide whether the term was indeed 
unfair, several substantive and procedural factors play a role and must be taken 
into account.  Some of these factors are applied proactively and as preventative 
measures.  The factors which render a contract unfair, unreasonable or unjust 
are listed in section 48(2).  Section 52(2) also lists factors which a court must 
consider in any proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract 
between a supplier and consumer where it is alleged that the supplier acted in 
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an unconscionable way,179 used false, misleading or deceptive 
representations,180 or where a contract or contract term is unfair.181  Some of 
these factors can be regarded as generalised substantive factors.  Generalised 
substantive factors are easy to apply and to consider, because they increase 
predictability and are not based on the protection of an individual.  One concern 
is that too many individualised factors must be taken into account in terms of 
the Act, which makes it difficult to ascertain whether a contract or term is unfair 
or not.  The generalised substantive factors are analysed in this paragraph. 
2.2.1.3.1 Fair Value of the Goods or Service in Question 
The fair value of the goods or services in question is one of the objective 
substantive factors the court must consider in order to determine whether a 
contract is unfair.182 
In terms of this factor, a court has to decide whether the value, in other words 
the price of goods or services, was unfair.183  The incorrect application of this 
factor may be dangerous because it may cause chaos and uncertainty.  It 
should not be interpreted in such a way that it seems as if the legislature 
intended courts to control prices or profit making.  This factor should not be 
considered in isolation.  Other factors should also always be considered, 
because a contract or term cannot be declared unfair simply because the price 
seems to be unfair, especially in circumstances where an excessive price is 
associated with specific trade marks or regarded as part of the reputation of a 
product. 
The market value of goods or service will always be a good standard against 
which to measure price.  Since market value is a question of fact, it can be 
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proved by expert evidence.  The market price of the relevant goods is also 
influenced by other aspects such as the risks against which the supplier is 
seeking to protect him/herself by using the term and the degree of detriment or 
risk caused to the consumer by the term.184 
In accounting, ‘fair value’ of assets (goods) for accounting purposes is 
described as the value of an asset in an arm’s-length transaction between 
unrelated willing and knowledgeable parties.  The concept ‘fair value’ is used in 
many accounting standards including the International Financial Reporting 
Standards185 covering acquisitions, and the valuation of securities, but is not 
limited to these.186  The methods used by the International Financial Reporting 
Standards to measure fair value include: (a) if there are identical transactions in 
the market, assets should be valued with reference to such transactions; and 
(b) if identical transactions do not exist, but similar transactions exist, fair value 
should be estimated making the necessary adjustments and using market-
based assumptions.187 
In European and English law, the dangers of controlling the fairness of prices 
have been avoided or limited.  In European law, article 4(2) of the EC Directive 
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts limits the scope of the Directive since it 
provides that, insofar as contract terms are in plain, intelligible language, 
assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall not relate to the definition of 
the subject matter of the contract, nor to the adequacy of price and 
remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplied in 
exchange, on the other.188  In English law, regulation 6(2) of the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations also provides that, insofar as contract terms 
are in plain, intelligible language, assessment of the unfair nature of the terms 
shall not relate to the definition of the subject matter of the contract, nor to the 
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adequacy of price and remuneration, as against the services or goods supplied 
in exchange.  So-called core terms will therefore not be subjected to the 
fairness test if they are in plain and intelligible language.189  However, in South 
Africa, contracts always have to be in plain and understandable language in 
terms of the Act, and this therefore cannot be a condition for not considering the 
price.  Since the contract price is a core term, a consumer is usually aware of 
the price.  A consumer would rarely buy goods or services without being aware 
of the price.  If a price is, however, vague the normal rules of interpretation 
should apply.  Furthermore, a contract is not a valid contract of sale if the price 
is not ascertainable or ascertained.  It is therefore suggested that the price or 
the value of goods or services should not be considered when deciding whether 
a contract is unfair or not. 
2.2.1.3.2 Amount for which and Circumstances under which Alternatives could 
have been acquired 
The amount for which, and circumstances under which the consumer could 
have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a supplier is one of 
the generalised factors the court must consider when it has to judge whether a 
contract is unfair or not.190 
When assessing the alternatives, the availability of an alternative must be 
considered as well as whether it would have been reasonably practicable to 
obtain the advice or goods from an alternative source, taking into account 
considerations of costs and time.  The reality of an alternative is therefore as 
important a factor as the alternative itself.191 
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The question therefore is whether the consumer could have acquired the same 
goods or services elsewhere for the same price or at a lower price without the 
terms alleged to be unfair.192 
2.2.1.4 The Standard for Generalised Substantive Fairness 
There is no overall and general fairness standard for objective substantive 
fairness.  The only standard is the standard in terms of each measure or factor 
applied in the determination of fairness, such as whether the substantive 
features of a specific term are disallowed or presumed to be unfair or whether 
the value of the goods or services is fair.  In practice it is therefore easy to 
determine whether a contract or contract term is substantively unfair or not. 
2.2.2 Individualised Substantive Fairness 
It is very difficult to apply individualised conceptions in practice, because the 
required information about a consumer’s state of mind and the effect of a term 
on him/her cannot always be obtained reliably, and consumers’ welfare differs 
from time to time.193  One point of critique that can be raised against the 
fairness provisions in the CPA is that the majority of factors or measures 
applied in the determination of substantive unfairness are individualised factors, 
which makes it very difficult to apply them proactively and to predict unfairness. 
As we have seen, the general fairness criterion for consumer contracts 
regulated in terms of the Act is set out in section 48.  In order to decide whether 
a contract or contract term was indeed unfair, several substantive and 
procedural factors play a role and must be taken into account, of which some 
are applied proactively and as preventative measures. The factors which render 
a contract unfair, unreasonable or unjust are listed in section 48(2).  Two of the 
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four factors listed in section 48(2) deal with the content of terms or a contract.  
Section 52(2) also lists specific factors, which a court must consider in any 
proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier 
and consumer where it is alleged that the supplier conducted him- or herself in 
an unconscionably, used false, misleading or deceptive representations, or that 
a contract or contract term is unfair.  In the first part of this discussion, the 
individualised factors listed in section 48(2), which render a contract unfair will 
be discussed.  The individualised factors which a court must consider in terms 
of section 52(2) will be covered in the last part of this discussion. 
2.2.2.1 Impact of Terms on Consumers’ Interests 
There are different measures that can be applied in order to determine whether 
contract terms are substantively fair.  One approach is to consider the type of 
consumer interests involved and whether a term has an effect on the individual 
consumer’s interests.  A fairness assessment must, for example, take into 
account whether a term has the effect of denying liability for injury or death 
(physical integrity), damage to property (property interests) or economic loss 
(economic interests) or whether it excludes remedies or access to justice or 
allows a supplier to vary or terminate a contract at his/her discretion.194  Factors 
or measures related to the consumer’s (the individual’s) substantive interests 
will be covered in the discussion in paragraph 2.2.2.1.2. 
2.2.2.1.1 Is the Contract Term or Contract Excessively One-sided? 
One of the factors which renders a contract unfair, unreasonable, or unjust and 
which is listed in section 48(2), is whether a term of contract is excessively one-
sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or other person to whom 
goods or services are to be supplied.195  This factor, which may render a term or 
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contract unfair, requires a balancing of the terms and interests of the parties to 
a contract. 
A consumer pays a ‘price’ for every term that is favourable to him/her.  If there 
is a term to a consumer’s detriment, there should be another term that protects 
the consumer or which allows the consumer to protect him/herself.  There 
should therefore be a balance between detrimental and favourable terms in 
order to reduce the detrimental effect of terms on an individual consumer’s 
interests.  It there are more detrimental than favourable terms, the contract may 
be regarded as one-sided.  A term may thus be regarded as one-sided if there 
is a detrimental term regarding a specific aspect but no similar term favourable 
to the consumer.  For example, if the term under scrutiny allows the supplier to 
increase the contract price at his/her discretion, there should be a term allowing 
the consumer to cancel in the event of a price increase.196 
In English law, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations sets a 
general standard for unfairness.  Regulation 5(1) provides that an unfair term is 
a contractual term which has not been individually negotiated and which, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the 
consumer.  The elements of the test for unfairness of a term or the factors 
which should be taken into account are: (a) an absence of good faith; (b) a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract; 
and (c) detriment to the consumer.197 
‘A significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract’ 
can be equated to ‘excessively one-sided’.  ‘Significant imbalance’ is not 
defined in the Regulations.  The House of Lords in Director General of Fair 
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Trading v First National Bank198 set out the approach to be taken in deciding 
whether a ‘significant imbalance’ existed.199  It found that:200 
‘The requirement of significant imbalance is met if a term is so weighted in favour 
of the supplier as to tilt the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract 
significantly in his favour.  This may be by the granting to the supplier of a 
beneficial option or discretion or power, or by the imposing on the consumer of a 
disadvantageous burden or risk or duty.  The illustrative terms set out in Schedule 
3 to the regulations provide very good examples of terms which may be regarded 
as unfair; whether a given term is or is not to be so regarded depends on whether it 
causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the 
contract.  This involves looking at the contract as a whole.  But the imbalance must 
be to the detriment of the consumer; a significant imbalance to the detriment of the 
supplier, assumed to be the stronger party, is not a mischief which the regulations 
seek to address.’ 
The case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes201 may also offer some guidance.  The 
court in this case held that a contract was illegal for being unconscionable and 
incompatible with public interests and therefore contrary to public policy.  The 
court weighed sanctity of contract against simple justice between man and man, 
and held that the effect of the contract was to place one party almost entirely 
within the economic power of the other.202 
Therefore, the terms, rights and obligations of parties must be weighed and 
compared in order to decide whether the terms, rights and obligations, or the 
contract is excessively one-sided and the court has a discretion to decide 
whether the terms, rights and obligations, or the contract was ‘excessively’ one-
sided.  A term or contract will, among others, be excessively one-sided if it 
places one party almost entirely with the economic power of the other party. 
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2.2.2.1.2 Is the Term or Contract so Adverse to the Consumer as to be 
Inequitable? 
One of the factors which renders a contract unfair, unreasonable or unjust listed 
in section 48(2) is whether the terms are so adverse to the consumer that they 
are inequitable.203  This factor also relates to the contents of a contract.  It 
however does not provide much guidance as to the meaning of ‘fairness’ or 
‘unfairness’ because ‘inequitable’ is merely a synonym of ‘unfair’.204  This 
aspect also overlaps with the question of whether a contract or term is 
excessively one-sided, because an excessively one-sided term or contract is 
also unfair (inequitable). 
2.2.2.2 The Conduct of the Supplier and Consumer 
The conduct of the individual supplier and the individual consumer is one of the 
specific factors which a court must consider in any proceedings before it 
concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier and a consumer where 
unfairness is alleged.205 
‘Conduct’ is not defined in the Act.  The court may thus, especially in light of the 
fact that the Act does not preclude the court from also considering other factors 
than the factors the court must consider in terms of section 52(2), consider any 
conduct of the supplier or consumer which resulted in or caused unfairness.206 
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2.2.2.3 Was the Consumer Required to Do Anything that was Not 
Reasonably Necessary for the Legitimate Interests of the Supplier? 
Whether, as a result of conduct engaged by the individual supplier, the 
individual consumer was required to do anything that was not reasonably 
necessary for the legitimate interests of the supplier is one of the specific 
factors which a court must consider in any proceedings before it concerning a 
transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer where unfairness is 
alleged.207 
Again ‘conduct’ is not defined in the Act.  The court may therefore consider any 
conduct of the supplier or consumer.  It is also not certain if ‘required to do 
anything’ would, for example, include a term requiring the consumer to 
indemnify the supplier against liability.  However, it is clear that this factor aims 
at addressing the issue of imbalance.208  The question could as well have been 
whether a term is reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate 
interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term.209  First, it must be 
shown that a term (or conduct) protects the legitimate interests of the supplier.  
Second, it must be determined whether the term is reasonably necessary to 
protect the supplier’s legitimate interests.  The proportionality of a term is 
therefore considered.  A term will only be reasonably necessary to protect the 
legitimate interests of the supplier where it represents a proportionate response 
to a risk it addresses.  If it does not address a risk, it is not protecting the 
legitimate interests of the supplier and it will therefore not be necessary or 
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reasonable.  In this inquiry, the court may also look at other conduct or terms, 
which would be less burdensome to the consumer.210 
2.2.2.4 Knowledge of a Specific Term 
Whether the consumer knew or ought reasonable to have known of the 
existence and extent of any particular terms of the agreement is one of the 
specific individualised factors, which a court must consider in any proceedings 
before it concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer 
where unfairness is alleged.211  In terms of the Act, regard must be had to any 
custom of trade and any previous dealings between the parties under this 
factor.212 
Since this factor is about knowledge, a term in itself may not be unfair, but may 
be regarded as unfair because the consumer was not aware of or could not 
reasonably have been aware of its presence or existence.  Knowledge extends 
to knowledge about the existence and knowledge about the extent of a term.  A 
consumer may thus, for example, be aware of the existence of a term but could 
not have been expected to know the contents of the term.  In order therefore to 
assess fairness against knowledge there should be measures to inform a 
consumer of the presence or existence of a specific term, such as an obligation 
to notify the consumer of the presence or existence of a term that purports to 
limit the risk or liability of a supplier.213  Such a disclosure may therefore curb 
unfairness.  Irrespective of measures obliging the supplier to inform a consumer 
of the presence or existence of a specific term it would always be easier for a 
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supplier to say that he/she reasonably believed that the consumer assented to 
the term if he/she has taken reasonable steps to bring the term to the 
consumer’s notice.214 
It is very difficult to prove actual knowledge of a term, because such knowledge 
is a subjective and individualised requirement.  Actual knowledge of the 
existence and the extent of a term indicates that the term is fair.  In order to 
decide whether the knowledge is ‘actual knowledge’, the actual extent and 
quality of the consumer’s knowledge should be considered.  The requirement of 
knowledge the consumer ought to have had is a more objective requirement.  
The law therefore asks whether the supplier could reasonably believe that the 
consumer was assenting to his/her terms.  This part of the test is not wholly 
objective; the supplier must actually (subjectively) believe that the consumer 
assents.  In the case of the existence of a trade practice, a term is usually 
sufficiently well known.  So, any failure by a consumer to apply his/her mind to 
the terms cannot be relied on to establish that it was unfair to include such term 
in the contract.  The existence of a trade practice may thus imply the fairness of 
a term.215 
The existence of previous dealings between parties may also be an indication of 
knowledge of a term, and such knowledge may be an indication of fairness.  
The court has to consider the extent and contents of previous dealings between 
the parties in order to make a decision in this regard.  If the parties, for example, 
in previous dealings agreed on the same term, it might be an indication of the 
fairness of the term. 
In considering a consumer’s knowledge, the following factors may help to 
assess knowledge more effectively: (a) whether the consumer knew of a 
particular term; (b) whether the consumer understood the meaning and 
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implications of the term; (c) what a person other than the consumer, but in a 
similar position, would usually expect in the case of a similar transaction; (d) the 
complexity of the transaction; (e) the information given to the consumer about 
the transaction before or when the contract was made; (f) whether the contract 
was transparent; (g) how the contract was explained to the consumer; (h) 
whether the consumer had a reasonable opportunity to absorb any information 
given; (i) whether the consumer took professional advice or it was reasonable to 
expect the consumer to have done so; and (j) whether the consumer had a 
realistic opportunity to cancel the contract without charge.216 
2.2.2.5 Were the Goods Special-order Goods? 
The question whether goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to a 
special order by the consumer is one of the specific individualised factors, which 
a court must consider in any proceedings before it concerning a transaction or 
contract between a supplier and consumer where unfairness is alleged.217  The 
question is thus whether goods are special-order goods.  ‘Special-order goods’ 
is defined in the Act as ‘goods that a supplier expressly or implicitly was 
required or expected to procure, create or alter specifically to satisfy the 
consumer’s requirements’. 
In terms of the English Unfair Contract Terms Act, the question of whether 
goods were manufactured, adapted, or processed to a special order by a 
customer is a factor that is relevant in assessing the reasonableness (fairness) 
of exemption clauses.  If a supplier manufactures or adapts goods for a 
consumer and the consumer indicates standards that the goods have to comply 
with or how the goods will be used, it will be unfair for the supplier to limit 
his/her liability in its entirety and to leave the consumer without any remedy.  If 
an exemption clause gives a consumer the right to test and reject the special-
order goods and the consumer does not utilise the right to reject the goods, the 
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exemption clause will be reasonable (fair).218  However, this factor must not only 
be considered in terms of exemption clauses.  It is suggested that legislature 
intended that, if a consumer instructed a supplier to manufacture, adapt or 
process goods with a specific standard, the terms or the contract will rarely be 
declared as unfair.  
2.2.2.6 The Standard for Individualised Substantive Fairness 
As we have seen, it is very difficult to apply individualised substantive fairness 
conceptions in practice, because the required information about a consumer’s 
state of mind and the effect of a term on him/her cannot always be obtained 
reliably, and consumers’ welfare differs from time to time.  It is also difficult to 
prescribe one overall and general fairness standard for individualised 
substantive fairness.  It is, however, clear that the overarching measure against 
which subjective substantive fairness is measured is the impact of the factor 
(terms) on the interests of the consumer.  The individualised factors or 
measures that must be considered in order to determine whether a term or 
contract is unfair are: (a) whether the term or contract is excessively one-sided; 
(b) whether the contract or term is so adverse to the consumer that it is 
inequitable; (c) the conduct of the supplier and the consumer; (d) whether, as a 
result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the consumer was required to do 
anything that was not reasonable necessary for the legitimate interests of the 
supplier; (e) knowledge of a term; and (f) whether the goods are special-order 
goods. 
2.3  Procedural Fairness Measures in the Act 
Measures aimed at procedural fairness address conduct during the bargaining 
process, and in general aim at ensuring transparency.219  Transparency 
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involves two elements: (a) transparency in relation to the terms of a contract, 
and (b) transparency in the sense of not being positively misled, pre-
contractually or during the performance of a contract, regarding aspects of the 
goods, service, price and terms.  Transparency in relation to the terms of a 
contract refers to whether the contract terms are accessible, in clear language, 
well structured and cross-referenced, with prominence being given to terms that 
are detrimental to the consumer or because they grant important rights.  
Procedural fairness measures usually enable consumers to protect themselves 
against substantive unfairness.220 
Irrespective of the noble aims which procedural fairness serves, more focus 
should be placed on substantive fairness.  That is because even if a contract or 
term is procedurally fair, it is uncertain whether a consumer will really make use 
of or will be in the position to make use of procedural fairness or measures 
aimed at procedural fairness.  Although procedural fairness may lead to 
transparency and may therefore increase the levels of consensus, the success 
of procedural fairness depends on many external factors, such as whether the 
consumer is going to study the contract.  The fact that the majority of factors 
which are listed in the Act (and which must be taken into account when the 
court has to decide whether a contract is unfair or not) are procedural factors 
may reduce the efficiency of the Act.  However, in a South African context, 
where many consumers are illiterate and where consumers are often exploited 
due to a lack of transparency, substantive fairness on its own can never be 
used to achieve contractual freedom.  In a South African context, procedural 
fairness and substantive fairness are therefore of equal importance. 
In the discussion below, the special factors and measures and guidelines which 
must be considered in order to decide whether a contract is procedurally fair, 
will be analysed.  Other factors, which may also increase procedural fairness, 
will also be pointed out. 
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2.3.1 Disclosure and Mandatory Terms 
2.3.1.1 Did the Consumer rely upon a False, Misleading or Deceptive 
Representation or a Statement of Opinion to his/her Detriment? 
In terms of the widely drafted guidelines for fairness listed in section 48(2), a 
contract or term will be unfair if the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or 
deceptive representation,221 or a statement of opinion provided by the supplier, 
to the detriment of the consumer.222  The first part of section 48(2) deals with 
false, misleading or deceptive representations as contemplated in section 41, 
and the second part relates to a statement of opinion provided by the supplier to 
the detriment of the consumer. 
Section 41 regulates false, misleading or deceptive representations.  It states 
that suppliers are not allowed to use false, misleading or deceptive 
representation concerning a material fact, use innuendo, exaggeration or 
ambiguity as to a material fact or fail to disclose a material fact, or must not 
knowingly allow consumers to believe false, misleading or deceptive facts by 
failing to correct an apparent misapprehension on the part of the consumer.223  
While a supplier thus has a duty to properly disclose material facts, failure to do 
so may be regarded as a false, misleading or deceptive representation.  A 
person acting on behalf of a supplier may also not falsely represent that such 
person has any sponsorship, approval or affiliation or engage in conduct that 
the supplier is prohibited from engaging in.224 
Praise of goods or service by a supplier, or sales talk or so-called ‘puffing’ as to 
a material fact can be equated to the use of ‘exaggeration, innuendo or 
ambiguity as to a material fact’.  In terms of common law, ‘puffing’ is regarded 
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as mere sales talk which has no binding effect.225  However, in terms of section 
41(1)(b), exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact are 
prohibited and, if the consumer relied upon exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity 
as to a material fact, it renders a contract or term unfair in terms of section 
48(2)(c).  Puffing as to a material fact is thus prohibited and it renders a contract 
or term unfair if the consumer relied upon it.226 
The second part of section 48(2)(c) relates to a statement of opinion provided 
by the supplier to the detriment of the consumer.  It states that if a consumer 
relied upon a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of a supplier to the 
detriment of a consumer, the contract or term is unfair.  A ‘statement of opinion’ 
is any opinion and not only false, misleading or deceptive opinions, since 
‘statement of opinion’ is not qualified by this section.  A term or contract can 
therefore be declared unfair should a consumer have relied on any opinion of 
the supplier if it caused detriment at the end.  Suppliers who normally give 
opinions, such as medical doctors, attorneys and advocates should therefore 
take notice of this section. 
It is possible that opinion is not qualified because an opinion of a supplier 
amounts to his/her view or point of view, so it cannot be false or misleading.  If it 
were possible for an opinion to be false or misleading, this would be very 
difficult to prove.  However, it is suggested that ‘statement of opinion’ should be 
qualified in one way or another, because it is unacceptable that any statement 
of opinion could lead to a contract being declared unfair.  The words ‘any 
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statement of opinion’ can, for example, be replaced by the word ‘advice’, which 
is a narrower term than ‘opinion’. 
Section 48(3) contains a non-exhaustive list of guidelines indicating when a 
representation is false, misleading or deceptive.  It states that it will be a false, 
misleading or deceptive representation to falsely state or imply or fail to correct 
misapprehension on the part of the consumer that: (a) a supplier has a 
particular status or affiliation, connection, sponsorship or approval that he/she 
does not have; (b) that any goods or services have, inter alia, ingredients, 
characteristics, uses, accessories that they do not have; or (c) goods are of a 
particular standard, are new or unused if they are not.  The same applies to any 
land or immovable property with regard to (a) characteristics that such land or 
property does not have; (b) the purpose of the land; or (c) the facilities and 
features of the land. 
2.3.1.2 Was the Contract Subject to a Term for Which a Notice is Required? 
In terms of 48(2)(d) a contract is unfair if the contract was subject to a term or 
condition or a notice to a consumer contemplated in section 49(1) and (a) the 
term, condition or notice is unfair or (b) the fact, nature and effect of that term 
was not drawn to the attention of the consumer in the manner that satisfied the 
requirements of section 49.  
Procedural fairness requires that consumers be aware of terms that are to their 
detriment, so that they can protect themselves against it.  Disclosure of the 
presence of detrimental terms and other important information furthermore 
increases transparency.  Informing a consumer of the presence of detrimental 
terms is therefore a measure aimed at preventing procedural unfairness.  
However, sometimes a supplier’s compliance with notice and disclosure 
requirements may not increase overall fairness because consumers are 
disinclined to read detailed contract terms.  In order to overcome the problems 
related to measures aimed at procedural fairness a strong emphasis should be 
placed on standardisation of the way in which terms should be presented.  
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However, this will still not address all these issues.  For example, it does not 
make it more likely that a consumer will actually read the terms.  
Standardisation in presentation, however, makes it slightly easier for a 
consumer to understand, as information is presented in a standard way.  It may 
also help a consumer to make comparisons between products, suppliers and 
prices.227  
Section 49 serves the above-mentioned purposes.  In terms of this section, 
should a contract contain the specific terms and conditions as set out in section 
49(1), it must be brought to the attention of the consumer in the prescribed 
manner and form.228 The information must therefore not only be brought to the 
consumer’s attention, it must also be brought to his/her attention in a 
standardised manner and form.  These specific terms and conditions are those 
that purport to limit in any way the liability or risk of the supplier or someone 
else, that constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer, that 
impose an obligation on a consumer to indemnify the supplier or someone else 
for any cause, or those which are an acknowledgment of any fact by the 
consumer.229  The above-mentioned terms would include clauses to the effect 
that no representations were made to a consumer, as well as indemnity clauses 
and exemption clauses. 
Furthermore, section 49(2) states that, should a provision concern any activity 
or facility that is subject to risk of an unusual character or nature, or risks which 
the consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware of,230 or those 
which could result in serious injury or death, the supplier has to specifically 
bring the fact, nature and potential effect of the risk to the attention of the 
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consumer in the prescribed form and manner.231  Furthermore, the consumer 
must have assented to that provision or notice by signing or initialling the 
provision or by otherwise acting in a manner consistent with acknowledgement 
of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision.232  This 
provision may, however, be to a consumer’s detriment where a supplier relies 
on the consumer’s signature in order to show that the contract or term is fair, 
since the consumer was aware of it.  A consumer should thus only sign it if 
he/she really agrees to the term and not only as a mere formality. 
Again, the aims of transparency are served by the disclosure and signature 
requirements.  In respect of form and manner, the notice or provision must be in 
plain language as contemplated in section 22,233 and the consumer must be 
given sufficient time or an adequate opportunity in the circumstances to receive 
and comprehend the provision or notice.234  The Act further places a duty on a 
supplier or other person to draw the attention of the consumer in a conspicuous 
manner and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinary alert 
consumer to the fact, nature and effect of the provision or notice.235  This must 
be done at the earliest before the consumer enters into the agreement or 
transaction, begins to engage in the activity or enters or gains access to a 
facility or before the consumer is required to offer consideration for the 
agreement or transaction.236  A supplier can therefore minimise his/her liability 
for unfair contract terms by (a) drawing the attention of the consumer to the fact, 
nature or effect of a clause or notice (b) in plain language and (c) by giving a 
consumer adequate opportunity to comprehend the notice or provision. 237 
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2.3.1.3 The Extent to which any Documents Satisfied the Plain and 
Understandable Language Requirements 
The extent to which any documents relating to the transaction or agreement 
satisfied the requirements of section 22 is one of the specific factors which a 
court must consider in any proceedings before it concerning a transaction or 
contract between a supplier and consumer where unfairness is alleged.238 
Measures aimed at procedural fairness increase transparency.  Transparency in 
relation to the terms of a contract refers to the question whether the contract 
terms are accessible, in clear language, well structured and cross-referenced, 
with prominence being given to terms that are detrimental to the consumer or 
terms which grant important rights.  One could therefore say that, in general, a 
procedurally fair contract is transparent and entered into voluntarily.  Although 
procedural fairness and measures aimed at procedural fairness have 
limitations,239 the plain and understandable language requirements as set out in 
section 22, in a multilingual South African context, where consumers are often 
only functionally literate, are probably the most important pro-active fairness 
measure contained in the Act.  The plain language provisions provisions will 
therefore be analysed in detail below. 
As we have seen, unfairness often results from standard term contracts.  
Consumers and suppliers do not always reach true consensus on the terms of 
standard term contracts, because the terms are not well structured and are 
written in formal language.  If contracts are written in plain and understandable 
language, it may result in ‘true’ consensus being reached, since the contract is 
written in language that the consumer understands.  Real consensus can only 
exist if a consumer really understands the terms of a contract.240 
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Section 22 requires notices, documents or visual representations that are 
required in terms of the Act or other law to be provided in plain and 
understandable language as well as in the prescribed form, if any.  Section 50 
also makes plain language compulsory in all consumer agreements.241 
The right to information in plain and understandable language242 is classified 
under the umbrella right of information and disclosure in the Act.243  In 
interpreting section 22, effect must be given to certain purposes set out in 
section 3, several of which are served by protection of the right to information in 
plain and understandable language.244  These include the purpose of ‘reducing 
and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accessing any supply of 
goods or services by consumers whose ability to read and comprehend any 
advertisement, agreement, mark, instruction, label, warning, notice or other 
visual representation is limited by reason of low literacy, vision impairment or 
limited fluency in the language in which the representation is produced, 
published or presented’.245  Section 22 also serves the purpose of ‘improving 
consumer awareness and information and encouraging responsible and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
although true agreement is required, courts only concern them with the external manifestation of 
their minds.  See SA Railways and Harbours v National Bank of SA Ltd 1924 AD 704 at 715 
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informed choice and behaviour’.246  Enabling consumers to make informed 
choices means that consumers are able to compare products and the prices 
they are willing to pay, which makes markets more efficient (proper disclosure 
can drive down prices by allowing consumers to shop around and compare 
prices).247  Accessible information in required notices and documents and in 
consumer agreements is also important for the purpose of ‘promoting consumer 
confidence, empowerment and the development of a culture of consumer 
responsibility’.248 The prescription of standardised forms for notices and 
documents that are required in terms of legislation enhances consumer 
protection because basic information is to be presented in a uniform format, 
making it less likely that consumers will be misled.249 
The plain language requirement therefore seeks to advance procedural 
fairness.  The purpose of measures aimed at procedural fairness is to enable 
consumers to look after their own interests when dealing with suppliers.  One 
important aspect of procedural fairness is transparency.  Several aspects form 
part of transparency, such as prominence given to certain terms, size of print, 
language and structure of the contract as well as an adequate opportunity for 
reflection.250  Plain language is vital to transparency and therefore also to 
procedural fairness.  Thus, many countries have adopted plain language 
legislation, which requires consumer agreements to be in plain language.251 
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2.3.1.3.1 The Documents which must be in Plain and Understandable 
Language 
Section 22(1) provides that any notice, document or visual representation that is 
required in terms of the CPA or any other law should be in the form prescribed 
by the Act.252  If no form is prescribed, the document must be in plain 
language.253  Therefore, this section only applies to notices required by 
legislation, visual representations and written agreements and not to oral 
agreements.254  Section 50 deals with written consumer agreements, and it 
states that the Minister of Trade and Industry may prescribe categories of 
agreements required to be in writing.255  It further states that even where an 
agreement between a supplier and a consumer has been put in writing 
voluntarily, it must satisfy the plain language requirement and the supplier must 
then send a copy of the agreement to the consumer.256 
                                                            
252
 Section 22(1)(a).  The Consumer Protection Act requires certain information to be made 
available to consumers, so the required notices, provisions or agreements should be written in 
plain and understandable language: see section 24 read with regulations 6-7 (prescribed 
product labelling and trade descriptions).  In this regard, see also section 15 of the Foodstuffs, 
Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act 54 of 1972, section 25 read with regulation 8 (notice disclosing 
reconditioned or grey market goods), section 27 read with regulation 9 (notice disclosing 
prescribed information in respect of intermediaries), section 37 read with regulation 12 
(cautionary statement disclosing prescribed information in respect of alternative work schemes), 
section 49 (notice required for certain terms and conditions), and section 50(1) (categories of 
agreements required to be in writing). 
253
 Section 22(1)(b). 
254
 See M du Preez ‘The Consumer Protection Bill: A few Preliminary Comments’ 2009 TSAR 
58 at 75-76. 
255
See the discussion of section 50 in para 2.3.3.3.1 below. 
256
 Section 50(2)(a)-(b). Contra M Gouws ‘A Consumer’s Right to Disclosure and Information: 
Comments on the Plain Language Provisions of the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 22 SA 
Merc LJ 79 at 86, where it is stated that ‘[a]lthough signature of an agreement signifies the 
parties’ assent to it, s 50(2)(a) is an exception with a view to protecting the consumer, and not 
the supplier.  However, to avoid creating a ‘ticket case’, and because the Act contemplates an 
agreement signed by both the consumer and the supplier, an agreement that is not signed by 
the supplier has to be signed by the consumer for s 22 to apply’. 
The Consumer Protection Act 
 
133 
 
2.3.1.3.2 The Definition of Plain and Understandable Language 
‘Plain language’ is language that enables an ordinary consumer (of the class of 
persons for whom a notice, document or visual representation is intended), with 
average literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer of the relevant 
goods or services, to understand the content, significance and import of a 
document, notice or visual representation without undue effort.257 
When determining whether a document or representation is in plain and 
understandable language, the following aspects must therefore be taken into 
account:258 (a) the context, comprehensiveness and consistency of the notice, 
document or visual representation;259 (b) the organisation, form and style of the 
notice, document or visual representation;260 (c) the vocabulary, usage and 
sentence structure of the notice, document or visual representation;261 and (d) 
aids used to assist the consumer in the reading and understanding of the 
notice, document or visual representation.262 
The definition of ‘plain language’ in section 22 has been analysed and has been 
lauded internationally, since it speaks about grammar and wording as well as 
structure, content, design and style of the document.263 
The elements of plain and understandable language are therefore as follows: 
(a) ‘An ordinary consumer’ indicates that not only lawyers and judges should be 
                                                            
257
 Section 22(2). 
258
 See M Gouws ‘A Consumer’s Right to Disclosure and Information: Comments on the Plain 
Language Provisions of the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 79 at 89, where he 
states that the features listed in section 22(2)(a)-(d) are merely guidelines and that non-
compliance with them will not without more ado render the agreement not plain. 
259
 Section 22(2)(a). 
260
 Section 22(2)(b).  
261
 Section 22(2)(c). 
262
 Section 22(2)(d). 
263
 F Gordon & C Burt ‘Plain Language’ 10.4 (2010) Without Prejudice 59-60. 
The Consumer Protection Act 
 
134 
 
able to understand a document sent to consumers.264  ‘For whom a notice, 
document or visual representation is intended’ indicates that suppliers will have 
to draft more than one set of standard contracts for a specific situation in order 
to cater for those consumers for whom it is intended.  Suppliers must therefore 
know their target audience in advance. (b) ‘Average literacy skills’ implies that 
documents must cater for average South African consumers of the class for 
whom the notice, document or representation is intended.  A total of eighteen 
per cent of South Africans are illiterate.  Only 82% are at least functionally 
literate, that is, they have at least some basic reading and writing skills.265  
However, that does not equip South African consumers to understand business 
and legal documents.266 (c) ‘Minimal experience’ indicates that drafters should 
write for first-time consumers of the particular goods or services.267 (d) ‘Content, 
significance and import’ indicates that consumers must not only understand 
what the document says, but also how it applies to them as well as what the 
effect of the document will be.268 (e) ‘Without undue effort’ indicates that, if 
consumers need to consult an advisor or dictionary to understand the terms of a 
document it would be considered that their understanding cost them undue 
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effort and such document would not be in plain language.269 (f) ‘Context’ 
indicates that it is necessary to take account of how and when consumers read 
a document.270  Therefore, it can be taken into account what the consumer 
would reasonably be expected to know from previous transactions.  Gordon and 
Burt use the example of a DVD.  With a DVD rental contract, it would be 
reasonable that consumers would know what a DVD is, as it is unlikely that they 
would be in this context if they did not.271 (g) ‘Comprehensiveness’ indicates 
that the document must give full information.272 (h) ‘Consistency’ indicates that 
the terminology and style must be consistent throughout a document.273 (i) 
‘Organisation, form and style’ refers to the way a document is structured, for 
example, no hidden small print should be used and important information 
should be given at the top of the document.274 (j) ‘Vocabulary, usage and 
sentence structure’ refers to general readability principles, such as using short 
sentences, the active voice and short words.275 (k) ‘Illustrations, examples, 
headings or other aids to reading and understanding’ refers to devices to make 
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a document more inviting and to good techniques for communicating complex 
information.276 
A question that can be raised is whether a contract must be in an official 
language in order to be in plain and understandable language.  Unlike section 
63 of the National Credit Act,277 the Act does not require information to be 
provided in more than one of the official languages.  In terms of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, South Africa has eleven languages.278  
The state has a constitutional duty to take positive and practical measures to 
elevate and advance the use of languages that, historically, have had 
diminished status.279  All official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and be 
treated equitably.280  An official language requirement would have placed an 
enormous burden on suppliers in South Africa.  However, it is uncertain what 
the position will be in respect of South Africans who do not speak English 
(sometimes regarded as the lingua franca of the country and also the language 
commonly used in agreements) and foreigners in South Africa (who only speak 
a foreign language).281  How would the requirements of plain language ever be 
complied with if consumers do not understand the language used in 
agreements or other communications?  Such consumers presumably have to 
consult an advisor or dictionary and it would be considered that their 
understanding cost them undue effort, and such document would not be in plain 
language.  Furthermore, section 40(2) provides that it is unconscionable for a 
supplier to knowingly take advantage of the fact that a consumer is substantially 
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unable to protect his or her own interests because of an inability to understand 
the language of an agreement.  
The draft of the Consumer Protection Bill contained a section on the right to 
information in an official language.282  However, it was omitted from the final Bill, 
after certain industry stakeholders made submissions that the requirement of 
information in all official languages would have been too onerous.283  In light of 
this omission, one can conclude that a notice, document or visual 
representation does not need to be written in an official language in order for it 
to be in plain language.  It will, however, be to a supplier’s advantage to 
translate documents, notices or visual representations into the official 
languages spoken by the class of persons for whom it is intended. 
2.3.1.3.3 Guidelines for the Assessment of Plain and Understandable 
Language 
The three most common plain language standards or assessment measures 
that may be applied to assess whether agreements comply with plain language 
requirements are: (a) informal assessment; (b) formal assessment; and (c) 
using assessment software.284  
Informal assessment guidelines include in-house style guides and any other in-
house assessment measures.  Informal assessment would be difficult to 
regulate, but is a valuable in-house assessment tool for plain language.  
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A formal and objective style guide gives more substance to general provisions 
and is a valuable test mechanism or guideline that a legislator or a regulator 
may use to give concrete guidance to drafters. 
The Act provides that the National Consumer Commission may publish 
guidelines on methods of assessing plain language.  No objective guidelines 
have been published yet that should be met in terms of language, style and 
structure.  In the absence of guidelines, it will be difficult to tell whether 
suppliers meet the requirements of plain language.  In order to proactively give 
effect to requirements of plain language, to improve levels of disclosure and to 
increase procedural fairness, objective assessment mechanisms or guidelines 
must be put in place.285 
Lawyers have raised their concerns about the lack of such guidelines, and it has 
been indicated that the requirement that documents be presented in plain and 
understandable language is challenging lawyers to find a legally acceptable 
consensus on how such language can be defined and applied in a way that 
complies with the law.  The right to plain and understandable language sounds 
well and good and it may contribute to procedural fairness, but one will not be 
able to tell whether this has been achieved due to the lack of guidelines.286 
It is also a concern that the definition of plain language is too flexible and is 
subject to discretion and interpretation.287  Guidelines on methods of assessing 
plain language might solve or address these concerns and will help in testing 
compliance with the plain language provisions and preventing non-compliance. 
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The National Consumer Commission may consider examples of style guides on 
plain language in foreign legislation when drafting guidelines for South Africa.  
In any event, such foreign legislation may be relevant to the interpretation of the 
plain language standard in section 22.  Section 2(2) provides that ‘[w]hen 
interpreting or applying this Act, a person, court or tribunal or the Commission 
may consider appropriate foreign and international law …’ 
In English law, regulation 5(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer 
Contract Regulations provide that an unfair contract term is a contract term 
which has not been individually negotiated and which, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.288  Good 
faith requires fair and open dealing.  Openness requires that the terms be 
expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps.  
Regulation 6(1) furthermore sets out the circumstances to be considered in the 
application of the unfairness test in regulation 5(1).  One of the factors that must 
be taken into account is all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the 
contract.  ‘Circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract’ 
encompasses factors such as whether the terms were expressed in plain 
language, whether the terms were presented clearly, bargaining power and the 
availability of alternatives.  Deciding whether a term is fair and whether such 
term was expressed in plain and intelligible language is one of the factors which 
is considered.  Above that, regulation 7(1) requires that a seller or supplier 
ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in plain, intelligible 
language.  In this context, ‘plain’ language is language that cannot be 
misunderstood or that does not give rise to doubts and ‘intelligibility’ 
encompasses the style used and the way a contract is printed on paper.  The 
Office of Fair Trading issued some guidelines in relation to plain language: (a) 
the contract should be comprehensible by the consumer without recourse to 
legal advice; (b) legal jargon should be avoided; (c) the contract should be in 
direct and ordinary language; (d) the first (I/me) and second person (you/your) 
should be used rather than naming and defining the parties; (e) cross-
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references should be minimised; (f) headings should be used; and (g) the size 
of the print should be large enough to be legible without difficulty.  Regulation 
7(2) deals with the effect of failure to comply with the requirement of plain and 
intelligible language.  It provides that if there is doubt about the meaning of a 
written term, the interpretation which is most favourable to the consumer shall 
prevail.289  Furthermore, if a ‘core term’ is not written in plain and intelligible 
language, it will be subjected to the fairness test of regulation 5.  Non-
compliance may also constitute an important factor in the assessment of the 
fairness of a term.290  English law does therefore not have detailed guidelines 
which could easily be applied in a multilingual South Africa with a large number 
of its consumers who are merely functionally literate and which may address all 
the elements set out in the definition of plain and understandable language.  
However, other jurisdictions offer very good examples of formal, general and 
visual guidelines for the assessment of plain and understandable language, 
which can also be applied in a multi-lingual context. 
Very good examples of formal, general and visual style guides that have been 
adopted by legislators can be found in the law of the states of Pennsylvania291 
and Connecticut292 in the United States of America.293  The legislator of 
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Pennsylvania prescribed a broad and general standard for plain language.  In 
section 2205(b)-(d) of the Pennsylvania Plain Language Consumer Contract 
Act, guidelines are listed to determine whether the general standard has been 
met.  The guidelines that should be applied in order to determine whether a 
document meets the plain language requirement are: (a) the contract should 
use short words, paragraphs and sentences and active verbs; (b) it should not 
use technical legal terms other than commonly understood legal terms; (c) Latin 
and foreign words may not be used; (d) if the document defines words, it must 
be defined by using commonly understood meanings; (e) sentences may not 
contain more than one condition; and (f) cross-references may not be used, 
except cross-references that briefly and clearly describe the substance of the 
item to which reference is made.  
Section 2205(c) contains visual guidelines.  In determining whether a contract 
meets these requirements, a court must consider the visual guidelines.  These 
guidelines, among others, require that the contracts should have type size, line 
length, column-width margins and spacing between lines and paragraphs that 
make the contract easy to read, that the contract should have caption sections 
typed in bold and that the contract should use ink that contrasts sharply with the 
paper.  If a creditor, lessor or seller does not comply with the plain language 
requirements of the Pennsylvania Plain Language Consumer Contract Act294 
(Pa Stat Ann Tit. 73 (1997)), he or she will be liable to that consumer for the 
following: (a) compensation in an amount equal to the value of the actual loss 
caused by the violation of the Act; (b) statutory damage of US$100 (or less if 
the total amount of the contract is less than US$100); (c) court costs; (d) 
reasonable attorney fees; and (e) any equitable and other relief ordered by 
court.295 
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In Connecticut, very similar guidelines to those that apply in Pennsylvania are 
used, but a more objective alternative approach may also be followed.296  An 
objective test is more because it stipulates specific numbers and sizes to which 
words, sentences and syllables should adhere.297  The Connecticut General 
Statutes in the alternative objective approach state that a consumer contract is 
also written in plain language if it fully meets the requirements of the objective 
test.  The objective test requires the following: (a) the average number of words 
per sentence must be less than 22; (b) no sentence in the contract may exceed 
50 words; (c) the average number of words per paragraph must be less than 75; 
(d) no paragraph in the contract may exceed 150 words; (e) the average 
number of syllables per word must be less than 1.55; (f) the contract must use 
personal pronouns, the actual or shortened names of the parties to the contract, 
or both, when referring to those parties; (g) no typeface of less than eight points 
in size may be used; (h) at least three sixteenths of an inch (one inch equals 2.5 
centimeters) of blank space must be allowed between each paragraph and 
section; (i) at least half an inch of blank space must be allowed at all borders of 
each page; (j) if the contract is printed, each section must be captioned in 
boldface type at least ten points in size.  If the contract is typewritten, each 
section must be captioned and the captions underlined; and (k) the average line 
length in the contract must be no more than 65 characters. 
The advantage of this alternative approach is that it can be applied easily and 
computers can be used to do the required calculations irrespective of the 
language of the contract. 
There are software programs that use well-known readability tests to test 
whether a document is written in plain and understandable language.  
Readability formulas are mathematical equations that predict the level or 
reading ability needed to understand a specific document, and are based on 
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correlations with some measure of comprehension, such as scores on a reading 
test.  Therefore, these formulas predict readability rather than measuring it.  
Another drawback is that they do not address the causes of problems people 
might have in understanding a document in order to deal with these problems 
proactively, i.e. legal language is hard to understand and it cannot be improved 
by only using shorter words and sentences.298  Readability formulas therefore 
have limited use, because they are not accurate in the context of law, nor are 
they proactive.299  Furthermore, these tests are not specifically adapted in order 
to test compliance with the plain language requirements of different sets of 
legislation.  The Flesch reading ease test300 is probably the most common 
readability test that is used in software packages such as Microsoft Office, and 
it is sometimes incorporated into legislation through the requirement of a 
minimum score.301  Basically, the test scores the readability of documents and a 
score of 100 would be simple and a score of zero would be very difficult.  The 
average number of words in every sentence and the average number of 
syllables per word are taken into account.302  A document with a very good 
score will therefore contain shorter words and sentences.   
The Flesch reading ease test can be criticised from a legal perspective.  Legal 
language is hard to understand and that it cannot be improved by only using 
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shorter words and sentences.303  This means that a document can pass the 
Flesch reading ease test without being written in plain language.  Readability 
tests, such as the Flesch reading ease test, were not developed for technical 
documents because they ignore content, layout, organisation, word order, visual 
aids and the intended audience, and they emphasise countable features of the 
document, rather that comprehensibility of the text.304  Readability formulas 
assume that all consumers are alike, while the Act requires that an ordinary 
consumer of the class of persons for whom the notice, document or 
representation is intended, with average literacy skills and minimal experience 
as a consumer would be able to understand the contents without undue 
effort.305  In the South African consumer context, general text-based readability 
tests can therefore not be applied in order to test compliance with the plain and 
understandable language requirements as set out in the Act. 
The plain and understandable language requirements in the Act are a not mere 
factor or measure that should be taken into account when the court has to 
decide whether a contract is unfair or not.  It is also, as we have seen, an 
independent right, which contributes towards procedural fairness.  Suppliers 
therefore have to comply with the plain and understandable language 
requirements at all times.  Non-compliance therefore has serious consequences 
for suppliers. 
Section 51(1)(a)(i) states that a supplier may not enter into a transaction or 
agreement subject to a term or condition if the contract or transaction’s general 
purposes is to defeat the policy of the Act.  Section 3(1)(b)(iv) of the Act states 
that it is the purpose of the Act to promote and advance the social and 
economic welfare of consumers by – 
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‘… reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accession any 
supply of goods or services by consumers whose ability to read and comprehend 
any advertisement, agreement, mark, instruction, label, warning, notice or other 
visual representation is limited by reason of low literacy, vision impairment or limited 
fluency in the language in which the representation is produced, published or 
presented’. 
Furthermore, section 51(1)(b)(i)-(iii) states that a supplier may not enter into a 
transaction or agreement subject to a term or condition if it directly or indirectly 
purports to waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of the Act or avoid a 
supplier’s obligation or duty in terms of the Act or override the effect of any 
provision of the Act.  Section 50(2)(b)(i) requires agreements to be written in 
plain and understandable language.  Section 50(3) states that a transaction or 
agreement, provision, term or condition of a transaction or agreement is void to 
the extent that it contravenes section 51.  Therefore it can be argued that, if an 
agreement is not written in plain and understandable language as required in 
terms of section 50(2)(b)(i), the agreement, provision, term or condition of the 
agreement will be void in terms of section 51(3), since it overrides the effect of 
the right to plain and understandable language.306  If an agreement, term or 
condition of an agreement is void, the court may sever any part of the 
agreement or provisions or alter it to the extent required to render it lawful, or it 
may declare the entire agreement or provision void as from the date it 
purportedly took effect.307  The court may also make any further order that is 
just and reasonable in the circumstances with respect to the agreement.308 
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In terms of section 71(1), any person may file a complaint with the Consumer 
Commission,309 alleging that a person has acted in a manner inconsistent with 
the Act.  After concluding an investigation into a complaint, the Consumer 
Commission may refer the matter to the National Prosecuting Authority if the 
Consumer Commission alleges that a person has committed an offence.310  If 
the Commission believes that a person has engaged in prohibited conduct,311 it 
may refer the matter to the Equality Court,312 propose a draft consent order in 
terms of section 74,313 make a referral to the National Consume Tribunal314 or a 
consumer court or issue a compliance notice in terms of section 100.315  It is an 
offence to fail to act in accordance with a compliance notice.316  If a person to 
whom a compliance notice has been issued fails to comply with the notice, the 
Consumer Commission may either apply to the Consumer Tribunal for the 
imposition of an administrative fine or refer the matter to the National 
Prosecuting Authority for prosecution as an offence in terms of section 
110(2).317  A person convicted of an offence may be liable for a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months, or both a fine and 
imprisonment.318  If the National Consumer Tribunal imposes an administrative 
fine in respect of prohibited or required conduct, the fine may not exceed the 
greater of ten per cent of the respondent’s annual turnover during the preceding 
financial year or R1 million.319 
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Plain language is not directly addressed in section 40(2).  It, however, provides 
that it is unconscionable for a supplier to knowingly take advantage of the fact 
that a consumer was substantially unable to protect his or her own interests 
because of an inability to understand the language of an agreement.320  If a 
consumer alleges that a supplier acted unconscionably,321 made false, 
misleading or deceptive representations322 or that a contract’s terms or terms 
are unfair, unreasonable or unjust,323 the court must consider the extent to 
which any documents relating to the transaction or agreement satisfied the plain 
language requirement.324 
2.3.2 Bargaining Position of the Parties and Choice 
A weak bargaining position and a lack of choice325 count against a finding of 
procedural fairness, because a weak bargaining position and a lack of choice 
implies that the consumer could not have done anything or was not in a position 
to protect his/her own interests.  However, a supplier is usually in a stronger 
bargaining position than a consumer simply because a single consumer is not 
important enough to a supplier to give him/her leverage.  A lack of choice and 
inequality of bargaining positions should not be regarded as the only measures 
of procedural fairness, since suppliers are usually in a stronger bargaining 
position. 
2.3.2.1 The Nature of the Parties and Bargaining Position 
The nature of the parties to the contract or transaction, their relationship to each 
other and their relative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and 
bargaining position form part of the specific factors which a court must consider 
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in any proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract between a 
supplier and consumer where unfairness is alleged.326 
As indicated, a mere inequality of bargaining positions cannot lead a court to 
conclude that a contract is unfair and vice versa.  However, if a supplier exploits 
a consumer’s lack of education, experience and sophistication, the inequality of 
the bargaining position may lead the court to the conclusion that the contract is 
unfair.327 
Several broad considerations or individualised elements may play a role when 
bargaining positions must be judged.  These considerations or elements 
includes whether the injured party had an opportunity to enter into a similar 
contract with other persons without having to accept a similar term.  In terms of 
section 52(2)(i), the amount for which and the circumstances under which the 
consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a 
supplier is one of the individualised factors the court must consider when it has 
to decide whether a contract is substantively unfair.328  In respect of the 
relationship between the parties, the existence of a continuing close working 
relationship and earlier collaboration may indicate that the bargaining positions 
of the parties are equal or that inequalities in bargaining positions have not 
been exploited.  Previous dealings may also be a consideration.  The existence 
of previous dealings between parties may be an indication of knowledge of a 
term, and knowledge may imply fairness.329 
The nature of the parties should also be considered.  The court therefore has to 
consider whether the parties have equal power.  Among others, the size of the 
supplier has to be considered. 
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2.3.2.2 The Circumstances of the Transaction or Agreement  
The circumstances of the transaction or contract that existed or which were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time that the conduct or transaction occurred or 
when the contract was entered into form part of the specific factors, which a 
court must consider in any proceedings before it concerning a transaction or 
contract between a supplier and consumer where unfairness is alleged.  Such 
circumstances must be considered, irrespective of whether the Act was in force 
at that time or not.330 
The court therefore has to consider only the circumstances of the transaction or 
contract that existed or were reasonably foreseeable at the time that the 
conduct or transaction occurred or when the contract was entered into and not 
the circumstances at a later stage.  In general, circumstances arising after the 
conclusion of the contract are irrelevant, because the Act limits circumstances 
to circumstances which existed or were reasonably foreseeable at the time that 
the conduct or transaction occurred or contract was made.  Only the current 
circumstances that were reasonably foreseeable may be taken into account.  
Whether circumstances were reasonably foreseeable is a question of fact.331  It 
is doubtful whether a court will ever ignore what has actually happened even if 
the Act clearly requires that fairness must be judged having regard to 
circumstances which existed or which were reasonably foreseeable when the 
contract was made.  The court should, however, as far as possible ignore 
circumstances that arose after the conclusion of the contract or a change in 
circumstances in order to protect contractual certainty. 
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‘Circumstances’ is not defined, since the definition would differ from contract to 
contract.  When a court has to assess whether a contract or term is fair in light 
of the circumstances, different relevant factors, including procedural and 
substantive matters, must be gathered and weighed to decide on which side the 
balance comes down.  The question is always whether a contract or term 
satisfies the requirement of fairness in relation to the circumstances of each 
particular contract or case.  It may be argued that this contextual approach may 
lead to uncertainty because a term may be fair against X, but not against Y.332  
However, the circumstances differ from contract to contract and from case to 
case.  The fact that the time frame against which an assessment is made is that 
of the conclusion of the contract at least creates certainty in the sense that it 
creates an opportunity for contract planning. 
English law has similar provisions on circumstances that should be considered 
when fairness of a contract is judged.  In terms of section 11(1) of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, an exemption clause or notice shall have been fair to 
include in a contract, having regard to all the circumstances which were or 
ought to have been known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was made.  The fact that fairness (reasonableness) is to be judged at 
the time the contract was entered into can be criticised, because it prevents the 
court from taking into account what has actually happened.  Where a term 
seems to be fair when the contract was made, the court will not be able to 
consider fairness if the contract later on operates harshly.  However, assessing 
the fairness of a term in relation to circumstances at the time of contracting 
helps with contract planning, because it will cause uncertainty and make 
contract planning a difficult task if a term is rendered unfair because it appears 
unfair in the light of unforeseeable events occurring after the contract was 
made.333  It is important to note that the question is not whether the 
circumstances were fair, but whether the contract was fair having regard to all 
the circumstances.  The same applies to the CPA.  Furthermore, regulation 6(1) 
of the Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations sets out the 
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circumstances to be taken into account in the application of the unfairness tests.  
The Regulations differs slightly from the Act because the Regulations does not 
explicitly require circumstances which were reasonably foreseeable at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract to be taken into account.  The Regulations 
states that the unfairness of a contract term shall be assessed taking into 
account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was 
concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all 
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract.  Circumstances 
attending the conclusion of the contract include factors such as whether the 
contract was expressed in plain language, whether the terms were presented 
clearly, bargaining power and the availability of alternatives.  The degree of 
genuine opportunity the consumer had to read and consider the terms of a 
contract is also an important factor.334 
2.3.2.3 Negotiation between the Parties and the Extent of Negotiation 
Whether there was any negotiation between the parties and the extent of it form 
part of the specific factors which a court must consider in any proceedings 
before it concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer 
where unfairness is alleged.335   
This factor leads one to the conclusion that the use of standard terms in 
contracts may be an indication of unfairness due to a lack of negotiation.  That 
is because non-negotiated terms or standard terms cannot always be regarded 
as the proper expression of the self-determination of both parties, and fairness 
intervention is therefore justified.336  Genuine negotiation may therefore be an 
indication of fairness.  However, that does not mean that all non-negotiated 
terms are unfair or that all negotiated terms are fair. 
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 See para 3.4.3 in Ch 6 for a discussion of circumstances attending the conclusion of a 
contract. 
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 Section 52(2)(e). 
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 See para 2.1 in Ch 3. 
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‘Negotiation’ is not defined in the Act.  In light of the other factors, the court 
must consider it is assumed that this factor has to do with choice.  The question 
is therefore whether the consumer had a real opportunity to influence the 
contents of a contract or term.  The mere fact that a supplier presents the 
consumer with more than one pre-formulated alternative to choose from 
therefore does not qualify as ‘negotiation’.  
In English law, negotiation is not a factor which has to be taken into account 
when the fairness of a contract is judged.  That is because the Unfair Contract 
Terms in Contract Regulations apply only to non-negotiated consumer 
contracts.337  The Act therefore goes much further than English law, since its 
aim is not only to address the fairness of standard term contracts.338  In fact, the 
general fairness criterion also set out in section 48(1) that a supplier must not 
negotiate in a manner that is unfair.339 
Taking into account this factor (and the other factors discussed above), it is 
clear that the court has to consider many factors extrinsic to a contract when 
making a determination of the fairness of a contract.340  The court must, for 
example, also take cognisance of circumstances which existed or which were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the 
negotiations between the consumer and supplier and the extent of the 
negotiations.  In order to determine whether the consumer had knowledge of a 
specific term in the contract, regard may be had to trade custom and past 
dealings between the consumer and the supplier.  Facts which may contradict 
the terms of a contract or the intention of the parties or are extrinsic to a 
contract must be taken into account by the court.  Although such evidence or 
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 See paras 1 and 3.3 in Ch 6. 
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 The fact that the fairness of a negotiated contract is also regulated may be criticised by some 
as being in conflict with private autonomy.  It may also be contended that it is irrational to affect 
the contents of individually negotiated contracts.  However, the mere fact that negotiation takes 
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facts may contradict the terms of the contract or the intention of the parties such 
evidence or facts may also shed light on the true nature of the contract between 
the consumer and the supplier.  In terms of the common law parol evidence 
rule, a contract document is regarded as the sole evidence of the terms of a 
contract.341  However, this rule now does not prevent the court from taking 
extrinsic evidence into account in order to determine whether a contract or term 
was unfair or not.  The parol evidence rule merely prevents one from adding, 
contradicting or modifying a contract on the basis of extrinsic evidence.  In 
terms of section 52(3)(b)(iii), a court may now make an order requiring the 
supplier to alter a form or document if the court determined that a term or 
contract was unfair.  The fairness provisions of the Act therefore have an impact 
on the parol evidence rule.  If the Act applies to a contract and the court 
determined the contract or terms to be unfair, based on the extrinsic evidence it 
had to consider, the parol evidence does not apply and the court may order the 
supplier to alter the contract or term. 
2.3.3 Other Factors which May Increase Procedural Fairness which are not 
Listed in Section 48(1) and 52(2) 
There are also other measures in the Act, which may contribute to fairness.  
However, these other factors are not part of the specific factors the court has to 
consider when it has to determine whether a contract is unfair or not.  Some of 
these factors will be pointed out and discussed below. 
In terms of section 52(2), the factors discussed above must be considered when 
the court has to decide on the fairness of a term or contract.  However, these 
factors must not only be considered when a contravention of section 48 (the 
general fairness criterion) is alleged, but also when a contravention of section 
40 (prohibition of unconscionable conduct) and section 41 (false, misleading or 
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 See Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 943, where the court held that the aim and effect 
of the parol evidence rule ‘is to prevent any party to a contract which has been integrated into a 
single and complete written memorial from seeking to contradict, add to or modify the writing by 
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deceptive representations) is alleged.342  It must also be considered when the 
Act does not otherwise provide a remedy sufficient to correct the relevant 
prohibited conduct or unfairness.343  In itself, the measures contained in section 
40 and 41 may also contribute to procedural fairness. 
Other factors dealing with disclosure of information will also be discussed 
below. These factors may pro-actively contribute towards the increase of 
openness or transparency and therefore towards procedural fairness.  Since 
consumer protection through the disclosure of information involves minimal 
interference with party autonomy, information disclosure requirements cannot 
even be criticised from a supplier’s point of view.344  Consumer protection in 
South Africa in terms of the Act is not mainly information-based, which can be 
welcomed because the effectiveness of consumer protection solely through the 
disclosure of information can be questioned.  It can be questioned because it is 
uncertain whether all South African consumers, especially the vulnerable ones, 
have the capacity to respond to information or whether they act rationally on the 
basis of information received.345  Disclosure of information therefore does not 
necessarily empower the vulnerable consumer.  The Act specifically aims at 
reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accessing any 
supply of goods and services by low-income consumers or communities, 
minors, seniors and other similarly vulnerable consumers, and most important, 
consumers whose ability to read and comprehend advertisements, contracts, 
marks, notices, warnings, labels or instructions is limited by reason of low 
literacy, visual impairment or limited fluency in the language of the 
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 Section 52(1)(b) 
343
 Section 52(1)(a). 
344
 See also para 3 in Ch 3. 
345
 See also M Donnely & F White ‘The Effect of Information Based Consumer Protection: 
Lessons from a Study of the Irish Online Market’ in C Twigg-Flesner, D Parry, G Howells & A 
Nordhausen (eds) The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2008 (2008) 271, where the limits of 
transparency are pointed out and where it is indicated that an essential presumption underlying 
fairness in the form of disclosure is that consumers will act in a rational way on the information 
received. 
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representation.346  However, one must keep in mind that, due to the use of 
standard terms contracts, the tide has shifted to consumer protection based on 
a paternalistic attitude towards society, which in turn is based on the view that 
consumers do not have sufficient information to help the consumers to protect 
their interests.  The disclosure of information enabling a consumer to protect 
his/her own interests is therefore very important to ensure procedural fairness.  
Procedural fairness measures therefore oblige suppliers, among others, to 
disclose specific information.  The preamble to the Act also states that it is 
necessary to develop and employ innovative means to protect the interests of 
all consumers and to ensure redress for consumers who are subjected to abuse 
or exploitation in the marketplace.  It further states that the Act was enacted in 
order to promote and protect the economic interests of consumers and to 
improve access to, and the quality of, information that is necessary so that 
consumers are able to make informed choices according to their individual 
needs. 
2.3.3.1 Unconscionable Conduct 
One of the aims of the Act is to protect consumers from unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or improper trade practices and from any deceptive, 
misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct.  In order to fulfil this aim, consumers 
have a right to fair and honest dealing.347  Under this right, the following matters 
are forbidden: unconscionable conduct such as duress or harassment,348 false, 
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 Section 3(1)(b). 
347
 Section 3(1)(c)–(d).  For a full discussion on the right to fair and honest dealing, see E van 
Eeden ‘Consumer Protection’ in LAWSA vol 5(1) 2 ed (replacement volume) (2010) (ed WA 
Joubert & JA Faris) par 244–245, 247, 251, 254, 265−266, 294 and 300. 
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misleading and deceptive representations,349 fraudulent schemes and offers,350 
and pyramid and related schemes.351 
The prohibition of unconscionable conduct in marketing, supply, negotiation, 
conclusion, execution or enforcement of a contract or the demand for payment 
or the recovery of goods from a consumer aims at preventing unconscionable 
(unfair) conduct in contractual procedures.  This section of the Act may 
therefore increase procedural fairness. 
Unconscionable conduct is conduct having a character contemplated in section 
40 or other improper or unethical conduct that would be improper or unethical to 
a degree that would shock the conscience of a reasonable person.352  Section 
40 prohibits the use of physical force against consumers, coercion, undue 
influence, pressure, duress or harassment, unfair tactics or any similar conduct 
in connection with the marketing and supply of goods or services, negotiations, 
conclusion, execution or enforcement of a contract for the supply of goods or 
services to consumers or demand or collection of payment for goods or services 
or recovery of goods from consumers.353  Common law also covers duress and 
undue influence.354 
                                                            
349
  Section 41. 
350
  Section 42. 
351
  Section 43. 
352
 See the definition of ‘unconscionable’ in s 1. 
353
 Section 40(1).   
354
 See para 3.1.4.2 in Ch 2 and para 4 in Ch 4.  See also Broodryk v Smuts 1942 TPD 47 for 
an example of duress.  Also see Preller v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A).  Under common law, 
duress and undue influence are based on the idea that undue influence and duress render a 
contract void or voidable, depending on the facts, because such duress and undue influence 
influence a person’s will and leads to improper obtaining of consensus.  When absolute force is 
used, an agreement will be void ab initio, and when relative force or undue influence is used, 
the agreement will be voidable at the choice of the consumer.  Section 40, therefore, in a sense 
codifies the common law.  However, s 40 has a wider ambit.  Section 40 deals not only with 
consensus obtained by improper means, but also with other improper or unethical conduct in 
marketing, supply, negotiation, execution and enforcement.  Section 40 reinforces the idea that 
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The Act further expands the ambit of the unconscionable conduct provision by 
stating that it is also unconscionable for suppliers to knowingly take advantage 
of a consumer because a consumer was unable to protect his/her own interests 
because of physical or mental disability, illiteracy, ignorance, inability to 
understand the language of an agreement or any similar factor.355  In order to 
avoid taking advantage of a consumer’s inabilities in such a way, suppliers must 
make sure that the consumer understands the agreement and is able to protect 
his/her interests. 
2.3.3.2 False, Misleading or Deceptive Representations 
The prohibition of false, misleading or deceptive representations in relation to 
the marketing of goods and services aims at preventing unfair pre-contractual 
conduct in the process of marketing.  It may therefore increase procedural 
fairness.356 
In terms of section 41, suppliers are not allowed to use false, misleading or 
deceptive representation, innuendo, exaggeration or ambiguity, or must not 
knowingly allow consumers to believe false, misleading or deceptive facts in 
relation to the marketing of the goods and services.357  A representation will be 
a false, misleading or deceptive representation if it falsely states or implies or 
fails to correct misapprehension on the part of the consumer that: (a) a supplier 
has a particular status or affiliation, connection, sponsorship or approval that he, 
she or it does not have; (b) that any goods or services have, inter alia, 
ingredients, characteristics, uses, accessories that they do not have; or (c) are 
of a particular standard, are new or unused if they are not. The same applies to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
parties to a contract should act in good faith and that their conduct should not be improper, 
unconscionable and against the boni mores. 
355
 Section 40(2). 
356
 See also para 2.3.1.1.  Section 48(2) sets out guidelines, which indicate that a contract or 
term is unfair.  In terms of section 48(2)(c), a contract or term is unfair when the consumer relied 
upon a false, misleading or deceptive representation. 
357
 Section 41(1). 
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any land or immovable property with regard to (a) characteristics that it does not 
have; (b) the purpose of the land; or (c) the facilities and features of the land.358 
2.3.3.3 Other Forms of Disclosure Required by the Act 
In consumer protection law, there are usually three levels of information 
disclosure.  These levels aim at helping consumers to make informed choices.  
They also increase transparency and therefore procedural fairness.  The three 
levels of disclosure are pre-agreement disclosure, entering into a contract and 
post-contractual disclosure.359   
The first level of disclosure entails seeking business in the form of marketing, 
issuing quotations or estimates, disclosure of prices and disclosure in trade 
descriptions and labels and the disclosure of re-conditioned or grey market 
goods.  The second level is where the parties enter into a contract, and this 
level entails formalities and disclosure in the contract document, for example a 
requirement that a contract must be in writing or that the contract must set out 
the financial obligations of the party or contain a cautionary statement.  The 
third level of disclosure entails post-contractual disclosure where copies of the 
contract and sales records are provided to the consumer.  All three levels of 
information disclosure are now made compulsory by the Act.  Some of these 
information disclosure measures will be pointed out below. 
2.3.3.3.1 Written Contracts 
In terms of section 50(1), the Minister of Trade and Industry may prescribe 
categories of contracts that should be in writing.  It further states that even 
where an agreement between a supplier and a consumer has been put in 
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 Section 41(3)(a)-(c).  See also section 41(3)(d)-(k). 
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 See PN Stoop ‘South African Consumer Credit Policy: Measures Indirectly Aimed at 
Preventing Consumer Over-indebtedness’ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 365 at 377-385 for a 
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The Consumer Protection Act 
 
159 
 
writing voluntarily, it must satisfy the plain language requirements of the Act360 
and the supplier must then send a copy of the agreement to the consumer.361  
The contract must also set out an itemised breakdown of the financial 
obligations of the consumer under the contract.362 
Since this section requires a written contract to be in plain and understandable 
language, it contributes towards procedural fairness.  The fact that it requires an 
itemised breakdown of the consumer’s financial obligations increases 
transparency.  It puts suppliers in a position where they have to make informed 
choices to protect their own interests given their current financial situation.  
Section 50(2)(a) states that if a contract between a supplier and consumer is in 
writing, whether voluntarily or as required by the Act, the contract applies 
irrespective of whether or not the consumer had signed the agreement.  It is 
dangerous to hold a consumer to a written contract he/she did not sign and it 
may even open doors to fraud. 
2.3.3.3.2 Miscellaneous Disclosure Measures 
To ensure sufficient disclosure of information, the CPA requires that certain 
minimum information must be disclosed to consumers.363  Under the right to 
information and disclosure,364 the Act deals with the right to information in plain 
and understandable language,365 disclosure of the price of goods or services,366 
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 Section 22. See also the discussion on plain and understandable language in para 2.3.1.3. 
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 Section 50(2)(b)(i). 
362
 Section 50(2)(b)(ii). 
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 For a detailed discussion on all the disclosure measures contained in the Act see W Jacobs, 
PN Stoop & R van Niekerk ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights under the Consumer Protection Act 
68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 PELJ 302 at 324, 329-336, 344 and 
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 Section 22.  See also para 2.3.1.3. 
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product labelling and trade descriptions,367 disclosure of reconditioned or grey 
market goods,368 sales records,369 disclosure by intermediaries370 and 
identification of deliverers and installers.371 
In addition, the Act also requires that repair or maintenance services may only 
be conducted once a binding estimate has been provided and the consumer 
had pre-authorised the charge up to a specific amount.372 
The Act furthermore sets a general standard for marketing.  In essence, section 
29 prohibits a producer, importer, distributor or service provider from marketing 
goods or services in a manner that is misleading, fraudulent or deceptive with 
regard to the nature, properties, advantages or uses of the goods or services, 
the conditions on or manner in which the goods or services may be supplied, 
the price of the goods, the existence of a relationship of the price to a previous 
price or a competitor’s price, the sponsoring of an event, or any material aspect 
of the goods or services.373 
Section 37 prohibits any person from making false representations in respect of 
the availability, actual or potential profitability, risk or any material aspect of 
work, business or activity involved in any arrangement for gain.374  
Arrangements in terms of which a person invites, solicits or requires persons to 
conduct work or business from their homes, represents to others as being 
practicable to conduct the business or work from their homes, or invites, solicits 
or requires persons to perform work or business or invest money from their 
homes are regulated in terms of the section.375  Advertisements promoting 
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these arrangements must be accompanied by a cautionary statement in the 
prescribed wording and form.  The cautionary statement must disclose the 
uncertainty of the extent of the work, business or activity and the income or 
benefit to be derived from it.  The full name or registered business name of the 
promoter, as well as the address and contact number of his, her or its primary 
place of business and the nature of the work, business or activity must be 
disclosed in the advertisement.376 
Direct marketing is also regulated by the Act.377 The Act provides that, should a 
person directly market goods or services and as a result conclude an 
agreement or enter into a transaction, the person then has a duty to, in the 
prescribed form and manner, inform the consumer of his/her cooling-off right in 
terms of the Act.378 
2.3.4 The Standard for Procedural Fairness 
The Act does not set an overall and general fairness standard for procedural 
fairness.  The only standard or question to be asked is that concerning the 
standard required in terms of all the factors or measures which must be applied 
in the determination of procedural fairness.  However, due to the nature of all 
factors and measures related to procedural fairness, it is clear that openness 
and transparency are required.  Openness and transparency require that terms 
should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, with no pitfalls, and that 
prominence should be given to certain terms which might operate to a 
consumer’s disadvantage. 
Under English law, good faith is the overarching standard for procedural 
fairness imposed by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations.379  
In deciding whether a clause complies with the requirement of good faith in 
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terms of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, mainly 
procedural matters or matters related to procedural fairness are taken into 
account, such as: (a) the strength of the bargaining position of the parties; (b) 
inducement offered to the consumer; (c) whether the goods were made to the 
special order of the consumer; (d) whether the term has been imposed on the 
consumer in circumstances which justify a conclusion that the supplier has 
fallen short of the general requirement of open and fair dealing; (e) whether a 
clause came as a surprise to a consumer; (f) whether the supplier took steps to 
bring a clause to the consumer’s attention and to explain it; (g) whether the 
consumer had a real choice, or whether he/she was in a position to make a real 
choice; (h) whether the terms were reasonably transparent and whether the 
terms operated to defeat the reasonable expectations of the consumer; and (i) 
whether the terms were expressed fully, clearly and legibly. 
Good faith seeks to promote fair and open dealing and to prevent unfair 
surprise and the absence of real choice.380  The majority of these aspects are 
also addressed by measures or factors aimed at procedural fairness in terms of 
the South African CPA.  These factors also significantly overlap with the 
procedural factors that must be taken into account by a court in terms of section 
52(2) when it has to decide whether a contract or term is unfair or not.  The 
House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank381 
found that:  
‘The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing.  
Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, 
containing no concealed pitfalls or traps.  Appropriate prominence should be given 
to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.  Fair dealing 
requires that a supplier should not, whether deliberately or unconsciously, take 
advantage of the consumer's necessity, indigence, lack of experience, unfamiliarity 
with the subject matter of the contract, weak bargaining position or any other factor 
listed in or analogous to those listed in Schedule 2 of the regulations’. 
So, good faith can be described as an overarching standard for procedural 
fairness in terms of the CPA. 
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3 Conclusion 
The CPA came into force on 31 March 2011.  The Act applies to every 
transaction occurring within South Africa for the supply of goods and services or 
the promotion of goods and services, and to the goods and services 
themselves, unless the transaction is exempted from the application of the Act.  
The Act, among others, aims at promoting fair business practices and protecting 
consumers from unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or improper trade 
practices and deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct.  The Act also 
aims at improving consumer awareness and information and encouraging 
responsible and informed consumer choice and behaviour.  When one has to 
interpret the Act, the traditional approaches may not be followed.  The Act, in 
section 2(1) expressly provides that the Act must be interpreted in a manner 
that gives effect to the purposes of the Act.  Furthermore, when interpreting the 
Act, applicable foreign law, international law, conventions, declarations or 
protocols may be considered. 
Chapter 2 Part G of the Act contains measures dealing with unfair, unjust and 
unreasonable contract terms.  The right to fair, just and reasonable terms and 
conditions is the first general fairness measure introduced in South African 
contract law whereby one party can rely on legal assistance if a bargain is 
unreasonable, unfair or onerous to him/her.  However, the Act also contains 
other provisions related to fairness. 
What exactly should be understood under ‘fairness’, has never been an easy 
question to answer.  The problem with fairness as provided for in the Act, is that 
it is very difficult to predict with certainty whether a contract is fair.  Suppliers 
therefore struggle to comply with fairness requirements in a pro-active manner.  
In order to bring some clarity, the concept ‘fairness’ was analysed in this 
chapter with reference to substantive and procedural fairness.  It was also put 
within a framework, so as to allow suppliers to understand what ‘fairness’ 
entails. 
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The concepts ‘fair’, ‘just’ and ‘reasonable’ are not defined in the Act.  Since 
these concepts seem to overlap significantly, it is not clear why the legislature 
used all these concepts to describe and regulate fairness in contracts.  It has 
been submitted that the concept ‘unfairness’ or ‘fairness’ would have served this 
purpose equally well. 
Under the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions, the following 
sections are important: (a) section 48 describes when terms and conditions will 
be unfair; (b) section 49 sets out when a notice is required for certain terms and 
conditions; (c) section 50 gives details on when consumer contracts must be in 
writing; (d) section 51 sets out which transactions, agreements, terms or 
conditions are prohibited; and (e) section 52 describes what the powers of court 
are to ensure fair conduct, terms and conditions. 
Over and above the fairness provisions contained under the right to fair 
contracts, the Act contains other provisions related to fairness.  To ensure 
sufficient disclosure of information, the Act requires that certain minimum 
information must be disclosed to consumers.  This ensures transparency and 
puts consumers in a better position to protect their own interests.  Under the 
right to disclosure and information, the Act, among others, deals with the right to 
information in plain and understandable language which significantly and pro-
actively contributes towards procedural fairness. 
South Africa does not have an administrative body that controls fairness in 
contracts proactively.  Only a court has the power to make orders in respect of 
unfair contract terms.  There is no official body or tribunal with the authority to 
hear complaints and apply proactive preventative measures in order to ensure 
that unfair terms, contracts and unconscionable conduct are prevented in 
accordance with the principle that prevention is better than cure.  The Act rather 
aims at reactive judicial control of unfairness.  However, the Act does not make 
provision for the court to raise the issue of unfairness mero motu.  A court can 
only assess fairness if the unfairness is alleged. 
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Section 48 sets out the general fairness criterion.  First, a supplier must not 
supply, offer to supply or enter into an agreement to supply goods or services at 
a price or on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust.  Second, a supplier 
is not allowed to market any goods or services, or negotiate, or enter into or 
administer a transaction or agreement for the supply of goods or services in a 
manner that is unfair, unjust or unreasonable.  Third, a supplier must not require 
a consumer or a person to whom goods or services are supplied at the 
consumer’s direction to waive any rights, assume any obligation or waive any 
liability of the supplier on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or 
impose any such terms as a condition of entering into a transaction.  To 
summarise, the general standard provides that an offer to supply, the supply, 
marketing, entering into a contract, negotiation, administration, waiver of rights, 
assumption of risk or waiver of supplier’s liability, terms or a price that are unfair 
are not allowed.  In order to decide whether a term or contract was indeed 
unfair, several substantive and procedural factors play a role and must be taken 
into account, of which some are applied proactively and as preventative 
measures. 
Section 48(2) contains a few guidelines on fairness.  If one of these factors 
exists or is present, it renders a contract or term unfair.  This includes that a 
term or contract is unfair – (a) should it be excessively one-sided in favour of 
any person other than a consumer; (b) should the terms of the agreement or 
transaction be so adverse to the consumer that they are inequitable; (c) should 
a consumer have relied to his/her detriment on a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of a supplier; 
or (d) should the transaction or agreement have been subject to a term or 
condition or a notice for which a notice in terms of section 49(1) is required, and 
the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable, 
or the fact, nature and effect of the term, condition or notice was not drawn to 
the consumer's attention as required by section 49(1). 
Section 52(2) also lists specific factors which a court must consider in any 
proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier 
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and consumer where it is alleged that the supplier conducted unconscionably, 
used false, misleading or deceptive representations, or that a contract or 
contract term is unfair. 
All of these guidelines or factors are related either to substantive or to 
procedural fairness.  In order to convert the right to fair contracts or terms from 
a right to a reality, it is necessary to distinguish between substantive and 
procedural fairness. 
Fairness entails substantive and procedural fairness.  Substantive fairness is a 
distinct virtue of good contracts, which can be measured, as we have seen, 
against the ‘price’ of a contract, by a balancing of interests, default rules, 
reasonable expectations, or pro-actively, by disallowing terms with certain 
substantive features.  Conceptions of substantive fairness may either be 
generalised or individualised.  If fairness is determined with reference to factors 
external to the contracting parties it is generalised, for example, the market 
price of goods or services or the availability of alternatives from competitors.  If 
fairness is determined with reference to factors related to consumers’ welfare, it 
is individualised, for example, the effect of terms on the consumer.  Procedural 
fairness is fairness in the formation of a contract, which can be measured 
against the requirement of transparency.  Transparency involves two elements, 
namely transparency in relation to the terms of a contract and transparency in 
the sense of not being positively misled, pre-contractually or during the 
performance of a contract, about aspects of the goods, service, price and terms.  
Transparency in relation to the terms of a contract refers to whether the contract 
terms are accessible, in clear language, well-structured and cross-referenced, 
with prominence being given to terms that are detrimental to the consumer or 
because they grant important rights to the consumer.  Procedural fairness 
measures usually enable consumers to protect themselves against substantive 
unfairness. 
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1 Introduction  
There are two basic contractual fairness-oriented regimes in the United Kingdom.  The 
first regime is contained in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the second regime 
is contained in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.1  These two 
sets of legislation have very different fields of application, although both deal with 
contractual fairness.2  The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 basically deals with 
exemption and limitation clauses and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract 
Regulations 1999 with non-negotiated consumer contracts or so-called standard term 
contracts.  In 2001 the Department of Trade and Industry asked the Law Commission 
and the Scottish Law Commission to rewrite the law of unfair contract terms into one 
regime.  In 2005 the law commissions published the Unfair Contract Terms Bill and a 
report on unfair contract terms.3  To date, it has not been accepted.  Even if accepted in 
the future, much can, from a South African perspective, be learnt from the application of 
the current two fairness-oriented regimes, such as the interpretation and application of 
the concept of reasonableness under the Unfair Contract Terms Act and the concept of 
good faith under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999. 
Furthermore, section 2(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act provides that 
‘[w]hen interpreting or applying this Act, a person, court or Tribunal or the Commission 
may consider appropriate foreign and international law …’.  
                                                          
1
 Statutory Instrument 1999 no 2083. 
2
 See a discussion on differences between these sets of legislation in AG Guest ‘The Terms of The 
Contract’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 29 ed (2004) para 14-125; C Willet Fairness in 
Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 75-81. 
3
 Law Commission No 298 and Scottish Law Commission No 199 Unfair Terms in Contracts (2005). See 
also E Macdonald ‘Unifying Unfair Terms Legislation’ 67 (2004) Modern Law Review at 69-93 for an 
outline of the proposed legislation. 
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2 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
2.1  Introduction and Background 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 came into force on 1 February 1978.4  It consists of 
three parts:5  Part I applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Part II applies only 
to Scotland and Part III to the whole United Kingdom.  The Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 followed on the Law Commission’s reports on exemption clauses.6  The aim of the 
law commissions was to examine the desirability of prohibiting, invalidating or restricting 
the effects of clauses that exempt or limit liability for negligence and the extent to which 
the manner of incorporating such terms should be regulated.7 The law commissions 
found that these clauses in many cases operated against public interest and that the 
judicial attitude of suspicion of such clauses was well founded.8  It also found that these 
clauses were often introduced in such way that the affected party remained ignorant of 
their presence or import and that, even if the party knew of the existence of such clause, 
was unable to appreciate such clause.9  Further, the party may not have had sufficient 
bargaining power to refuse to accept certain terms.10  Another problem was that the risk 
of carelessness or of failure to deliver the appropriate standards of performance was 
moved onto the party who was not liable for it or who was unable to guard against it, 
which in fact reduced the economic pressure to maintain high standards of 
performance.11 So, the misuse of these clauses and the need for devising satisfactory 
                                                          
4
 See section 31(1). 
5
 Section 32 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
6
 Law Commission No 69 and Scottish Law Commission No 39 Exemption Clauses in Contract, Second 
Report (1975) and Law Commission No 24 and Scottish Law Commission No 12 Exemption Clauses in 
Contract, First Report (1969). 
7
 Law Commission No 69 and Scottish Law Commission No 39 Exemption Clauses in Contract, Second 
Report (1975) at iii. 
8
 Idem at 4. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
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methods of controlling the use of these clauses were clear.12  The Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 was also enacted in order to bridge the gap between the classical 
theory of contract law and the social reality.  The gap was created by the rule that a 
person who signs a contract without fraud or duress should be bound by its contents 
because contracts are individually negotiated agreements and that the absence of 
fraud, misrepresentation or duress implies freedom of consent. 13  Before I discuss the 
concept of unfairness in contract law with reference to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977, it is necessary to give a cursorily analysis of the Act’s field of application and 
scope. 
2.2  Field of Application of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
The name of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 is misleading, because the Act does 
not deal with unfair terms as such, but rather with exemption and limitation clauses (so-
called ‘exemption clauses’), dealing with the exclusion or the limitation of certain 
responsibilities of traders to consumers, and with non-contractual notices which exclude 
or restrict delictual liability.  It also does not affect every exemption clause in all 
contracts.  The Act only addresses certain situations.14  The situations in which the Act 
may be relevant are: (1) cases of negligence and breach of contract;15 (2) contracts in 
which one party deals as consumer or on the other party’s written standard terms of 
business;16 (3) indemnity clauses;17 (4) guarantees of goods in consumer contracts;18 
contracts for the sale of goods or hire-purchase;19 (5) other contracts under which 
                                                          
12
 Ibid. 
13
 H Beale ‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’ (1978) 5 British Journal of Law and Society 114 at 114-115. 
14
 The provisions of the Act that regulate specific situations are sometimes referred to as the ‘active 
sections’ of the Act.  See E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (1999) 78. 
15
 Section 2. 
16
 Section 3. 
17
 Section 4.  
18
 Section 5. 
19
 Section 6 
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possession or ownership of goods passes;20 (6) liability for misrepresentation;21 (7) the 
effect of breach of contract;22 (8) and evasion by means of secondary contracts.23 The 
first part of the Act24 applies to exclusion and limitation clauses; and to notices making 
liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions, or excluding any 
right or remedy, or excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure.25  The Act 
applies to business and consumer contracts.  
Certain contracts are specifically excluded from the application of the Act.26  The 
exclusions include (a) contracts of insurance;27 (b) any contract so far as it relates to the 
creation, transfer, or termination of interest in land;28 (c) any contract so far as it relates 
to the creation, termination or transfer of a right or interest in any patent, trade mark, 
copyright, design, technical or commercial information or other intellectual property;29 
(d) any contract so far as it relates to the formation or dissolution of a company or 
relating to its constitution or rights or obligations of its members;30 (e) any contract so far 
as it relates to the creation of transfers of securities or of any right or interest in 
securities;31 (f) contracts of charterparty or carriage of goods by sea except for personal 
injury or death of a resulting from negligence (in favour of consumers);32 (g) contracts of 
                                                          
20
 Section 7. 
21
 Section 8. 
22
 Section 9. 
23
 Section 10. 
24
 Sections 1-14. 
25
 Section 13(1).  The reference to excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure in section 
13(1)(c) does not refer to a written agreement to submit differences to arbitration.  See section 13(2). 
26
 Sections 2-4 of the Act do not apply to the excluded contracts. For a full discussion of these and other 
exclusions under the Act see E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (1999) 89-95. 
27
 Section 1(2) and item 1(a) of Sch 1 to the Act. 
28
 Section 1(2) and item 1(b) of Sch 1 to the Act 
29
 Section1(2) and item 1(c) of Sch 1 to the Act. 
30
 Section 1(2) and item 1(d) of Sch 1 to the Act. 
31
 Section 1(2) and item 1(e) of Sch 1 to the Act. 
32
 Section 1(2) and item 2 of Sch1 of the Act read with s 2(1). 
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employment;33 (h) international supply contracts;34 and (i) contracts in which English law 
is the proper law of the contract only by choice of the parties.35 
Sections 2-7 which deal with the abovementioned issues only apply to ‘business 
liability’.36  That is liability for breach of obligations or duties arising from things done or 
to be done in the course of a business or from the occupation of premises used for 
business purposes.37 In terms of section 14 ‘business’ includes ‘a profession and the 
activities of any government department or local or public authority’. The use of this 
wide and imprecise word has been criticized for making it difficult to determine whether 
a certain activity constitutes ‘business’.38  However, the law commissions in their reports 
indicated that the aim was not to exclude the application of the Act in connection with all 
purely private relationships, but only to exclude services supplied in a purely personal 
capacity.39 In Customs & Excise Commissioners v Fisher40 a taxpayer was assessed on 
value added tax in respect of contributions on the basis that they constituted 
consideration for the supply of services ‘in the course of a business’ carried on by the 
taxpayer within section 2(2)(b) of the Finance Act 1972.  The court in that case 
                                                          
33
 Section 1(2) and item 1(4) of Sch 1 of the Act read with s 2(1) and (2). 
34
 Section 26. 
35
 Section 27. 
36
 Section 1(3). However, it does not only apply to business liability if s 6 on sale of goods or hire 
purchase applies.  
37
 Section 1(3)(a)-(b). Also see E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (1999) 79.  
38
 See Lloyd v Brassey [1969] 2 QB 98 at 106; [1969] All ER 382 at 386, a case which deals with 
dismissal as a result of redundancy, where the court of appeal per Salmon LJ held that ‘‘business’ is an 
imprecise word and may have a very wide meaning’.  Also see E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and 
Unfair Terms (1999) 79-81 for a discussion of the concept ‘business’. 
39
 Law Commission No 69 and Scottish Law Commission No 39 Exemption Clauses in Contract, Second 
Report (1975) at 3. 
40
 [1981] BVC 392; [1981] 2 All ER 147. 
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accepted certain principles from which guidance may be obtained in order to determine 
whether a certain activity constitutes ‘business’:41   
‘Firstly, ... it will never be possible or desirable to define exhaustively the word ‘business’ .... By 
providing in s 45(1) [of the Finance Act 1972] that ‘business’ includes any trade, profession or 
vocation it is clear that a wide meaning of ‘business’ is intended ...Secondly, in determining 
whether any particular activity constitutes a business it is necessary to consider the whole of 
that activity as it is carried on in all its aspects ... Thirdly, the aspects of that activity which are to 
be considered, as being indicia or criteria for determining whether the activity is a business, are 
six in number and ... listed by counsel for the Crown as follows: (a) whether the activity is a 
‘serious undertaking earnestly pursued’... or ‘a serious occupation, not necessarily confined to 
commercial or profit-making undertakings’ ... (b) whether the activity is an occupation or function 
actively pursued with reasonable or recognisable continuity ... (c) whether the activity has a 
certain measure of substance as measured by the quarterly or annual value of taxable supplies 
made ... (d) whether the activity was conducted in a regular manner and on sound and 
recognised business principles ... (e) whether the activity is predominantly concerned with the 
making of taxable supplies to consumers for a consideration ... (f) lastly, whether the taxable 
supplies are of a kind which, subject to differences of detail, are commonly made by those who 
seek to profit by them ... Fourthly, ... certain aspects of the activity are not to be considered as 
relevant for determining whether the activity is a ‘business’, or are not decisive of that question, 
namely whether the activity is pursued for profit or whether pursued for some other private 
purpose or motive. Fifthly and finally, if ... all, or, alternatively a sufficient number, of those 
indicia or criteria were satisfied in sufficient measure to override any contra-indications which 
might be seen in the facts, then as a matter of law the activity must be held to be a business.’ 
The Act does not only apply to business liability, but is further limited in section 1(3)(a) 
of the Act to duties or obligations arising from things done or to be done in the ‘ course 
of a business’.42 Section 12 of the Act also refers to the ‘course of a business’ in another 
context and this term has been interpreted by the court of appeal in R & B Custom 
Brokers v United Dominiums Trust Ltd & another.43 The court held that a degree of 
regularity is required before a transaction could be said to be an integral part of the 
                                                          
41
 [1981] BVC 392 at 398; [1981] 2 All ER 147 at 154. 
42
 The South African Consumer Protection Act applies to every ‘transaction’ occurring within the Republic 
of South Africa (see s 5).  A ‘transaction’ means ‘… in respect of person acting in the ordinary course of 
business … an agreement ...’.  The Consumer Protection Act therefore applies to transactions entered 
into in the ‘ordinary course of business’.  In the interpretation of this phrase, the English law may be 
considered.  However, ss 2-7 of Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 apply to duties or obligations arising 
from things done or to be done in the ‘course of a business’.  See the discussion in par 1.2 in Ch 5. 
43
 [1988] 1 WLR 321; [1988] 1 All ER 847. 
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business carried on and so entered into in the course of that business.44  The reference 
to ‘in the course of a business’ rather that ‘in the course of business’ is indicative of a 
wide meaning.45  The phrase ‘things done or to be done by a person. in the course of a 
business’ also indicates that activities merely incidental to a specific business should be 
construed as having been made in the ‘course of a business’.46  Therefore, once-off 
transactions are also regulated by the Act without the need to establish any regularity in 
their occurrence.47  From the above it is clear that the Act does not touch every 
exemption clause in every contract, but it imposes some control over exemption 
clauses.  The effect of the Act is that it renders certain clauses or notices ineffective in 
all circumstances and others effective, if they are reasonable, depending on which 
active section of the Act applies.  I will now continue to discuss the most important 
sections of the Act for purposes of this chapter, which form the standard for unfairness 
in contracts. 
2.3 General Standard for Unfairness Imposed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 
In essence, the key benchmarks of fairness in the Act are default rules relating to 
responsibilities of traders and expectations consumers may have regarding the way in 
which traders will perform their obligations.48 
                                                          
44
 [1988] 1 WLR 321 at 330;[1988] 1 All ER 847 at 854-855. See E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and 
Unfair Terms (1999) 81-83 where the author indicates that this meaning of ‘in the course of a business’ is 
far too restrictive to be adopted in the context of section 1(3) and where the meaning of ‘in the course of a 
business’ is discussed. 
45
 See also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (1999) 82. 
46
 Ibid.  For support for a wider approach see Stevenson & another v Rogers [1999] QB 1028; [1999] 2 
WLR 1064; [1999] 1 All ER 613 where the court of appeal interpreted the phrase ‘in the course of a 
business’. 
47
 See E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (1999) 82. 
48
 See C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 119. 
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The aim of the Act is to impose limits on the extent to which liability for breach of 
contract, for negligence or other breach of duty can be avoided by means of contract 
terms and other methods.49  The Act therefore focuses on fairness, rather than 
freedom.50 
The general standard for fairness imposed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 is 
reasonableness and is contained in section 11 of the Act.51  Substantive fairness and 
procedural fairness matters are taken into account in terms of the reasonableness test.  
The terms deviating from the default rules may not be fair depending on the interests 
affected by them, the substantive picture and whether there was procedural fairness.52  
Section 11 in effect contains three tests for reasonableness.  Section 11(1), (3) and (5) 
contains the general test for reasonableness for contracts and notices.  Section 11(4) 
contains the second test and section 11(2) read with Schedule 2 contains the third test.  
Each test has its own field of application. 
As indicated above, the Act renders certain clauses ineffective in all circumstances53 
and others effective, if they are reasonable, depending on which active section of the 
Act applies.54 So-called absolute fairness is applied when terms are automatically 
regarded ineffective.  This is the most radical form of fairness. Absolute fairness is 
usually applied in order to protect irreducible rights or certain substantive interests by 
                                                          
49
 Preamble to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
50
 See the discussion in C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 
156-157 on a fairness-oriented approach versus a freedom-oriented approach. See also the discussion in 
Ch 2 paras 3 and 4. 
51
See AG Guest ‘The Terms of The Contract’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 29 (2004) at par 
14-092 – par 14-099 for a discussion on examples of terms which were held by the courts to be unfair. 
52
 Section 11; also see C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 148. 
53
 For example, in terms of section 2, liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence cannot 
be excluded or limited. 
54
 See the discussion on absolute fairness in Ch 3 para 2.1. 
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giving absolute protection to consumers.55  Where terms are rendered ineffective in all 
circumstances, the default rules in the Act serve as fairness norms (reasonableness 
norms) and where the context must be considered the default rules in the Act serve as 
triggers for a broader assessment of fairness (reasonableness).56 
Before I continue with a discussion of the three tests for reasonableness in the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, 1977 it is important to note that the proposed Unfair Contract 
Terms Bill57 also contains a basic reasonableness test for contract terms in section 
14(1) and for notices in section 14(2). In these tests, transparency is the core element of 
reasonableness.  
2.3.1 The First Test for Unreasonableness: Contract Terms and Notices 
The first test applies to most consumer contracts. In terms of section 11(1) a contract 
term shall have been fair and reasonable to include in a contract, having regard to all 
the circumstances which were or ought reasonably to have been known to or in the 
contemplation of the parties58 when the contract was made.59  The fact that 
                                                          
55
 An example is the prohibition of the exclusion of liability for death caused by negligence. Also see C 
Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 129-131 where different 
rationales for making certain terms wholly ineffective are discussed. 
56
 See C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 128-129 where the 
two approaches of the Unfair Contract Terms Act to fairness are discussed. 
57
 See para 1. 
58
 Only factors which were or ought reasonably to have been in the contemplation of all the parties when 
the contract was made are relevant. 
59
 In terms of section 52(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider specific 
factors when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations or unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.  One of these factors, as set out in section 52(2)(c) is 
‘those circumstances of the transaction or agreement that existed or were reasonably foreseeable at the 
time that the conduct or transaction occurred or agreement was made ...’. Section 52(2)(c) of the 
Consumer Protection Act is therefore similar to s 11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  Section  
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reasonableness is to be judged at the time the contract was made can be, on the one 
hand, criticized.60  What if a term that seemed to be reasonable when the contract was 
made turn out to operate harshly?  If a court has to judge reasonableness at the time 
the contract was made, the court will have then to ignore what has actually happened.  
On the other hand, assessing the reasonableness of a clause in relation to 
circumstances at the time of contracting should assist with contract planning.61  It will 
cause uncertainty and make contract planning a difficult task if a clause is rendered 
unreasonable because it appears unreasonable in the light of unforeseeable events 
occurring after the contract was made.62 
Section 11(3) requires that, in relation to a notice having a non-contractual effect, it 
should be fair and reasonable to allow reliance on it, having regard to all the 
circumstances obtaining when the liability arose or would have arisen.  So, again the 
basic standard to be met in order to satisfy the reasonableness-test is that it should be 
fair and reasonable in all the relevant circumstances. The difference between the two 
tests in sections 11(1) and 11(3) is the time frame of assessment.  Furthermore, the 
question is not whether there are not circumstances in which a clause may be fair and 
reasonable but whether, in the circumstances, it would be fair and reasonable to allow 
reliance on the clause.63  So, when a court has to assess whether a clause is fair and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11(1) may therefore be considered when interpreting and applying s 52(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection 
Act.  See the discussion of section 52(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act in Ch 5 para 2.3.2.2.  
60
 See HG Beale, WD Bishop & MP Furmston Contract Cases and Materials 5 ed (2008) 1011 where the 
authors raise the point that it seems doubtful whether a court will ever ignore what has actually happened 
even it the Act clearly requires that reasonableness must be judged having regard to circumstances 
which existed or which ought to be reasonably to have been known or in the parties’ contemplations when 
the contract was made. 
61
 See E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 169. 
62
 See also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 169 and AG Guest ‘The 
Terms of The Contract’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 29
 
ed (2004) para 14-084. 
63
 See the court of appeal judgment in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) v Finney Lock Seedy Ltd [1983] QB 
284 at 307; [1983] 1 All ER 108 at 121. The court at [1983] QB 284 at 301; [1983] 1 All ER 108 at 117 
referred to R W Green Ltd v Cade Bros Farm [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 602 at 607-608 regarding the question  
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reasonable, different relevant factors, including procedural and substantive matters, 
must be gathered and weighed to decide on which side the balance comes down.64  
The question is always whether a clause satisfies the requirement of reasonableness in 
relation to each particular case.65  This approach may lead to uncertainty because a 
clause may be fair and reasonable against P, but not against S. Section 11(1) makes it 
clear that the time frame, against which an assessment is made, is that of the 
conclusion of the contract.  So, this approach at least creates an opportunity for contract 
planning.66 
The party claiming that a contract term or notice satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness has to prove that it does.67 The burden of proof falling on the person 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
whether a clause was fair and reasonable. In that case Griffiths J held that the specific terms had been 
evolved over twenty years, that they were therefore not conditions imposed by the strong upon the weak; 
but were rather a set of trading terms upon which both sides were apparently content to do business. The 
judge in that case added that in the circumstances no moral blame attached to either party; neither of 
them knew, nor could be expected to know, that the potatoes were infected. In that case the judge held 
that the exemption clause was fair and reasonable and that the seed merchants were entitled to rely on it. 
64
 See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) v Finney Lock Seedy Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 at 815-816; [1983] 2 All 
ER 737 at 743 where the then House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom), per Lord 
Bridge of Harwich, held that: ‘It would not be accurate to describe such a decision as an exercise of 
discretion. But a decision under any of the provisions referred to will have this in common with the 
exercise of a discretion, that, in having regard to the various matters to which the modified section 55(5) 
of the 1979 Act, or section 11 of the 1977 Act [Unfair Contract Terms Act] direct attention, the court must 
entertain a whole range of considerations, put them in the scales on one side or the other and decide at 
the end of the day on which side the balance comes down. There will sometimes be room for a legitimate 
difference of judicial opinion as to what the answer should be, where it will be impossible to say that one 
view is demonstrably wrong and the other demonstrably right. It must follow, in my view, that, when asked 
to review such a decision on appeal, the appellate court should treat the original decision with the utmost 
respect and refrain from interference with it unless satisfied that it proceeded on some erroneous principle 
or was plainly and obviously wrong’. 
65
 See the decision of the court of appeal in Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland & another [1987] 1 WLR 659 
CA at 668; [1987] 2 All ER 620 at 628-629. 
66
 See also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 162. 
67
 Section 11(5). 
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who wants to rely on an exemption clause has been welcomed previously by the court 
as being of great significance in cases in light of the obscurity of evidence or the 
absence of evidence on issues which are, or might be, relevant on the issue of 
reasonableness.68  
2.3.2 The Second Test for Unreasonableness: Clauses Limiting Liability to a Specified 
Sum (Limitation Clauses) 
The second test for unreasonableness which applies to consumer contracts, deals with 
the limitation of the amount of compensation recoverable.  In terms of section 11(4) if a 
contract term or notice restricts liability to a certain sum of money, the requirement of 
reasonableness should be judged by having regard in particular to the resources that 
could be expected to be available to a person for the purpose of meeting the liability 
should it arise.69  Regard must also in particular be had to how far it was open to a 
person to cover himself by insurance.70 Section 11(4) does not only cover cases where 
a specified sum is stated in a contract, but also where a contract states a formula for 
determining a sum.71 
Although section 11(4) points out the factors that must in particular be taken into 
account, all relevant factors must still be taken into account.72  The cost of insurance is, 
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 As per the court of appeal in Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland & another [1987] 1 WLR 659 CA at; [1987] 
2 All ER 620 at 628. 
69
 Section 11(4)(a). 
70
 Section 11(4)(b). 
71
 See E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 172. 
72
 Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164.  The then House of 
Lords (now the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) in Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm) [1990] 1 AC 831 at 
858; [1989] 2 All ER 514 at 531 (the only real consumer case) indicated that it is impossible to draw up an 
exhaustive list of the factors that must be taken into account when a judge is faced with the question of 
reasonableness.  However, the court listed matters that should always be considered. 
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for example, in general, an important factor to be considered when considering 
reasonableness.  The House of Lords in Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm)73 held that 
‘Everyone knows that all prudent, professional men carry insurance, and the availability and 
cost of insurance must be a relevant factor when considering which of two parties should be 
required to bear the risk of a loss. ... I would not, however, wish it to be thought that I would 
consider it unreasonable for professional men in all circumstances to seek to exclude or limit 
their liability for negligence. Sometimes breathtaking sums of money may turn on professional 
advice against which it would be impossible for the adviser to obtain adequate insurance cover 
and which would ruin him if he were to be held personally liable. In these circumstances it may 
indeed be reasonable to give the advice on a basis of no liability or possibly of liability limited to 
the extent of the adviser’s insurance cover.’ 
This decision clearly illustrates that what must be considered is not only whether a party 
relying upon an exemption clause could have insured himself, but also the cost of the 
insurance. When liability is limited to a specific sum, that sum also has to be justified in 
order to comply with the requirements of reasonableness.74 
2.3.3 The Third Test for Unreasonableness: Clauses for the Sale of Goods or Hire-
purchase or Terms under which Possession or Ownership of Goods Passes 
The third test for reasonableness applies only to terms caught by sections 6 and 7 of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977.  These sections deal with terms in contracts for 
the sale of goods or hire-purchase or terms in other contracts under which possession 
or ownership of goods passes.  In order to determine whether terms for the purposes of 
section 6 and 7 satisfy the requirement of reasonableness, regard must be had to 
specific matters set out in Schedule 2 to the Act.75 However, this does not prevent a 
court or arbitrator from holding that a term which purports to exclude or restrict liability is 
not a term of the contract.76  Schedule 2 lists certain factors to which regard is to be had 
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 [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858-859; [1989] 2 All ER 514 at 531-532. 
74
 St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1995] FSR 686; (11/11/1994) TLR 1.  
For a discussion on the reasonableness of a limitation of liability to a specified sum see E Macdonald 
Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 172-175.  
75
 Section 11(2). 
76
 Section 11(2). 
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in particular for the purposes of sections 6(3), 7(3) and (4), 20 and 21.  These are 
sections that are relevant in commercial contracts in relation to exclusion or restriction 
of implied terms as to description, quality and fitness in contracts for the sale and supply 
of goods.77  Exclusions or restrictions are allowed as against persons dealing otherwise 
than as consumers, only insofar as a term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.  
Regard is to be had to any of the following factors listed in Schedule 2 that are relevant 
(the list is therefore not exhaustive):  (a) the strength of the parties’ bargaining position 
relative to each other;78 (b) whether the customer received any inducement to agree to 
the term or whether he had an opportunity to enter into a similar contract with other 
persons without having to accept a similar term;79 (c) whether the customer knew or 
ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of a term;80 (d) where a 
term excludes or restricts any liability if some condition is not complied with, whether it 
was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that compliance with it would be 
practicable;81 (e) whether the goods were manufactured, adapted or processed to the 
special order of a customer.82  Although Schedule 2 only applies to commercial 
contracts, the court has drawn upon it in several consumer cases, because these 
factors are usually relevant to reasonableness of exemption clauses.83 
                                                          
77
 Commercial contracts in these circumstances refer to exclusion of restriction of liability as against a 
person dealing otherwise than as a consumer.  See section 6(3).   
78
 Schedule 2, item (a).  Among other things, alternative means by which the customer’s requirements 
could have been met should also be taken into account. 
79
 Schedule 2, item (b).  Among other things, regard must be had to any custom of the trade and any 
previous course of dealings between the parties. 
80
 Schedule 2, item (c).   
81
 Schedule 2, item (d). See commentary on the time frame for assessment in par  2.3.1 . 
82
 Schedule 2, item (e). 
83
 See the decisions of the court of appeal in Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland & another [1987] 1 WLR 659 
CA at 668; [1987] 2 All ER 620 at 628 and Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] QB 600 at 608; 
[1992] All ER 257 at 262 where the court confirmed that although Schedule 2 does not always apply in 
cases, the considerations set out in Schedule 2 are usually regarded as being of general application to 
the question of reasonableness.  See also E Peel ‘Making More Use of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977: Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd’ 56 (1993) Modern Law Review 98 at 102 where it is that 
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The guidelines set out in Schedule 2 are not exhaustive.  In Overseas Medical Supplies 
Ltd v Orient Transport Services Ltd84 the court identified further factors that may be 
relevant in the question of reasonableness, and which had been regarded as relevant 
by previous courts: (a) the way in which the relevant conditions came into being and are 
used generally; (b) in relation to the equality of bargaining position, the question of 
whether the customer was obliged to use the services of the supplier and how far it 
would have been practical or convenient to go elsewhere; (c) the clause must be viewed 
as a whole, rather than taking any particular part of it in isolation; (d) the reality of the 
consent of the customer to the supplier’s clause; (e) in cases of limitation rather than 
exclusion of liability, the size of the limit in comparison with other limits in widely used 
standard terms; (f) the availability of insurance, although it is not a decisive factor; (g) 
the presence of a term allowing for an option to contract without the limitation clause but 
with an increase in price.85 
The proposed Unfair Contract Terms Bill86 contains a non-exhaustive list of relevant 
factors that can be taken into account when reasonableness of an exemption clause is 
assessed.  The list includes the following factors:  (a) the other terms of the contract; (b) 
the terms of any other contract on which the contract depends; (c) the balance of the 
parties’ interests; (d) the risks to the party adversely affected by the term; (e) the 
possibility and probability of insurance; (f) other ways in which the interests of the party 
adversely affected by the term might have been protected; (g) the extent to which the 
term (whether alone or with others) differs from what would have been the case in its 
absence; (h) the knowledge and understanding of the party adversely affected by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
although it is only necessary to apply the guidelines laid down in Schedule 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 to the test of reasonableness required under sections 6 and 7, they must be regarded as being 
of general application. 
84
 [1999] CLC 1243 at 1248; [1999] EWCA Civ 1449 at par 10. 
85
 See also AG Guest ‘The Terms of The Contract’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 29
 
ed 
(2004) para 14-086. 
86
 Section 14(4).  See also para 1. 
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term, the strength of the parties’ bargaining positions, and the nature of the goods or 
services to which the contract relates. 
2.3.3.1 Inequality of Bargaining Power87 
Although inequality of bargaining power is not determinative of unreasonableness, 
bargaining power is probably the most basic factor in relation to the requirement of 
reasonableness.  The House of Lords in Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm)88 held that 
bargaining power is a factor that should always be considered when deciding whether 
an exemption clause is reasonable. Bargaining power must be judged by broad 
considerations.89 One such broad consideration is also listed in Schedule 2.  That is 
whether the injured party had an opportunity to enter into a similar contract with other 
persons without having to accept a similar term.90 When deciding whether a customer 
had an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with some other persons, the court 
should evaluate that opportunity.  The court should for example, ask how practical and 
convenient it is to contract with some other person.  The court of appeal in Overseas 
Medical Supplies Ltd v Orient Transport Services Ltd91 held that in relation to the 
question of equality of bargaining position, it will have regard not only to the question of 
whether the customer was obliged to use the services of the supplier but also to the 
                                                          
87
 In terms of section 52(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider specific 
factors when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations or unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.  One of these factors, as set out in section 52(2)(b) is 
‘the nature of the parties to that transaction or agreement, their relationship to each other and their 
relative capacity, education, experience, sophistication and bargaining position’. Section 52(2)(b) of the 
Consumer Protection Act is therefore similar to Schedule 2, item (a) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977. Schedule 2, item (a) may therefore be considered when interpreting and applying section 52(2)(b) 
of the Consumer Protection Act.  See the discussion of schedule 52(2)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act 
in Ch 5 par 2.3.2.1 . 
88
 [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858. 
89
 See the findings of the Queen’s Bench Division in Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group (The Zinnia) 
[1984] Lloyd’s Rep 211 at 222. 
90
 Schedule 2, item (b). 
91
 [1999] CLC 1243 at 1248; [1999] EWCA Civ 1449 at par 10. 
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question of how far it would have been practicable and convenient to go elsewhere.  
Another factor that plays a role is the relationship between the parties.  In Rolls Royce 
Power Engineering Plc v Ricardo Consulting Engineers Ltd92 the court, for example, 
held that a continuing close working relationship and earlier successful collaboration 
indicate that the bargaining power of the parties are equal even if one of the parties is in 
a much stronger position.  In general, it can be reasoned that the use of standard terms 
in an industry indicates inequality of bargaining power.93   
In the Law Commissions’ Report,94 guidance is given on factors that may be considered 
in assessing the strength of parties’ bargaining positions.  It involves questions such as 
whether the transaction was unusual for either or both of them, whether the complaining 
party was offered a choice over a particular term, whether that party had a reasonable 
opportunity to seek a more favourable term, whether that party had a realistic 
opportunity to enter into a similar contract with other persons, but without that term, 
whether that party’s requirements could have been met in other ways, whether it was 
reasonable, given that party’s abilities, for him or her to have taken advantage of any 
choice offered over a particular term or choice to meet his or her requirements in other 
ways.95 
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 [2003] EWHC 2871 (TCC) at par [77]; [2003] WL 23145261 at par [77]. 
93
 Just before the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 came into force, the court of appeal in Levison & 
another v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1997] 3 WLR 90 at 96 (the court took cognisance of the 
then Unfair Contract Terms Bill) with reference to Suise Atlantique Society d’Armement Maritime SA v NV 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 at 406, held that exemption clauses differ from other 
clauses because in the ordinary course a consumer has no time to read them, and if he did read them he 
would probably not understand them.  And, if the customer understands and objects to an exemption 
clause, he would in general be told to take it or leave it.  If he then went to another supplier the result 
would be the same. That is in contrast with the idea of freedom of contract that implies choice or room for 
bargaining. 
94
 See para 1. 
95
 Note 45 of the Explanatory Notes. 
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2.3.3.2 Availability of Alternatives96 
Availability of alternatives is the second factor listed under Schedule 2, but it, as already 
indicated, plays a role in the strength of the bargaining power of the parties.  The House 
of Lords in Smith v Eris S Bush (a firm)97 held that when assessing the availability of 
alternatives, it must be considered whether it would have been reasonably practicable 
to obtain the advice (or goods) from an alternative source taking into account 
considerations of costs and time.  So, the reality of an alternative is as important a 
factor as the alternative itself.  
2.3.3.3 Knowledge98 
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 In terms of section 52(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider specific 
factors when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations or unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.  One of these factors, as set out in s 52(2(i) is ‘the 
amount for which, and circumstances under which, the consumer could have acquired identical or 
equivalent goods or services from a different supplier’. Section 52(2)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act is 
therefore similar to Schedule 2, item (b) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  Schedule 2, item (b) may 
therefore be considered when interpreting and applying section 52(2)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act.  
See the discussion of section 52(2)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act in Ch 5 paras 2.2.1.3.2 and 2.3.2.1. 
97
 [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858; [1989] 2 All ER 514 at 531. See, in general, R W Green Ltd v Cade Bros Farm 
[1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 602 regarding a choice of level of risk.  See also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses 
and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 177-178. 
98
 In terms of section 52(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider specific 
factors when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations or unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.  One of these factors, as set out in section 52(2)(h) is 
‘whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of any 
particular provision of the agreement that is alleged to have been unfair, unreasonable or unjust, having 
regard to any (i) custom of trade; and (ii) any previous dealings between the parties’. Section 52(2)(h) of 
the Consumer Protection Act is therefore similar to Schedule 2, item (c) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977.  Schedule 2, item (c) may therefore be considered when interpreting and applying section 52(2)(h) 
of the Consumer Protection Act.  See the discussion on schedule 52(2)(h) of the Consumer Protection 
Act in Ch 5 para 2.2.2.4. 
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Whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and 
extent of an exemption clause is the third factor listed under Schedule 2. So, although 
difficult to prove, knowledge of the existence and extent of an exemption clause 
indicates that such clause is reasonable.  There are two types of knowledge:99  (a) 
actual knowledge;100 and (b) knowledge the customer ought to have had.101  However, 
the court of appeal in Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd & others v Messer UK Ltd & another held 
that it is legitimate to consider and take into account the actual extent and quality of the 
knowledge of a party.  However, the court of appeal in Schenkers Ltd v Overland Shoes 
Ltd102 looked at knowledge the customer ought to have had. It found that the specific 
clause was in common use in the trade concerned.  The court also held that the clause 
was sufficiently well known that any failure by the defendants to put their minds to the 
clause could not be relied on to establish that is was unfair or unreasonable to include it 
in a contract. This also implies that a trade practice may indicate the reasonableness of 
an exemption clause.103  Since knowledge is about the existence and extent of a term, a 
consumer may for example be aware of the existence of a term but could not have been 
expected to know the content of the term.104  It is difficult to assess reasonableness 
against knowledge if there is no specific measure to inform a customer of the presence 
of a specific term, such as an obligation to notify a customer of any term that purports to 
                                                          
99
 Schedule 2, item (c). 
100
 The requirement of actual knowledge is a subjective requirement.  See R Bradgate ‘Unreasonable 
Standard Terms’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 582 at 591. 
101
 The requirement of knowledge the customer ought to have had is an objective requirement.  So, the 
law asks whether the profferor could reasonably believe that the profferee was assenting to his terms.  
This part of the test is not wholly objective:  The profferor must actually (subjectively) believe that the 
profferee assents.  See R Bradgate ‘Unreasonable Standard Terms’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 582 
at 591. 
102
 (26/02/1998) TLR 1 at 2; [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 498 at 507. 
103
 In this regard, see s 52(2)(h) of the South African Consumer Protection Act in terms of which the 
following must be taken into account: ‘whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of 
the existence and extent of any particular provision of the agreement ... having regard to any (i) custom of 
trade...’. This also implies that a trade practice may indicate fairness. 
104
 See Charlotte Thirty and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46 and E Macdonald Exemption 
Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 181.  
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limit or waive risk.  An obligation to notify a customer of a specific term can contribute 
towards increased transparency.105  It would also be easier for a profferor to say that he 
reasonably believes that the profferee assented if he has taken reasonable steps to 
bring the terms to the profferee’s notice.106 
The Law Commissions, in the notes to the Unfair Contract Terms Bill107 listed factors 
that might be relevant in considering a party’s knowledge and understanding.  These 
factors, although placing a huge burden on the other party, will help to assess 
knowledge more effectively.  They are: (a) any previous course of dealing between the 
parties;108 (b) whether the party knew of a particular term; (c) whether the party 
understood its meaning and implications; (d) what a person other than the party, but in a 
similar position, would usually expect in the case of a similar transaction; (e) the 
complexity of the transaction; (f) the information given to the party about the transaction 
before or when the contract was made; (g) whether the contract was transparent; (h) 
how the contract was explained to the party; (i) whether the party had a reasonable 
opportunity to absorb any information given; (j) whether the party took professional 
advice or it was reasonable to expect the party to have done so; and (k) whether the 
party had a realistic opportunity to cancel the contract without charge. 
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 In this regard see section 49 of the South African Consumer Protection Act which places an obligation 
on a supplier to notify consumers of the presence of certain notices or provisions in consumer 
agreements which makes is easier to assess reasonableness against knowledge.  See the discussion on 
s 49 of the Consumer Protection Act in Ch 5 para 2.3.1.2. 
106
 R Bradgate ‘Unreasonable Standard Terms’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 582 at 591-592. 
107
 Note 44 in the Bill.  See para 1. 
108
 In this regard, see section 52(2)(h) of the South African Consumer Protection Act in terms of which the 
following must be taken into account: ‘whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of 
the existence and extent of any particular provision of the agreement ... having regard to ... any previous 
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2.3.3.4 Practicability of Compliance 
Where a term excludes or restricts any liability if some condition is not complied with, 
whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that compliance with the 
term would be practicable is the fourth factor listed under Schedule 2.  A time limitation 
clause is an example of such clause, for example a clause stating that a buyer may only 
institute a claim against a seller if the buyer gave notice of the claim to the seller within 
six months of entering into the agreement. If compliance with the condition will, within 
the contemplation of the parties lead to unexpected results, it indicates that the clause is 
unreasonable and vice versa.  Since what the parties could reasonably have 
contemplated is taken into account, actual breach of the condition is only relevant to the 
extent that it was within the parties’ contemplation at the time of contracting.109 
2.3.3.5 Special Order-goods110 
Whether goods were manufactured, adapted or processed to the special order of a 
customer is a factor that is relevant in assessing the reasonableness of exemption 
clauses.111  So, if a seller manufactures goods for buyers and the buyers indicate 
standards that the goods have to comply with or how the goods will be used, it will be 
unreasonable for the sellers to limit their liability in its entirety and to leave the buyers 
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 See E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 183. 
110
 In terms of section 52(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider 
specific factors when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations or unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.  One of these factors, as set out in section 52(2(j) is ‘... 
whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the consumer’. 
Section 52(2)(j) of the Consumer Protection Act is therefore similar to Schedule 2, item (e) of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977.  Schedule 2, item (e) may therefore be considered when interpreting and 
applying s 52(2)(j) of the Consumer Protection Act.  See the discussion of section 52(2)(j) of the 
Consumer Protection Act in Ch 5 para 2.2.2.5 . 
111
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without any remedy.112  However, if an exemption clause gives a buyer the right to test 
and reject the special order-goods and the buyer does not exercise the right to reject 
the goods, the exemption clause will be reasonable.113   
2.4 Final Remarks Regarding Reasonableness in terms of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act, 1977 
To summarize, the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 applies to exemption clauses.  
Section 11 requires that such clause must be reasonable.  Reasonableness is a matter 
that must be decided on the circumstances as they were when the contract was made.  
This allows for contract planning.  Section 11 in effect contains three tests for 
reasonableness.  Section 11(1), (3) and (5) contains the general test for 
reasonableness for contracts and notices.  Section 11(4) contains the second test and 
section 11(2) read with Schedule 2 contains the third test. Except for providing factors to 
be taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of a term or contract, the 
court cases do not provide real guidance to contract drafters and planners in respect of 
what is required to pass the reasonableness test.114  The House of Lords, however, in 
Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm)115 indicated that it is impossible to draw up an exhaustive 
list of the factors that must be taken into account when a judge is faced with the 
question of reasonableness of an exemption, exclusion or limitation clause.  However, 
the court listed, in a list similar to Schedule 2, substantive and procedural matters that 
should always be considered.  The factors are: (1) Were the parties of equal bargaining 
power? (2) In the case of advice, would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain 
advice from alternative sources taking into account considerations of costs and time? 
                                                          
112
 See the Court of Appeal’s decision in Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International Foundation Ltd [1992] 
33 Con LR 1 (CA). See also and E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2nd ed (2006) at 
184. 
113
 See the decision of the Queen’s Bench Division in British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair 
Reveal Ltd [1999] WL 487199; [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389 (QBD); 66 Con LR 1 (QBD). 
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 See also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 167-168. 
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(3) How difficult is the task being undertaken for which liability is being excluded?  If a 
dangerous or difficult undertaking is involved, there may risks of failure which would be 
a pointer towards reasonableness of the exclusion. (4) What are the practical 
consequences of the decision on the question of reasonableness, such as the money 
potentially at stake and the ability of the parties to bear the loss involved (insurance)?  
The first and second factors relate to procedural fairness.116  
The third and fourth factors mentioned by the court, relate to the substance of a term, 
because aspects such as the availability and cost of insurance and the difficulty of a 
task being carried out are aspects that can determined from the terms.117 The last factor 
also focuses on the consequences and therefore opens the door to predict the 
outcomes of finding a clause to be reasonable or unreasonable.   
In his criticism, Willet118 opined that the court, in Smith v Eric S Bush (a firm), didn’t 
focus on general substantive fairness, ie, whether there were favourable terms 
balancing out the detriment caused by the exclusion of limitation of liability.  He 
suggests that the court could have held that the contract price would have been higher if 
the contract was without the exclusion.  The court also didn’t find that the factors it listed 
applied to other exclusions than the exclusion of liability for negligence. Further, the 
relationship between procedural and substantive fairness was not analysed, for 
example how transparency affects the substance of a term.  The court also did not 
address choice or the possibility of getting a second opinion.  So, to conclude, the court 
cases do not provide real guidance to contract drafters and planners in respect of what 
is required to pass the reasonableness test. 
From a South African perspective, the interpretation of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 may be of guidance when interpreting the South African Consumer Protection Act.  
Although these pieces of legislation have very different fields of application, the factors 
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 See C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 155. 
117
 See C Willet Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 154-155. 
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 Fairness in Consumer Contracts – The Case of Unfair Terms (2007) 155-158. 
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that may be taken into account when assessing unreasonableness in terms of section 
11(1) and Schedule 2 to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 are similar to the factors 
that must considered when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive 
representations or unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms are alleged in terms of 
sections 52(1) and (2) of the Consumer Protection Act.   
3 The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
3.1  Introduction and Background 
Article 100A of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community119 
empowers the Council of the European Communities to adopt measures for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States which have as their object the establishing and functioning of the 
internal market.  On 5 April 1993, as a result, the Council of the European Communities 
adopted the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.120  In terms of this Directive member 
states have to provide a minimum level of consumer protection in respect of unfair 
contract terms.121 Article 10(1) of the Directive obliges member states to bring laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions into force to comply with the Directive not later 
than 31 December 1994.  The provisions of the Directive can be divided in three 
sections:122 (1) an attempt to formulate a European concept of unfairness;123 (2) 
interpretation and plain language;124 and (3) the legal consequences of unfairness.125  
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 The Treaty of Rome of 25 Mar 1957. 
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 EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC). 
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Article 3 sets a general standard for unfairness.  It states that a term which has not been 
individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good 
faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumers.  This implies that the Directive aims at 
addressing issues associated with standard form contracts.126  In the Annex to the 
Directive an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms which may be regarded as unfair 
is set out.  Article 4(1) makes provision for guidelines on assessing unfairness.  It 
provides that unfairness shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods 
or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, to all circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract 
and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependant. 
Article 4(2) limits the scope of the Directive since it provides that in so far as contract 
terms are in plain, intelligible language, assessment of the unfair nature of the terms 
shall not relate to the definition of the subject matter of the contract, nor to the adequacy 
of price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplied 
in exchange, on the other.  The focus on plain language in article 4(2) is significant.  It 
implies that the Directive does not require consumer contracts to be substantively fair, 
but it does require them to be clear, because clarity is essential for effective market 
competition between terms.127 
Article 5 states that all written contract terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible 
language.128  It also provides that were there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the 
interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.129 
                                                          
126
 See the discussion on the exclusion of individually negotiated contracts in G Howells & T Wilhelmsson 
EC Consumer Law (1997) 91-93. 
127
 H Collins ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229 at 
234-238. 
128
 See the discussion on section 22 of the Consumer Protection Act, which contains the right ot 
information in plain and understandable language, in Ch 5 para 2.3.1.3. 
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Article 6 provides that unfair terms are not binding on a consumer.  Article 7 places a 
duty on all member states to ensure that adequate and effective means exist to prevent 
the continued use of unfair terms in contracts. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 was not amended in order to give effect to the 
Directive, but as a result, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994130 
were implemented.  The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999131 
replaced these regulations and came into force on 1 October 1999.132  In 2005 the law 
commissions proposed a single piece of legislation to replace the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 in the form of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Bill and a report on unfair contract terms.133  To date, the Bill 
has not been accepted.  Before I discuss the concept of unfairness in contract law with 
reference to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, it is necessary 
to give a cursory analysis of the Regulations’ field of application and scope. 
3.2 Field of Application of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
 Regulations 1999 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 is largely based on the EC 
Directive.  The Regulations, with certain exceptions, apply in relation to unfair terms in 
contracts between a seller or supplier and a consumer.134  The Regulations provide for 
a fairness test in respect of non-negotiated consumer contracts or so-called standard 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
129
 See also s 4(4) of the Consumer Protection Act in Ch 5 para 2.3.1.3.3.  Section 4(4) also provides that 
the interpretation most favourable to the consumer must prevail. 
130
 Statutory Instrument 1994 no 3159. 
131
 Statutory Instrument 1999 no 2083. 
132
 Regulation 1. 
133
 Law Commission No 298 and Scottish Law Commission No 199 Unfair Terms in Contracts (2005). 
134
 Regulation 4(1). A ‘consumer’ is defined in reg 3 as any natural person who, in contracts covered by 
the Regulations, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession. A ‘seller or 
supplier’ is defined in reg 3 as any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by the Regulations, 
is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly or privately owned. 
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term contracts which have not been individually negotiated.135  A term ‘not having been 
individually negotiated’ is a term which has been drafted in advance and the consumer 
therefore has not been able to influence the substance of the term.136 Certain terms are 
excluded from the application of the Regulations.  Regulation 6(2) provides that in so far 
as contract terms are in plain, intelligible language, assessment of the unfair nature of 
the terms shall not relate to the definition of the subject matter of the contract, nor to the 
adequacy of price and remuneration, as against the services or goods supplied in 
exchange.  So, so-called core terms will not be subjected to the fairness test if they are 
in plain and intelligible language.137  Furthermore, the Regulations do not apply in 
relation to contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions 
or the provisions of principles of international conventions to which the Member States 
or the European Community are party.138 
 
                                                          
135
 Regulation 5.  See also E Macdonald ‘Scope and Fairness of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract 
Regulations:  Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 763. 
136
 Regulation 5(2).  See also the case of Bryen & Langley v Boston [2005] EWCA Civ 973 and the 
discussion in E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 207-210. 
137
 See also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) at 188 and 213-215.  See 
the discussion by SJ Whittaker ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on 
Contracts vol 1, 29
 
ed (2004) para 15-043 where it is stated that the Regulations make two requirements 
of contract terms.  That is, that: (1) they should be fair, and (2) they should be expressed in plain and 
intelligible language. 
138
 Regulation 4(2).  See SJ Whittaker ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on 
Contracts vol 1, 29
 
ed (2004) at par 15-013 – par 15-020 and par 15-030 – 15-042 for a discussion 
contracts to which the Regulations apply. 
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3.3  General Standard for Unfairness Imposed by the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
 Contracts Regulations 
Regulation 5(1) provide that an unfair term is a contractual term139 which has not been 
individually negotiated and which, contrary to the requirement of good faith, causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the 
detriment of the consumer.  If a supplier or seller claims that a contractual term was 
individually negotiated, they have to show that it was.140 Furthermore, Schedule 2 
contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list or grey list of terms which may be 
regarded as unfair.141 
The court of appeal in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc142 
analysed the elements of the test of unfairness of a contractual term as set out in the 
Regulations.  The elements are:  (1) an absence of good faith; (2) a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract; and (3) detriment to 
the consumer.143 
                                                          
139
 The reference to ‘contractual term’ implies that the Regulations apply to contractual terms and not to 
non-contractual clauses and notices.  However, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 may apply to them. 
140
 Regulation 5(4).  The Regulations do not contain any provision addressing the burden of proof in 
relation to fairness of a term, so the normal burden applies, that is the consumer has to prove that a term 
is unfair. 
141
 Regulation 5(5).  The list is identical to the list in the Directive.  The list is similar to the list of terms 
presumed to be unfair published in the Regulations under the South African Consumer Protection Act.  
See Ch 5 par 2.2.1.1.2.  For a comprehensive discussion on the list of terms see SJ Whittaker ‘Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 29
 
ed (2004) at par 15-069 – 
par 15-088. 
142
 [2000] EWCA Civ 27 at par 26. 
143
 See also E Macdonald ‘Scope and Fairness of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations:  
Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 763 at 768 and R 
Stone The Modern Law of Contract 8
 
ed (2009) 333-337. 
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3.3.1 Good Faith 
One concern is that the Directive and Regulations give very little guidance on the 
meaning and scope of ‘good faith’.144  
The preamble of the Directive merely states that ‘… in making an assessment of good 
faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the 
parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the 
goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; whereas 
the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals 
fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into 
account’.  Some of these aspects are familiar to the English law.  In the context of 
determining reasonableness in terms of the third test for reasonableness in the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977, (1) the strength of the bargaining position of the parties, (2) 
inducement offered to the consumer, and (3) whether the goods were made to the 
special order of the consumer are some of the five factors listed in Schedule 2.145  It is 
therefore clear that the concepts of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘good faith’ overlap 
significantly.  Another aspect that should be taken into account in terms of the Directive 
is the legitimate interests of the other party.146  
                                                          
144
 See SJ Whittaker ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 29
 
ed (2004) at par 15-047 and R Zimmermann & S Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law 
(2000) 690.  See also R Brownsword, G Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson ‘Between Market and Welfare:  
Some Reflections on Article 3 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in C Willet (ed) 
Aspects of Fairness in Contract (1996) 25 at 39 and G Teubner ‘Legal Irritants:  Good Faith in British Law 
or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11 at 11-12. 
145
 See para 2.3.3.  See also SJ Whittaker ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty 
on Contracts vol 1, 29
 
ed (2004) para 15-046.  In South Africa, these factors are also factors that the court 
must in terms of section 52(2) when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive 
representations or unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.   
146
 In terms of section 52(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider 
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The most important feature of the test for unfairness is the concept of ‘good faith’.  Its 
implementation gave rise to some concern in England, because it is not an established 
or well-defined concept in the English law.147  England, like South Africa, always 
addressed the issue of unconscionability of unfair contracts by means of a collection of 
different doctrines such as duress, undue influence and restraint of trade.  Modern 
consumer protection legislation in general moves the emphasis away from the maxim 
caveat emptor to regulating procedural aspects such as behaviour during the bargaining 
process or pre-contractual behaviour with the aim of preventing abuse of bargaining 
position and consumer exploitation.  The focus on behaviour during the bargaining 
process or pre-contractual behaviour leads one to the conclusion that a duty to bargain 
in good faith exists. 148  The appeal court in Bryen & Langley Ltd v Boston149 came to a 
similar conclusion in its application of regulation 5(1).  It found that in assessing whether 
a term that has not been individually negotiated is unfair, it is necessary to consider not 
merely the commercial effects of the term on the relative rights of the parties but, in 
particular, whether the term has been imposed on the consumer in circumstances which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.  One of these factors, as set out in section 52(2(f) is ‘ 
whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the consumer was required to do anything that 
was not necessary for the legitimate interest of the supplier’. Section 52(2)(f) of the Consumer Protection 
Act in a sense overlaps with the preamble of the Directive:  the Consumer Protection Act places the focus 
on the legitimate interests of the supplier by taking into account whether he did anything that was not 
necessary for his legitimate interest, while the Directive places the focus places the focus on the 
legitimate interest of the consumer by stating that the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the 
seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he 
has to take into account. See the discussion of section 52(2)(f) of the Consumer Protection Act in Ch 5 
para 2.2.2.3. 
147
 M Dean ‘Unfair Contract Terms: The European Approach’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 581 at 584; 
H Collins ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229 at 229 
and 245.  In South Africa majority in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [22] held that good faith 
could not be accepted as an independent basis for not enforcing or setting aside a contract. See the 
discussion in Ch 4 para 2.4. 
148
 See also M Dean ‘Unfair Contract Terms: The European Approach’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 
581 at 585-586. 
149
 [2004] EWCA Civ 973 para 45. 
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justify a conclusion that the supplier has fallen short of the general requirement of fair 
dealing. Collins is also of the opinion that ‘good faith’ refers to the necessity of pursuing 
the so called ‘fair dealing’, that is re-establishing consumer consent through complete 
knowledge and correct mechanisms of choice (procedural fairness) and good faith 
promotes the fair deal, that is making an overall evaluation of the different interests 
involved (substantive fairness).150  On the one hand, it may seem that the interpretation 
of this concept of good faith which is limited to the procedural aspects of unfairness is 
preferred by the court.151 On the other hand, the court of appeal and the House of Lords 
in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc152 found that ‘good faith’ 
has a double operation and that any purely procedural or even predominantly 
procedural interpretation of the requirement of ‘good faith’ must be rejected.  The court 
found that it has a procedural aspect, which requires the supplier to consider the 
consumer’s interest.153  A court may, however, uphold a clause that might be unfair if it 
came as a surprise if the supplier took steps to bring it to the consumer’s attention and 
to explain it.  The court also found that good faith has a substantive aspect.  Some 
clauses may cause such an imbalance that they will always be treated as unfair.154   
The Court of Appeal further found that  
 
                                                          
150
 H Collins (ed) Standard Contract Terms in Europe – A Basis for and a Challenge to European Contract 
Law (2008) 191. 
151
 See Munkenbeck & Marshall v Harold [2005] EWHC 356 (TCC) at par 15 where the court found that 
certain points are relevant to the question whether the requirement of good faith mentioned in regulation 
5(1) has been satisfied.  These points are: whether the terms are unusual and onerous and whether they 
were drawn to the consumer’s attention. 
152
 [2000] EWCA Civ 27 at para 28 and [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at para 36; [2001] 3 WLR 1297 at para 
36. 
153
 This leads to an overlap with one other of the three factors that should be taken into acount, namely a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract. See par 3.3.2. 
154
 See also H Collins (ed) Standard Contract Terms in Europe – A Basis for and a Challenge to 
European Contract Law (2008) 191-192. 
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‘… the ‘good faith’ element seeks to promote fair and open dealing, and to prevent unfair 
surprise and the absence of real choice.  A term to which the consumer’s attention is not 
specifically drawn but which may operate in a way which the consumer might reasonably not 
expect and to his disadvantage may offend the requirement of good faith.  Terms must be 
reasonably transparent and should not operate to defeat the reasonable expectations of the 
consumer.  The consumer in choosing whether to enter into a contract should be put in a 
position where he can make an informed choice.’
155
 
It must, however, be kept in mind that the Regulations apply to non-negotiated terms, so 
the Regulations address the issue of fairness in standard form contracts.  The major 
problem with standard form contracts is usually the lack of transparency.156  This 
problem can be addressed by focusing on procedural fairness at a preventative level.  
The Office of Fair Trading157 also takes the stance that the test of unfairness takes note 
of how a term could be used and what a consumer is likely to understand by the 
wording of a clause.158  The Office of Fair Trading is likely to conclude that a term has 
potential for unfairness if it is likely to mislead consumers, or be unintelligible to them. 
The House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank159 found 
that:  
‘The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing.  Openness 
requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed 
pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate 
disadvantageously to the customer. Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, whether 
deliberately or unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer's necessity, indigence, lack of 
                                                          
155
 At para 29. 
156
 The Law Commissions’ Joint Consultation Paper, Unfair Terms in Contracts (2002) (Law Commission 
Consultation Paper No 166, Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 119) at par 4.108-4.109. See 
also E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 229-230. 
157
 See regulations 10, 11 and 12.  The Office of Fair Trading consider any complaints about the 
unfairness of a contract term and it believes that a term is unfair, it has powers to ask a court for an 
injunction to prevent it being used or recommended for use. However, only the courts can finally decide 
whether a term is or is not unfair. 
158
 See Office of Fair Trading 3 (1997) Unfair Contract Terms Bulletin at 7.  See also E Macdonald 
Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 230. 
159
 [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at para 17; [2001] 3 WLR 1297 at para 17. 
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experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, weak bargaining position or any 
other factor listed in or analogous to those listed in Schedule 2 of the regulations’.
160
 
So, according to the court openness requires that terms should be expressed fully, 
clearly and legibly, with no pitfalls and that prominence should be given to certain terms 
which might operate to a consumer’s disadvantage.161  In deciding whether a clause 
complies with the requirement of good faith, mainly procedural matters or matters 
related to procedural fairness are taken into account, such as:162  (1) the strength of the 
bargaining position of the parties, (2) inducement offered to the consumer, (3) whether 
the goods were made to the special order of the consumer, (4) whether the term has 
been imposed on the consumer in circumstances which justify a conclusion that the 
supplier has fallen short of the general requirement of open and fair dealing, (5) whether 
a clause came as a surprise to a consumer, (6) whether the supplier took steps to bring 
a clause to the consumer’s attention and to explain it, (7) whether the consumer had a 
real choice or was in a position to make a real choice, (8) whether the terms were 
reasonably transparent and whether it operated to defeat the reasonable expectations 
of the consumer, and (9) whether the terms were expressed fully, clearly and legibly.163  
All of these factors pertain to transparency, openness and fair dealing. 
                                                          
160
 At para 17. 
161
 See also sections 22 and 49 of the South African Consumer Protection Act which require contract, 
terms and notices to be in plain and understandable language and that a supplier must notify a consumer 
of the presence of certain notices and terms.  See the discussion in Ch 5 paras 2.3.1.2 and 2.3.1.3. 
162
 See R Brownsword, G Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson ‘Between Market and Welfare:  Some 
Reflections on Article 3 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in C Willet (ed) 
Aspects of Fairness in Contract (1996) 25 at 40-45 where it is stated that good faith looks is a procedural 
test, which requires (1) disclosure and (2) choice. 
163
 Many of these factors are also required by the South African Consumer Protection Act.  In terms of 
section 52(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider specific factors when 
unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations or unfair, unreasonable or unjust 
contract terms is alleged.  These factors are similar to the factors listed in section 52(2) of the Consumer 
Protection Act.  Furthermore, section 49 of the Consumer Protection Act requires that a supplier must 
notify a consumer of the presence of certain notices and terms.  This may lead to the conclusion that 
good faith is in effect required by the Consumer Protection Act. See the discussion in Ch 5 para 2.3.1.2. 
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Finally, it is also clear that good faith means different things both within a particular legal 
system and between legal systems.164 
3.3.2 Significant Imbalance in the Parties’ Rights and Obligations under the Contract 
‘Significant imbalance’ is not defined in the Regulations.  It, however, first directs 
attention to the substantive unfairness of the contract and it overlaps substantially with 
that of the absence of good faith.  A term which gives a significant advantage to the 
seller or supplier without a countervailing benefit to the consumer, such as a price 
reduction, might fail to satisfy this part of the test of an unfair term.165   
It is clear that a significant imbalance is required and not merely any imbalance.  The 
House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank166 set out the 
approach to be taken in deciding whether a ‘significant imbalance’ exists.  It found that: 
‘The requirement of significant imbalance is met if a term is so weighted in favour of the supplier 
as to tilt the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract significantly in his favour. This may 
be by the granting to the supplier of a beneficial option or discretion or power, or by the 
                                                          
164
 The House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
489 at para 17; [2001] 3 WLR 1297 at para 17 confirmed that the member states do not have a common 
concept of fairness or good faith and that the Directive does not aim to state the law of any member state.  
See also SJ Whittaker ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 
29 ed (2004) para 15-047 and R Zimmermann & S Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law 
(2000) 690, G Teubner ‘Legal Irritants:  Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11 at 11-12, and R Brownsword, G Howells & Thomas 
Wilhelmsson ‘Between Market and Welfare:  Some Reflections on Article 3 of the EC Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in C Willet (ed) Aspects of Fairness in Contract (1996) 25 at 39 where it is 
stated that the European interpretation of the concept of good faith can be taken to connote simply a 
particular state of mind, namely one free from suspicion or notice – good faith in the sense of pure heart 
and empty head, but that the implications of such an interpretation would be dire.  
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 See the decisions of the court of appeal and House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First 
National Bank Plc [2000] EWCA Civ 27 at par 30 and [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at par 37; [2001] 3 WLR 
1297 at par 37. 
166
 [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at para 17; [2001] 3 WLR 1297 at para 17. 
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imposing on the consumer of a disadvantageous burden or risk or duty. The illustrative terms 
set out in Schedule 3 to the regulations provide very good examples of terms which may be 
regarded as unfair; whether a given term is or is not to be so regarded depends on whether it 
causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract. This 
involves looking at the contract as a whole. But the imbalance must be to the detriment of the 
consumer; a significant imbalance to the detriment of the supplier, assumed to be the stronger 
party, is not a mischief which the regulations seek to address.’ 
Accordingly, what is required is that terms and obligations must be weighed and 
compared, which means that matters related to substantive fairness are taken into 
consideration.167   
3.3.3 Detriment to the Consumer 
‘Detriment to the consumer’ is one of the three elements of the unfairness test.  It 
merely indicates that the Regulations are aimed at ‘significant imbalance’ against the 
consumer rather than the seller of supplier.168  It may also indicate that there can 
sometimes be a significant imbalance, but no detriment to the consumer.169 
3.4  Circumstances to be Taken into Account in the Application of the 
 Unfairness Test 
Regulation 6(1) sets out the circumstances to be considered in the application of the 
unfairness test in regulation 5(1).  It states that  
 
                                                          
167
 See also section 48(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act which also requires that the 
terms of a contract must be weighed and compared.  It provides that, a transaction or agreement, a term 
or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject, 
is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the 
consumer or other person to whom goods or services are to be supplied or the terms of the transaction or 
agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable.  See the discussion in Ch 5. 
168
 E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 231. 
169
 R Lawson Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms 8
 
ed (2005) 221. 
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‘Without prejudice to regulation 12, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, 
taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded 
and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on 
which it is dependent’. 
3.4.1 Terms of the Contract 
All the terms of the contract are relevant, although not all of them are subject to the 
fairness test.  Core terms are not, if they are in plain and intelligible language, subject to 
the fairness test.170  The terms of other dependant contracts are also relevant.171   
3.4.2 Nature of the Goods or Service 
The nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded must be taken 
into account.  This include aspects such as what was to be supplied, risks, the 
complexity of what is being supplied, what the consumer knew, or might be expected to 
know about it and the nature of the transaction.172 If a consumer, for example, hires 
industrial drilling tools for use at home, the fact the tools are usually used in a 
commercial context by an experienced person may argue for the fairness of an 
exemption clause.173 
3.4.3 Circumstances Attending the Conclusion of the Contract 
In terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, fairness is a matter that must be 
decided on the circumstances as they were when the contract was made, because this 
                                                          
170
 Regulation 6(2).  See also para 3.2. 
171
 Regulation 6(2). 
172
 Bryen & Langley v Boston [2004] EWHC 2450 (TCC) para 45. 
173
 See SJ Whittaker ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts vol 1, 29
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approach allows for contract planning.174  Although the fairness test is applied at the 
level of a particular contract, ie, at the time when the contract was made, it must also be 
applied as preventative measure.175  However, one may ask how fairness can be 
applied in a preventative action, since the contract is, at that time, not yet in existence.  
In this regard, the House of Lords in Director General of Fair Trading v First National 
Bank Plc176 found that ‘… [t]he system of pre-emptive challenges is a more effective 
way of preventing the continuing use of unfair terms and changing contracting practice 
than ex casu actions … The directive and the regulations must be made to work 
sensibly and effectively and this can only be done by taking into account the effects of 
contemplated or typical relationships between the contracting parties.’ 
‘Circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract’ should also encompass factors 
such as whether the terms were expressed in plain language, whether the terms were 
presented clearly, bargaining power and the availability of alternatives.177 Furthermore, 
the fact that a seller has put pressure on a consumer to conclude the contract or to do 
so in haste, without time to think about it, point against fairness of any term which 
                                                          
174
 See para 2.3.1.  In terms of section 11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 a contract term shall 
have been fair and reasonable to include in a contract, having regard to all the circumstances which were 
or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties  when the contract was 
made. In terms of section 52(2) of the South African Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider 
specific factors when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or deceptive representations or unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged.  One of these factors, as set out in section 52(2)(c), is 
‘those circumstances of the transaction or agreement that existed or were reasonably foreseeable at the 
time that the conduct or transaction occurred or agreement was made ...’. .  See the discussion on 
section 52(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act in Ch 5 para 2.3.2.2. 
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 E Macdonald Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms 2 ed (2006) 229. 
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 [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at par 33; [2001] 3 WLR 1297 at par 33. 
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 These factors are also taken into consideration in the application of the third reasonableness test.  See 
the discussion on Schedule 2 to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 in para 2.3.3.  The Unfair Contract 
Terms Bill also contains a basic reasonableness test for contract terms in section 14(1) and for notices in 
section 14(2). In these tests, transparency is the core element of reasonableness.  The same factors are 
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prejudices the consumer.  The degree of genuine opportunity for the consumer to read 
and consider the terms of a contract is also an important factor.178 
3.5  The Requirement of Plain Language 
Openness is one of the core elements of good faith.  As indicated in paragraph 3.4.3, 
openness requires that terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, with or 
pitfalls and that prominence should be given to certain terms which might operate to a 
consumer’s disadvantage.179  Furthermore, regulation 6(1) sets out the circumstances 
to be considered in the application of the unfairness test in regulation 5(1).  One of the 
factors that must be taken into account is all the circumstances attending the conclusion 
of the contract.180  ‘Circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract’ encompass 
factors such as whether the terms were expressed in plain language, whether the terms 
were presented clearly, bargaining power and the availability of alternatives.  So, when 
deciding whether a term is fair, whether a term was expressed in plain and intelligible 
language is one of the factors which is considered.  Above that, regulation 7(1) requires 
that a seller or supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in 
plain, intelligible language.  This requirement of plain language is a procedural one, 
because it focuses on the drafting of the term, rather than its effect.  ‘Plain’ language is 
language that cannot be misunderstood or that does not give rise to doubts and 
‘intelligibility’ encompasses the style used and how a contract is printed on paper.181 
The Office of Fair Trading issued some guidelines in relation to plain language: (1) the 
contract should be comprehensible by the consumer without recourse to legal advice; 
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(2) legal jargon should be avoided; (3) the contract should be in direct and ordinary 
language; (4) the first and second person should be used rather than naming and 
defining the parties; (5) cross-references should be minimised; (6) headings should be 
used; and (7) the size of the print should be large enough to be legible without 
difficulty.182  
Regulation 7(2) deals with the effect of failure to comply with the requirement of plain 
and intelligible language.  It provides that if there is doubt about the meaning of a written 
term, the interpretation which is most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.  
Furthermore, if a ‘core term’ is not written in plain and intelligible language, it will be 
subjected to the fairness test of reg 5.183  Non-compliance may also constitute and 
important factor in the assessment of the fairness of a term.184 
3.6  Final Remarks Regarding Unfairness in terms of the Unfair Terms in 
 Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
Many of the considerations to be taken into account in assessing the fairness of a term 
for the purposes of the Regulations, especially in relation to the requirement of good 
faith, are the same or similar to the considerations to be taken into account in assessing 
the reasonableness of a terms under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  The 
‘definitions’ of both good faith and reasonableness in effect allow a court to take into 
account whatever factors it thinks right in deciding whether a term should be enforced.  
So these tests are quite similar in that they both inquire whether a term should be 
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enforceable by considering the contract itself, the relative positions of the parties to the 
contract or to the circumstances in which the contract was made.185 
As already indicated, the courts held that good faith is a concept comprising elements of 
both procedural and substantive fairness.  However, in general, good faith, deals mostly 
with procedural safeguards for the consumer, to enable the consumer to protect himself.  
In deciding whether a clause complies with the requirement of good faith, mainly 
procedural matters or matters related to procedural fairness are taken into account, 
such as (1) the strength of the bargaining position of the parties, (2) inducement offered 
to the consumer, (3) whether the goods were made to the special order of the 
consumer, (4) whether the term has been imposed on the consumer in circumstances 
which justify a conclusion that the supplier has fallen short of the general requirement of 
open and fair dealing, (5) whether a clause came as a surprise to a consumer, (6) 
whether the supplier took steps to bring a clause to the consumer’s attention and to 
explain it, (7) whether the consumer had a real choice or was in a position to make a 
real choice, (8) whether the terms were reasonably transparent and whether it operated 
to defeat the reasonable expectations of the consumer, and (9) whether the terms were 
expressed fully, clearly and legibly. Finally, the legitimate interests of the other party 
should be taken into consideration in deciding whether a term complies with the 
requirements of good faith. 
The ‘significant imbalance’ aspect of fairness test directs attention to the substantive 
unfairness of the contract.  It requires that terms and obligations must be weighed and 
compared in order to determine whether a significant imbalance exists.  Furthermore, 
schedule 2 to the Regulations sets out an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms 
which may be regarded as unfair. 
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From a South African perspective, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999 may be of guidance when interpreting the South African Consumer Protection Act.  
Although these pieces of legislation have very different fields of application, the factors 
that may be taken into account when assessing fairness in terms of reg 5(1) are similar 
to the factors that must considered when unconscionable conduct, false, misleading or 
deceptive representations or unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms is alleged in 
terms of sections 48 and 52(1) and (2) of the Consumer Protection Act.  When applying 
the fairness test as set out in the Regulations, one can, clearly distinguish between the 
requirements of procedural and substantive fairness.  Whereas procedural fairness 
focuses on preventing unfairness, substantive fairness deal with the fairness of the 
contract terms.   
Finally, what matters for the European and English contract law is consumer choice and 
not consumer rights, while what matters primarily for South African contract law is 
consumer rights and not consumer choice.186 
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1. Conclusion 
For many years, fairness-oriented approaches (or collectivism) were 
suppressed by the over-emphasis on traditional contract ideologies.  However, 
in recent years, the freedom-oriented approach was increasingly criticised for 
being abstract, formalistic, and non-contextual.  It was also realised that the 
classical law of contract with its freedom-oriented approach was designed for 
parties negotiating at arm’s length.  The need to implement a fairness-oriented 
approach through the implementation of legislation was accordingly recognised.  
A fairness-oriented approach takes proper account of social reality, and places 
obligations on parties not to exploit each other and effectively to contract in 
good faith.868 
The two main elements or dimensions of fairness are substantive and 
procedural fairness. To achieve substantive and procedural fairness, certain 
specific factors need to be considered and certain measures need to be 
adopted.869 
Although the courts in South Africa have had several opportunities to create or 
enforce fairness mechanisms or requirements in the law of contract, they never 
did so, despite the fact that the need for the regulation of unfair contract terms 
was noted several times.  The courts further paid little or no attention to the 
significance of fairness in the process of negotiating and concluding contracts.  
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At common law, the courts have formally recognised only three instances in 
which contracts may be rescinded for procedural unfairness – 
misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence.  Freedom of contract, with its 
emphasis on negotiation and real party autonomy, is actually only a theoretical 
freedom, as a result of the increased use of standard-term contracts, and the 
concomitant lack of true negotiation.  Legislative control in the form of fairness 
legislation was accordingly the only option.  This led to the enactment of the 
Consumer Protection Act, that regulates fairness in consumer contracts under 
the right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and conditions.870 
Under the right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and conditions, the following 
sections are of importance:(a)section 48 describes when terms and conditions 
will be unfair; (b)section 49 sets out when a notice is required for certain terms 
and conditions;(c)section 50 gives details as to when consumer contracts must 
be in writing;(d)section 51 sets out which transactions, agreements, terms, or 
conditions are prohibited; and (e)section 52 describes the powers of the court to 
ensure fair conduct, terms, and conditions.871 
Over and above the fairness provisions contained under the right to fair 
contracts, the Act contains other provisions related to fairness.  To ensure 
sufficient disclosure of information, the Act requires that certain minimum 
information be disclosed to consumers.  This ensures transparency and puts 
consumers in a better position to protect their own interests.  Under the right to 
disclosure and information, the Act, among others, deals with the right to 
information in plain and understandable language, which right significantly and 
pro-actively contributes towards procedural fairness. 
Section 48 sets out the general fairness criterion.  In the first instance, a 
supplier must not supply, offer to supply, or enter into an agreement to supply 
goods or services at a price or on terms that are unfair, unreasonable, or unjust.  
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Secondly, a supplier is not allowed to market any goods or services, or 
negotiate, or enter into, or administer a transaction or agreement for the supply 
of goods or services in a manner that is unfair, unjust, or unreasonable.  Thirdly, 
a supplier must not require a consumer or a person to whom goods or services 
are supplied at the consumer’s direction to waive any rights, assume any 
obligation, or waive any liability of the supplier on terms that are unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust, or impose any such terms as a condition of entering 
into a transaction.  To decide whether a term or contract was indeed unfair, 
several substantive and procedural factors play a role and must be taken into 
account, of which some are applied proactively and as preventative measures. 
Section 48(2) contains a few guidelines as to fairness.  If one of these factors 
exists or is present, it renders a contract or term unfair.  This includes that a 
term or contract is unfair (a) where it is excessively one-sided in favour of any 
person other than a consumer; (b) where the terms of the agreement or 
transaction are so adverse to the consumer that they are inequitable; (c) where 
a consumer has relied to his/her detriment on a false, misleading, or deceptive 
representation, or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of a supplier; 
or (d) where the transaction or agreement has been subject to a term, condition, 
or notice for which a notice in terms of section 49(1) is required, and the term, 
condition, or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust, or unconscionable, or the 
fact, nature, and effect of the term, condition, or notice was not drawn to the 
consumer's attention as required by section 49(1). 
Section 52(2) also lists specific factors which a court must consider in any 
proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier 
and consumer where it is alleged that the supplier conducted unconscionably, 
used false, misleading, or deceptive representations, or that a contract or 
contract term is unfair. 
All these guidelines or factors are related to either substantive or procedural 
fairness.  To convert the right to fair contracts or terms from anabstract right to a 
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reality, it is necessary to distinguish between substantive and procedural 
fairness. 
Substantive fairness is a distinct virtue that can be measured against the ‘price’ 
of a contract, by a balancing of interests, default rules,and reasonable 
expectations, or pro-actively, by disallowing terms with certain substantive 
features.  Conceptions of substantive fairness may either be generalised or 
individualised.  If fairness is determined with reference to factors external to the 
contracting parties it is generalised, for example, where fairness is determined 
with reference to the market price of goods or services, or the availability of 
alternatives from competitors.  If fairness is determined with reference to factors 
related to consumers’ welfare, it is individualised, such as where fairness is 
determined with reference to the effect of terms on the consumer.  Procedural 
fairness connotes fairness in the formation of a contract, which can be 
measured against the requirement of transparency.  Transparency involves two 
elements – transparency in relation to the terms of a contract, and transparency 
in the sense of not being positively misled, pre-contractually or during the 
performance of a contract, about aspects of the goods, service, price, and 
terms.  Transparency in relation to the terms of a contract refers to whether the 
contract terms are accessible, in clear language, well structured, and cross-
referenced, with prominence being given to terms that are detrimental to the 
consumer or because they grant important rights to the consumer.  Procedural 
fairness measures usually enable consumers to protect themselves against 
substantive unfairness. 
Irrespective of the noble aims of procedural fairness, more emphasis should 
have been placed on substantive fairness, for example, by compiling a grey and 
a black list as pre-contractual fairness measures:872  even if a contract or term is 
procedurally fair, it is uncertain whether a consumer will avail him/herself of 
procedural fairness or of measures aimed at procedural fairness; put differently, 
it is uncertain whether a consumer will utilise the measures in the Act aimed at 
procedural fairness.  Although procedural fairness may lead to transparency 
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and so may increase the levels of consensus, the success of procedural 
fairness depends on many external factors, such as whether the consumer will 
study the contract.  However, in South Africa, many consumers are illiterate and 
accordingly procedural fairness is important.  Substantive fairness on its own 
can never function as the only fairness requirement, especially when 
consumers are illiterate. 
Procedural fairness requires that consumers be aware of terms that are to their 
detriment, so that they can protect themselves against them.  Disclosure of the 
presence of detrimental terms also increases transparency.873  Informing a 
consumer of the presence of detrimental terms is accordingly a measure aimed 
at preventing procedural unfairness.  However, sometimes a supplier’s 
compliance with notice and disclosure requirements may not increase overall 
fairness, as consumers are disinclined to read detailed contract terms.  To 
address the problems related to measures aimed at procedural fairness, a 
strong emphasis should be placed on standardisation of the way in which terms 
should be presented.  However, this is still not a complete solution: it does not 
make it more likely that a consumer will actually read the terms. 
Figure 1 below sets out a framework that indicates the aspects that should be 
taken into account, or measures that should be adopted in terms of the Act in 
order to achieve fairness (or to determine fairness). 
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Section 2(2) of the Consumer Protection Act provides that ‘when interpreting or 
applying this Act, a person, court or Tribunal or the Commission may consider 
appropriate foreign and international law…’. In chapter 6, the two basic 
contractual fairness regimes of the United Kingdom, which are in many ways 
similar to the Consumer Protection Act, were discussed.  The first regime is 
contained in the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, and the second regime, 
which is based on the Unfair Contract Terms Directive adopted by the Council 
of the European Communities, is contained in the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999.  These instruments were used to interpret the 
concept ‘fairness’ in consumer contracts regulated by the Consumer Protection 
Act. 
2. Recommendations 
The concept ‘fairness’ in the regulation of consumer contracts under the Act 
was analysed in this thesis and many points of criticism were raised.  The main 
points of criticism and uncertainties are summarised below.  Further, specific 
amendments874 to the Act and specific interpretations of certain provisions of 
the Act are recommended: 
(a) To understand what ‘fairness’ entails, fairness should be understood 
within a framework of substantive and procedural fairness, which makes 
it easier to apply and to measure.875 
(b) Too many individualised factors have to be taken into account when 
substantive fairness is assessed.  It is accordingly difficult to comply with 
the requirements of fairness in a pro-active manner.  Generalised 
substantive factors are easier to apply and to consider, because they 
increase predictability.  To make it easier to apply, it is advisable to 
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distinguish between generalised and individualised substantive fairness 
factors.876 
(c) Disallowing terms with certain substantive features is the most radical 
form of fairness and the least acceptable from a freedom-oriented 
perspective.  This is usually done by way of a black list.  A black list 
contains a list of absolutely prohibited terms.  The benefit is that black 
lists enhance the effectiveness of the control of unfair contract terms and 
that they lead to greater predictability.  At the same time, black lists are 
also applied pro-actively, since suppliers apply these lists as a measure 
of self-imposed control.  Proactive control is not fully dependent on 
judicial control, so the costs and risks of litigation are also reduced by 
black lists.  The same applies to grey lists.  Terms presumed to be unfair 
are usually listed in a grey list. 
In practice, a black list functions better than a general criterion of fairness 
on its own: the latter may take a long time to be given content in practice, 
and the outcome of its application to any given instance may well be 
difficult to predict.  In order for black lists (and grey lists) to be 
manageable, they should focus on terms that are not desirable across 
different types of contracts.  Terms unique to specific types of contract 
should be dealt with in sector-specific legislation.  It is therefore 
recommended that legislation should accordingly state that a black or 
grey list is additional to any other statutory or common-law measures of 
control, and not intended to replace such measures.As South Africa has 
practically no experience with the general control of fairness in contract, 
it is prudent to be careful when one compiles an extensive black list. 
Where a termwhich may seem substantively unfair may sometimes be 
justified, it is better to put such term on a grey list; later, based on 
experience, it may be moved to the black list.  Section 51 contains a 
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black list of prohibited terms.877  It does not contain an extensive list of 
terms, but rather a list of factors or guidelines.  The first part of the list is, 
however, vague and long.  It is not as specific as it should be, as it is 
linked to the purpose and policy of the Act.  In turn, the purpose of the 
Act is set out in wide and general terms.  The list further prohibits a term 
with the effect or object of deceiving and misleading the consumer.  
However, it is difficult to determine whether the effect or purpose of a 
term is to mislead or deceive a consumer.  These parts of the black 
listaccordingly do not enhance predictability, as the black list is 
dependent on judicial control.Another problem with the black list is that it 
does not provide for regular updates, which is key to the effectiveness of 
the Act and the black list.  The Act should at least make provision for the 
Consumer Commission to review the black list regularly and to make 
recommendations to the Department of Trade and Industry.  The 
following amendments to section 51 of the Act are recommended: 
‘51  Black list of [P]prohibited transactions, agreements, terms or 
conditions 
(1) A supplier must not make a transaction or agreement subject to any 
term,[or] conditionor notice if – 
 [(a) its general purpose or effect is to – 
 (i)defeat the purposes and policy of this Act; 
 (ii)mislead or deceive the consumer; or 
 (iii)subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct; 
 (b) it directly or indirectly purports to – 
 (i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of this Act; 
(ii) avoid a supplier's obligation or duty in terms of this Act; 
(iii) set aside or override the effect of any provision of this 
Act; or 
 (iv)authorise the supplier to – 
(aa) do anything that is unlawful in terms of this Act; 
or 
(bb) fail to do anything that is required in terms of this 
Act;] 
(a) it directly or indirectly waives or restricts the consumer’s rights 
under this Act or in any other way contravenes this Act; 
(b) … 
 (c) it purports to – 
(i) limit or exempt a supplier of goods or services from liability 
for any loss directly or indirectly attributable to the gross 
negligence of the supplier or any person acting for or 
controlled by the supplier; 
(ii) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer 
for a loss contemplated in subparagraph (i); or 
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(iii) impose an obligation on a consumer to pay for damage to, or 
otherwise assume the risk of handling, any goods displayed 
by the supplier, except to the extent contemplated in section 
18(1); 
 (d) it results from an offer prohibited in terms of section 31; 
(e) it requires the consumer to enter into a supplementary 
agreement, or sign a document, prohibited by subsection (2)(a); 
(f) it purports to cede to any person, charge, set off against a debt, or 
alienate in any manner, a right of the consumer to any claim 
against the Guardian's Fund; 
(g) it falsely expresses an acknowledgement by the consumer that – 
(i) before the agreement was made, no representations or 
warranties were made in connection with the agreement by 
the supplier or a person on behalf of the supplier; or 
(ii) the consumer has received goods or services, or a document 
that is required by this Act to be delivered to the consumer; 
(h) it requires the consumer to forfeit any money to the supplier – 
(i) if the consumer exercises any right in terms of this Act; or 
(ii) to which the supplier is not entitled in terms of this Act or any 
other law; 
 (i) it expresses, on behalf of the consumer – 
(i) an authorisation for any person acting on behalf of the 
supplier to enter any premises for the purposes of taking 
possession of goods to which the agreement relates; 
(ii) an undertaking to sign in advance any documentation 
relating to enforcement of the agreement, irrespective of 
whether such documentation is complete or incomplete at 
the time it is signed; or 
(iii) a consent to a predetermined value of costs relating to 
enforcement of the agreement, except to the extent that is 
consistent with this Act; or 
 (j) it expresses an agreement by the consumer to – 
(i) deposit with the supplier, or with any other person at the 
direction of the supplier, an identity document, credit or debit 
card, bank account or automatic teller machine access card, 
or any similar identifying document or device; or 
(ii) provide a personal identification code or number to be used 
to access an account. 
(2) A supplier may not – 
(a) directly or indirectly require or induce a consumer to enter into a 
supplementary agreement, or sign any document, that contains 
a provision contemplated in subsection (1); 
 (b) request or demand a consumer to – 
(i) give the supplier temporary or permanent possession of 
an instrument referred to in subsection (1)(j)(i) other than 
for the purpose of identification, or to make a copy of such 
instrument; or 
(ii) reveal any personal identification code or number 
contemplated in subsection (1)(j)(ii); or 
(c) direct, or knowingly permit, any other person to do anything 
referred to in this section on behalf of or for the benefit of the 
supplier.’ 
(3) A purported transaction or agreement, provision, term or condition of a 
transaction or agreement, or notice to which a transaction or 
agreement is purported to be subject, is void to the extent that it 
contravenes this section.  
(4)  This section does not preclude a supplier to require a personal 
identification code or number in order to facilitate a transaction that in 
the normal course of business necessitates the provision of such code 
or number.  
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(5) The National Consumer Commission must review this section at least 
once every three years and the must thereafter make 
recommendations to the Minister who may by public notice amend 
section 51 so as to add, modify or omit an entry on the 
recommendation of the National Consumer Commission.’ 
(d) A grey list contains a list of terms that may be unfair.  The final decision 
on whether a term is unfair depends on the circumstances of a particular 
case.  One of the benefits of greylisting problematic terms is that it places 
the burden of proving to a court that a term is fair on the supplier.  
Furthermore, as with black lists, a grey list has the benefit of proactive 
control, as suppliers usually avoid greylisted terms.  A grey list is set out 
in the regulations to the Act.878  Ideally, the grey list in regulation 44 
should have been included in the text of the Act, in the same part as the 
black list (in a section 51A).  It would then have had greater prominence 
and would have been more accessible to consumers. It may be argued 
that it is easier to amend regulations, because regulations don’t have to 
go through the full legislative process. However, in practice it is not 
necessarily easier to amend regulations.  The benefit of an Act is that it 
has greater prominence and is more accessible to consumers than 
regulations.Again, the problem is that the grey list does not provide for 
regular updates.  The following amendments to the Act are 
recommended (subsection 5 was added to the current regulation 44 
which were incorporated with the necessary changes): 
‘51A Grey list of contract terms which may be regarded as not fair 
(1) For purposes of section 120(d) of the Act, a term of a consumer 
agreement between a supplier operating on a for-profit basis and 
acting wholly or mainly for purposes related to his or her business or 
profession and an individual consumer or individual consumers who 
entered into it for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to his or her 
business or profession is presumed to be unfair if it - 
(a) has the purpose or effect of a term listed in subsection (3), and 
(b) does not fall within the ambit of subsection (4). 
(2)(a) The list in subsection (3) is indicative only, so that a term listed 
therein may be fair in view of the particularcircumstances of the 
case. 
(b) The list in subsection (3) is non-exhaustive, so that otherterms 
may also be unfair for purposes of section 48 of the Act. 
(c) A term which falls within the ambit of subsection (4) 
remainssubject to sections 48 to 52 of the Act. 
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(d) This section does not derogate from provisions in the Act 
orother law in terms of or in respect of which a term of an 
agreement is prohibited. 
(3) A term of a consumer agreement subject to the provisions 
ofsubsection (1) is presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose oreffect 
of –  
(a) excluding or limiting the liability of the supplier for death or 
personal injury caused to the consumer through an act or 
omission of that supplier subject to section 61(1) of the Act; 
(b) excluding or restricting the legal rights or remedies of the 
consumer against the supplier or another party in the event of 
total or partial breach by the supplier of any of the obligations 
provided for in the agreement, including the right of the 
consumer to set off a debt owed to the supplier against any 
claim which the consumer may have against the supplier; 
(c) limiting the supplier's obligation to respect commitments 
undertaken by his or her agents or making his or her 
commitments subject to compliance with a particular condition 
which depends exclusively on the supplier; 
(d) limiting, or having the effect of limiting, the supplier's vicarious 
liability for its agents; 
(e) forcing the consumer to indemnify the supplier against liability 
incurred by it to third parties; 
(f) excluding or restricting the consumer's right to rely on the 
statutory defence of prescription; 
(g) modifying the normal rules regarding the distribution of risk to 
the detriment of the consumer; 
(h) allowing the supplier to increase the price agreed with the 
consumer when the agreement was concluded without giving 
the consumer the right to terminate the agreement; 
(i) enabling the supplier to unilaterally alter the terms of the 
agreement including the characteristics of the product or 
service; 
(j) giving the supplier the right to determine whether the goods or 
services supplied are in conformity with the agreement or giving 
the supplier the exclusive right to interpret any term of the 
agreement; 
(k) allowing the supplier to terminate the agreement at will where 
the same right is not granted to the consumer; 
(l) enabling the supplier to terminate an open-ended agreement 
without reasonable notice except where the consumer has 
committed a material breach of contract; 
(m) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his or her obligations where the 
supplier has failed to fulfil all his or her obligations; 
(n) permitting the supplier, but not the consumer, to avoid or limit 
performance of the agreement; 
(o) permitting the supplier, but not the consumer, to renew or not 
renew the agreement; 
(p) allowing the supplier an unreasonably long time to perform; 
(q) allowing the supplier to retain a payment by the consumer 
where the latter fails to conclude or perform the agreement, 
without giving the consumer the right to be compensated in the 
same amount if the supplier fails to conclude or perform the 
agreement (without depriving the consumer of the right to claim 
damages as an alternative); 
(r) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his or her obligation to 
pay damages which significantly exceed the harm suffered by 
the supplier; 
(s) permitting the supplier, upon termination of the agreement by 
either party, to demand unreasonably high remuneration for the 
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use of a thing or right, or for performance made, or to demand 
unreasonably high reimbursement of expenditure; 
(t) giving the supplier the possibility of transferring his or her 
obligations under the agreement to the detriment of the 
consumer, without the consumer’s agreement; 
(u) restricting the consumer's right to re-sell the goods by limiting 
the transferability of any commercial guarantee provided by the 
supplier; 
(v) providing that the consumer must be deemed to have made or 
not made a statement or acknowledgment to his or her 
detriment, unless – 
(i) a suitable period of time is granted to him or her forthe 
making of an express declaration in respect thereof;and 
(ii) at the commencement of the period the supplier draws 
theattention of the consumer to the meaning that will 
beattached to his or her conduct; 
(w) providing that a statement made by the supplier which is of 
particular interest to the consumer is deemed to have reached 
the consumer, unless such statement has been sent by prepaid 
registered post to the chosen address of the consumer; 
(x) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action 
or exercise any other legal remedy, including by requiring the 
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered 
by the Act or other legislation; 
(y) restricting the evidence available to the consumer or imposing 
on him or her a burden of proof which, according to the 
applicable law, should lie with the supplier; 
(z) imposing a limitation period that is shorter than otherwise 
applicable under the common law or legislation for legal steps to 
be taken by the consumer (including for the making of a written 
demand and the institution of legal proceedings); 
(aa) entitling the supplier to claim legal or other costs on a higher 
scale than usual, where there is not also a term entitling the 
consumer to claim such costs on the same scale; 
(bb) providing that a law other than that of the Republic appliesto a 
consumer agreement concluded and implemented in 
theRepublic, where the consumer was residing in the Republic 
at the time when the agreement was concluded. 
(4)(a) Paragraph (k) of subsection (3) does not apply to a term interms 
of which a supplier of financial services reserves the right 
tounilaterally terminate an open-ended agreement without 
notice, but thesupplier is required to immediately inform the 
consumer thereof, 
(b) Paragraph (h) of subsection (3) does not apply to – 
(i) a transaction in transferable securities, 
financialinstruments and other products or services where 
the priceis linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange 
quotation orindex or a financial market rate that the trader 
does notcontrol; 
(ii) an agreement for the purchase or sale of foreigncurrency, 
traveller's cheques or international moneyorders 
denominated in foreign currency; 
(iii) a price-indexation clause, where lawful, but the methodby 
which prices vary must be explicitly described. 
(c) Paragraph (i) of subsection (3) does not apply to – 
(i) a term under which a supplier of financial 
servicesreserves the right to alter the rate of interest 
payableby the consumer or due to the latter, or the 
amount ofother charges for financial services without 
notice where there is a valid reason, but – 
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(aa) the supplier must immediately inform the consumer 
thereof;and 
(bb) the consumer is free to dissolve the agreement at 
theearliest opportunity; 
(ii) a transaction in transferable securities, 
financialinstruments and other products or services where 
the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange 
quotation or index or a financial market rate that the 
trader does notcontrol; 
(iii) an agreement for the purchase or sale of foreigncurrency, 
traveller's cheques or international moneyorders 
denominated in foreign currency; 
(iv) a term under which the supplier reserves the right 
tounilaterally alter the conditions of an open-
endedagreement, but –  
(aa) the supplier must forthwith inform the consumer 
thereof; and 
(bb) the consumer is free to dissolve the agreement 
immediately; 
(d) Paragraphs (r) and (s) of subsection (3) do not apply to any 
penalty, fee or compensation which the supplier is entitled to 
charge under the provisions of this Act or any other law. 
(5) The National Consumer Commission must review this section at least 
once every three years and thereafter must make recommendations to 
the Minister who may by public notice amend section 51A so as to 
add, modify or omit an entry on the recommendation of the National 
Consumer Commission.’ 
(e) The fair value of the goods or services in question is one of the 
generalised substantive factors that the court must consider in order to 
determine whether a contract is unfair.879  The incorrect application of 
this factor may cause chaos and uncertainty.  It should not be applied in 
such a way as toimpute to the legislature the intention that the courts 
should control prices or profit making.  This factor should not be 
considered in isolation becausea contract should not be declared unfair 
simply because the price is unfair.  The market values of goods or 
service will always be a good standard against which to measure a 
particular price.  As market value is a question of fact, it can be proved 
by expert evidence.  The market price of the relevant goods or services 
is also influenced by others aspects such as the risks against which the 
supplier is seeking to protect him/herself by using the term, and the 
degree of detriment or risk caused to the consumer by the term.  In 
English law, core terms (those that define the subject matter and price) 
are excluded from unfairness challenges, as consumers are always 
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aware of these terms.  If a price is vague, the normal rules of 
interpretation should apply.  If a price is not ascertainable or ascertained, 
the contract is not a valid contract of sale.  It is accordingly suggested 
that the price or the value of goods or services should not be considered 
when a court has to decide whether a contract is unfair. The following 
amendment to section 52(2)is recommended: 
‘(2)  In any matter contemplated in subsection (1), the court must consider 
– 
[(a) the fair value of the goods or services in question;]  
(b) the nature of the parties to that transaction or agreement, their 
relationship to each other and their relative capacity, education, 
experience, sophistication and bargaining position...’ 
(f) The amount for which, and circumstances under which, the consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from 
another supplier is one of the generalised factors the court must consider 
when deciding whether a contract is unfair.880  When assessing the 
alternatives, the availability of alternative should also be considered, as 
well as whether it would have been reasonably practicable to obtain the 
advice or goods from an alternative source, taking into account 
considerations of costs and time.The following amendment to section 
52(2)(i) of the Act is recommended: 
‘(i) the amount for which, and circumstances under which, the 
consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or 
services from a different supplier if the consumer had an 
opportunity of entering into a similar contract with another supplier;’ 
(g) One of the factors which renders a contract unfair, unreasonable, or 
unjust and which is listed in section 48(2), is whether a term or contract is 
excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer 
or other person to whom goods or services are to be supplied.881  It is not 
clear what the precise meaning of ‘excessively one-sided’ is.  It can be 
equated to ‘a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
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See para 3.2.1.3.2 in Ch 5.See also para 2.3.3.2 in Ch 6 for a discussion of the availability of 
alternatives. 
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under the contract’, which may render a contract unfair under English 
law.  In terms of English law, the requirement of significant imbalance is 
met if a term is so weighted in favour of the supplier as to tilt the parties’ 
rights and obligations under the contract significantly in his/her favour.882  
The terms, rights, and obligations of parties must accordingly be weighed 
and compared in order to decide whether a term or the contract is 
excessively one-sided. The court has a discretion to decide whether the 
term or contractis ‘excessively’ one-sided.  A term or contract will, among 
others, be excessively one-sided if it places one party almost entirely 
within the economic power of the other party.I recommend that 
‘excessively one-sided’ should be equated to ‘a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract’.  The court then has 
to decide if a term is so weighted in favour of the supplier as to tilt the 
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract significantly in his/her 
favour. 
(h) One of the factors which renders a contract unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust listed in section 48(2), is whether the terms are so adverse to the 
consumer that they can be regarded as inequitable.883  This factor relates 
to the contents of a contract.  It however does not provide much 
guidance as to the meaning of ‘fairness’ or ‘unfairness’, because 
‘inequitable’ is merely a synonym for ‘unfair’.  This aspect also overlaps 
with the question of whether a contract or term is excessively one-sided, 
because an excessively one-sided term or contract is also unfair 
(inequitable).It is therefore suggested that the word ‘inequitable’ in 
section 48(2) be replaced by ‘unfair’. 
‘(b) the terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the 
consumer as to be unfair[unequitable];’ 
(i) The conduct of the supplier and the consumer is one of the specific 
factors that a court must consider in any proceedings before it 
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concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer 
where unfairness is alleged.884  ‘Conduct’ is not defined in the Act.  I 
therefore submit that the court may thus, especially in light of the fact that 
the Act does not preclude the court from considering factors other than 
those which the court must consider in terms of section 52(2), consider 
any conduct of the supplier or consumer, which resulted in or caused 
unfairness. 
(j) Whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the 
consumer was required to do anything that was not reasonably 
necessary for the legitimate interests of the supplier is one of the specific 
factors which a court must consider in any proceedings before it 
concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer 
where unfairness is alleged.885  Again, ‘conduct’ is not defined in the Act.  
I therefore submit that the court may accordingly consider any conduct of 
the supplier or consumer.  It is also not certain whether ‘required to do 
anything’ would, for example, include a term requiring the consumer to 
indemnify the supplier against liability.  However, it is clear that this factor 
aims at addressing the issue of imbalance between the parties.  The 
question could as well have been whether a term is reasonably 
necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who 
would be advantaged by the term.  In the first instance, it must be shown 
that a term (or conduct) protects the legitimate interests of the supplier.  
Secondly, it must be determined whether the term is reasonably 
necessary to protect the supplier’s legitimate interests.  The 
proportionality of a term is accordingly considered.  A term will be 
reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the supplier 
only where it represents a proportionate response to a risk it addresses. 
The following amendment to section 52(2)(f) is recommended: 
‘(f) whether the term or the supplier’s conduct is reasonably 
necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the 
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supplier who would be advantaged by the term or 
conduct;[whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the 
supplier, the consumer was required to do anything that 
was not reasonably necessary for the legitimate interests of 
the supplier].   
(k) Whether the consumer knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the 
existence and extent of any particular term of the contract is one of the 
specific factors that a court must consider in any proceedings before it 
concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer 
where unfairness is alleged.  It is difficult to prove actual knowledge of a 
term.  Actual knowledge of the existence and the extent of a term may 
serve as an indication that the term is fair.  To decide whether the 
knowledge is ‘actual knowledge’, the actual extent and quality of the 
consumer’s knowledge should be considered.  The requirement of 
knowledge the consumer ought to have had is an objective requirement.  
The Act accordingly asks whether the supplier can reasonably believe 
that the consumer is assenting to his/her terms.In terms of section 
52(2)(h)(i)-(ii), the court should pay regard to any custom of trade and 
any previous dealings between the parties to assess the consumer’s 
knowledge.  Other factors may also help to assess knowledge more 
effectively.  If the majority of these factors are present, the court may 
assume that the consumer ought to have had knowledge of the specific 
term or terms.  The following amendments are accordingly 
recommended: 
‘(h) whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
existence and extent of any particular provision of the agreement that 
is alleged to have been unfair, unreasonable or unjust, having regard 
to any-  
(i) custom of trade; [and] 
(ii) any previous dealings between the parties; 
(iii) whether the consumer was informed of the presence of a 
specific provision; 
(iv) whether the consumer understood the meaning and implications 
of the provision; 
(v) the complexity of the transaction; 
(vi) information given to the consumer about the transaction before 
or when the contract was made; 
(vii) whether the contract was written in plain language; 
(viii) how the contract was explained to the consumer; 
(ix) whether the consumer had a reasonable opportunity to absorb 
any information given to him about the transaction by the 
supplier; 
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(x) whether the consumer took professional advice;  
(xi) whether the consumer had an opportunity to cancel the contract 
without charge; and 
(xii) any other relevant factor.’ 
(l) In terms of the fairness guidelines listed in section 48(2), a contract or 
term will be unfair if the consumer relied upon a false, misleading, or 
deceptive representation, or a statement of opinion provided by the 
supplier, to the detriment of the consumer.886 In the first instance, section 
41 regulates false, misleading, or deceptive representations.  It states 
that suppliers may not use a false, misleading, or deceptive 
representation concerning a material fact, use innuendo, exaggeration, 
or ambiguity as to a material fact, or fail to disclose a material fact.  
Suppliers must furthermore not knowingly allow consumers to believe 
false, misleading, or deceptive facts by failing to correct an apparent 
misapprehension on the part of the consumer.  Praise by a supplier of 
goods or service, or sales talk (or so-called ‘puffing’) as to a material fact 
can be equated to the use of exaggeration, innuendo, or ambiguity as to 
a material fact.  At common law, ‘puffing’ is regarded as mere sales talk 
and has no binding effect.  However, in terms of section 41(1)(b), 
exaggeration, innuendo, or ambiguity as to a material fact is prohibited; if 
the consumer relied upon it, it renders a contract or term unfair in terms 
of section 48(2)(c).  Puffing as to a material fact is thus prohibited, and it 
may render a contract or term unfair.  Secondly, section 48(2)(c) relates 
to a statement of opinion provided by the supplier to the detriment of the 
consumer.  It states that if a consumer relied upon a statement of opinion 
provided by or on behalf of a supplier to the detriment of a consumer, the 
contract or term is unfair.  A ‘statement of opinion’ includes any opinion 
and not only false, misleading, or deceptive opinions, as a ‘statement of 
opinion’ is not qualified by this section.  A term or contract can 
accordingly be declared unfair should a consumer have relied on any 
opinion of the supplier to his/her (the consumer’s) detriment.  An opinion 
of a supplier amounts to his/her view or point of view, so it cannot be 
false, but it can be misleading.  If it is possible for an opinion to be false, 
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it would be very difficult to prove.  However, it is suggested that the term 
‘statement of opinion’ should be qualified, as it is uncertain whether the 
legislature’s intention was that any statement of opinion could lead to a 
contract being declared unfair.  The following amendment to section 
48(2)(c) is recommended:  
‘(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a transaction or 
agreement, a term or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a 
notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject, is unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust if-  
(a) it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the 
consumer or other person to whom goods or services are to be 
supplied;  
(b) the terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the 
consumer as to be inequitable;  
(c) the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation, as contemplated in section 41 or a patently 
incorrect statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of the 
supplier, to the detriment of the consumer; ....’ 
 
 or 
 
‘(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a transaction or 
agreement, a term or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a 
notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject, is unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust if-  
(a) it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the 
consumer or other person to whom goods or services are to be 
supplied;  
(b) the terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the 
consumer as to be inequitable;  
(c) the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation, as contemplated in section 41 or an incorrect 
statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of the supplier, to 
the detriment of the consumer; ....’ 
 
(m)The extent to which any documents relating to the transaction or 
agreement satisfied the plain and understandable language requirements 
of section 22 is one of the specific factors that a court must consider in 
any proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract between a 
supplier and consumer where unfairness is alleged.  Although procedural 
fairness and measures aimed at procedural fairness have limitations, the 
plain and understandable language requirements as set out in section 22 
are, in the South African context where consumers are often only 
functionally literate, probably the most important proactive fairness 
measure in the Act.  The plain and understandable language 
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requirements also address the issues relating to the use of standard-term 
contracts.  If contracts are written in plain and understandable language, 
it may result in ‘real’ consensus being reached, as the contract is written 
in language that consumer comprehends.  Section 22 requires notices, 
documents, or visual representations that are required in terms of the Act 
or other law to be provided in plain and understandable language as well 
as in the prescribed form, if any. Section 50 also makes plain language 
compulsory in all consumer agreements.  Several elements form part of 
the definition of ‘plain and understandable language’.  In the first 
instance, the Act provides that the National Consumer Commission may 
publish guidelines on methods of assessing plain languagein terms of 
language, style, and structure.  No objective guidelines have, however, 
been published.  In the absence of guidelines, it is difficult to determine 
whether suppliers meet the requirements of plain language.  To give 
effect to requirements of plain language in a pro-active manner, to 
improve levels of disclosure and to increase procedural fairness, 
objective assessment mechanisms or guidelines must be put in 
place.887The following amendment to regulations to the Regulation is 
recommended: 
‘45A Plain and understandable language guidelines 
(1) The following guidelines may be applied in order for a contract or 
document to meet the plain and understandable language 
requirements of section 22 of the Act: 
(a) the contract should use short words, paragraphs and sentences 
and active verbs; 
(b) the contract or document should not use technical legal terms 
other than commonly understood legal terms; 
(c) Latin and foreign words may not be used in a contract or 
document; 
(d) if the contract or document defines words, the words must be 
defined by using commonly understood meanings; 
(e) sentences may not contain more than one condition; 
(f) cross-references may not be used in the contract or document, 
except cross-references that briefly and clearly describe the 
substance of the item to which reference is made; 
(g) the contract or document should be printed or written on a white 
background; 
(h) the letters in the contract or document should at least be twelve 
points in size; 
(i) at least 1.5 centimeter of blank space must be allowed between 
each paragraph; 
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(j) at least 2 centimeter of blank space must be allowed at all 
borders of each page; 
(k) if the contract or document is printed, each section must be 
captioned and the captions must be underlined or printed in 
boldface type; and 
(l) the contract or document should use ink that contrasts sharply 
with the paper. 
(2) The guidelines in subregulation (1) are indicative only, so that the 
contract or document may not in particular circumstances comply with 
the plain and understandable requirements set out in section 22 of the 
Act, irrespective of compliance with all the guidelines in subregulation 
(1).’ 
(3) The National Consumer Commission must review this regulation at 
least once every three years and thereafter must make 
recommendations to the Minister who may by public notice amend 
regulation 45A so as to add, modify or omit an entry on the 
recommendation of the National Consumer Commission. 
Secondly, a further issue is whether a contract must be in an official 
language or a consumer’s language in order to be in plain and 
understandable language.  In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, South Africa has eleven languages and the state has 
a constitutional duty to take positive and practical measures to elevate 
and advance the use of languages that, historically, have had diminished 
status.  Furthermore, all official languages must enjoy parity of esteem 
and be treated equally.  An official language requirement would have 
placed an enormous burden on suppliers in South Africa.  However, it is 
uncertain what the position will be in respect of South Africans who do 
not speak English (sometimes regarded as the lingua franca of the 
country and also the language commonly used in agreements) and 
foreigners in South Africa (who only speak a foreign language).  How 
would the requirements of plain language be complied with if consumers 
do not understand the language used in agreements or other 
communications?  Such consumers presumably have to consult an 
advisor or dictionary. It would be considered that their understanding cost 
them undue effort, and such document would not be in plain language.  
Thirdly, section 40(2) provides that it is unconscionable for a supplier 
knowingly to take advantage of the fact that a consumer was 
substantially unable to protect his/her own interests, because of an 
inability to understand the language of an agreement.In light of the fact 
that the draft Consumer Protection Bill contained a section on the right to 
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information in an official language, I submit that a contract or document 
does not need to be written in a consumer’s official language.  It will, 
however, be to a supplier’s advantage to translate documents into the 
official language spoken by the class of persons for whom it is intended. 
(n) The nature of the parties to the contract or transaction, their relationship 
to each other, and relative capacity, education, experience, 
sophistication, and bargaining position of the consumer form part of the 
specific factors which a court must consider in any proceedings before it 
concerning a transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer 
where unfairness is alleged.888It is recommended that a mere inequality 
of bargaining positions should not lead a court to conclude that a contract 
is unfair, and vice versa.  However, if a supplier exploits a consumer’s 
lack of education, experience, and sophistication, the inequality of the 
bargaining position may lead the court to conclude that the contract is 
unfair. 
(o) The circumstances of the transaction or contract that existed or which 
were reasonably foreseeable at the time that the conduct or transaction 
occurred or when the contract was made form part of the specific factors 
which a court must consider in any proceedings before it concerning a 
transaction or contract between a supplier and consumer where 
unfairness is alleged.889  The court therefore has to consider only the 
circumstances of the transaction or contract that existed or were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time that the conduct or transaction 
occurred or when the contract was made, and not the circumstances at a 
later stage.  Generally, circumstances arising after the conclusion of the 
contract are irrelevant, as the Act limits the relevant circumstances to 
circumstances which existed or which were reasonably foreseeable at 
the time that the conduct or transaction occurred or the contract was 
made.  It is doubtful whether a court will ever ignore what has actually 
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happened after the conduct or the contract was made, even if the Act 
clearly requires that fairness must be judged having regard to 
circumstances which existed or which were reasonably foreseeable 
when the contract was made.  I recommend that if unfairness of a 
contract term or transaction is alleged, the court should as far as possible 
ignore circumstances that arose after the conclusion of the contract or a 
change in circumstances in order to protect contractual certainty. 
(p) Whether there was any negotiation between the parties and the extent of 
it also form part of the specific factors which a court must consider in any 
proceedings before it concerning a transaction or contract between a 
supplier and consumer where unfairness is alleged.890  This factor 
directly leads one to the conclusion that the use of standard-term 
contracts may be an indication of unfairness due to a lack of negotiation.  
That is because non-negotiated (or standard) terms cannot always be 
regarded as the proper expression of the self-determination of both 
parties, and a fairness intervention is accordingly justified.  ‘Negotiation’ 
is not defined in the Act.  In light of the other factors the court must 
consider, it is assumed that negotiation has to do with choice.  The 
question is therefore whether the consumer had a real opportunity to 
influence the contents of a contract or term.  On the basis of the fact that 
the extent of negotiation should be taken into account I recommend that 
the mere fact that a supplier presents the supplier with more than one 
pre-formulated alternative to choose from does not qualify as proper 
‘negotiation’. 
(q) Taking into account negotiation (and the other factors discussed above), 
it is clear that the court has to consider many factors extrinsic to a 
contract when determining the fairness of a contract.  In terms of the 
parol evidence rule, a contract document is regarded as the sole 
evidence of the terms of a contract.  It prevents one from adding, 
contradicting, or modifying a contract on the basis of extrinsic evidence.  
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In terms of section 52(3)(b)(iii), a court may make an order requiring the 
supplier to alter a form or document if the court determined that a term or 
contract was unfair.  The fairness provisions of the Act have an impact 
on the parol evidence rule.  If the Act applies to a contract and the court 
determined that the contract or term is unfair, based on the extrinsic 
evidence it had to consider, the parol evidence rule should therefore not 
prevent the court from ordering the supplier to alter the contract or term. 
(r) There are other factors relevant to substantive and procedural fairness 
that are worthy of inclusion in the list of factors that must be considered.  
The following amendment to section 52(2) of the Act is recommended:  
‘... 
(i) the amount for which, and circumstances under which, the consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a 
different supplier; [and] 
(j) in the case of supply of goods, whether the goods were manufactured, 
processed or adapted to the special order of the consumer[.]; 
(k) all the other provisions of the contract;  
(l) the terms of any other contract on which the contract depends; 
(m) the balance of the parties’ interests;  
(n) the risks to the party adversely affected by the provision;  
(o) other ways in which the interests of the party adversely affected by the 
provision might have been protected;  
(p) the extent to which the provision, whether alone or with others, differs 
from what would have been the case in its absence; and 
(q) the nature of the goods or services to which the contract relates.’ 
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